Research

Projects in Moral & Social Philosophy

• Social Roles and Exculpatory Ignorance, Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, forthcoming

When are we blameworthy for wrongdoing committed in the course of our jobs? I argue that our social roles involve deliberative norms. Agents who conform to those norms may neglect moral considerations that bear on their decisions—and do so for good reason. According to some theorists, this can excuse them from blame. But even those who deny that moral ignorance exculpates, arguing that what matters is responsiveness to moral considerations, should take role-occupants' excuses seriously. The upshot is a novel position in the debate about moral ignorance as an excuse.​ ​

• Paper on role normativity (under review, draft available upon request)

Philosophical orthodoxy holds that social roles do not themselves have normative force: agents only have genuine normative reasons to comply with their role norms when doing so is explained by independent moral principles. I disagree. Instead, I argue that role norms’ contribution to functioning social practices generates genuine normative reasons for role-occupants to comply with those norms as such. I motivate this view by showing that other models of role normativity face significant structural and practical challenges. While popular accounts of role normativity often maintain that moral considerations can cancel roles’ normative force, my project suggests a radically different conclusion: role-occupants have good reasons to comply even with norms that require them to act immorally or unjustly. 

• Paper on responsibility for structural injustice (under review, draft available upon request)

What are individuals’ responsibilities for structural injustice? I argue that our participation in structural injustice through our social roles generates distinctive responsibilities to address those particular injustices. In doing so, this paper makes a methodological intervention into the conversation about responsibility for structural injustice. Drawing inspiration from theorists who object to consequentialist explanations for the moral significance of partiality, I argue that explanations of the normative significance of participation in structural injustice are unsatisfying when grounded in consequences alone. ​

• Caring Social Structures

Feminist ethics of care has historically struggled to reconcile its commitment to large-scale political change with its emphasis on attitudes and relationships. I propose resolving this tension by focusing on an intermediate level between institutions and individuals: how our practices relate us to each other as role-occupants. In addition to meeting needs (e.g. through social service programs) and facilitating caring interpersonal relationships (e.g. alleviating care sector burnout), social structures can manifest care. Structural features like incentives, distribution of power, role ideals, and norms can express more or less fitting attitudes about value. This has two upshots: first, care ethics can avoid criticisms of parochialism by vindicating the significance of attitudes and relationships beyond the individual level. Second, insofar as we ought to be in caring relations with others, complying with uncaring role norms can generate responsibilities to work for change. 

• Resisting and Reforming Roles through Consciousness-Raising

• Corruption as the Devaluation of Membership (with Milan Mossé)

• The Ethics of Protest Resignations

Projects in Philosophy and Religion

• "Mormonism, Feminism, and Relational Moral Agency." In Taylor-Grey Miller & Katharina Paxman (eds.), Contemporary Philosophy and the Latter-day Saint Tradition, Routledge. 2026. (open-access link)

This chapter argues that Mormon theology has distinctive internal resources for feminist philosophy. Among Christian movements, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and the broader Mormon tradition have unusual views about the nature of God. The chapter argues that taking these ideas seriously points towards a relational model of moral agency—one that is friendlier to contemporary feminism than to traditional Western thought. Using these resources, we can identify and further develop feminist commitments within Mormon epistemology and ethics. For philosophers of religion, this project demonstrates the rich possibilities of engaging some of the more unusual aspects of Mormon theology with analytic philosophy. Additionally, a relational, embodied Mormon theology has internal resources, and a mandate, to alter existing gendered practices in the LDS Church.

• “‘Weaned from Milk’: Agency and Authority in Francine Bennion’s ‘A Latter-day Saint Theology of Suffering’.’” in Latter-day Eloquence: Two Centuries of Mormon Oratory, Ben Crosby and Isaac Richards (eds.). University of Illinois Press, 2026. ​​

• "Quoted at the Pulpit: Male Rhetoric and Female Authority in Fifty Years in General Conference," in Dialogue: A Journal of Mormon Thought vol 55, no. 4 (Winter 2022).

This article explores women's position in the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints through quantitative and qualitative analysis of quotation practices in the Church's biannual General Conference between 1971-2021. Because quotation is a rhetorical practice that relies on a speaker’s audience finding the quotation’s source authoritative, I argue that frequency of quotation in General Conference is an indication of a source’s perceived authority in the Latter-day Saint community. Women’s representation in Conference quotation practices is extremely low among all groups of speakers. This is the case quantitatively, in terms of actual citation numbers, and qualitatively, as seen in verbal presentation of women as sources and the context in which women are quoted. This data indicates that, despite stated commitments to gender equality, Church leaders perceive women as having little authority. 

Check out this interview, this podcast, or this article to learn more about the project. ​