Current research projects
Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Competing Mechanisms, Private Disclosures and the Revelation Principle, with A. Attar, T. Mariotti and A. Pavan, 2025, CEPR DP 20450, https://cepr.org/publications/dp20450 (previously circulated under the title Keeping the Agents in the Dark: private disclosures in competing mechanisms, CEPR Discussion Paper DP 16807)
Competition in auctions with privately disclosed reserve prices, 2024, mimeo.
Gradual negotiation in competing insurance settings.
Oldies
Born to run: Adaptive and Strategic Behavior in Experimental Bank-Run Games, with F. Belotti, V. Larocca, F. Marrazzi, L. Panaccione and A. Piano Mortari, CEIS Research Paper 529/2021.
Financial literacy and bank runs: an experimental analysis, with V. Larocca, L. Mirra and L. Panaccione, CEIS Research Paper 402/2017.
A proof without words and a maximum without calculus, with L. Panaccione, 2014, CEIS Research Paper 316/2014.
Monitoring and default in non-exclusive financial markets, mimeo 2014.
Financial structure and monetary policy with competing lenders, with A. Attar, mimeo CORE-UCL, 2005.