Abstract
Women’s empowerment has increasingly become a central pillar of nation-branding strategies in the Arab Gulf, particularly in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). While existing scholarship often frames authoritarian gender quotas as "genderwashing" designed to project liberal values, few studies have empirically tested their effectiveness as instruments of foreign influence. This chapter introduces the concept of Gender Diplomacy (GD)—defined as the strategic deployment of women’s leadership to enhance a state’s "reputational security" among foreign publics. Using a web-based survey experiment with over 800 U.S. respondents, we test the impact of the UAE’s 2019 decision to reserve 50 percent of seats in the Federal National Council (FNC) for women. Participants were randomly exposed to vignettes depicting either a mixed-gender council with quotas or an all-male council. The results provide strong evidence of a "GD effect": respondents exposed to the mixed-gender council perceived members as significantly more kind, honest, and effective. Crucially, these positive trait stereotypes transferred to the state itself, leading respondents to view the UAE as more respectful of human rights. This study contributes to the literature on authoritarianism and international relations by validating the strategic logic behind gender reforms.
Trustee Appointments and the Politics of Local Governance in Turkey
with Ozlem Tuncel (Under review at Political Studies Review)
Abstract: In the aftermath of the 2016 failed coup attempt, Turkey underwent a profound institutional transformation toward centralized authoritarianism. A defining feature of this shift has been the systematic appointment of government trustees (kayyum) to replace elected mayors in opposition-controlled municipalities. Despite the high legitimacy costs and potential electoral backlash, this practice has evolved from an emergency measure into a routine administrative tool. This paper investigates the institutional logic underpinning these interventions, asking why the incumbent persists in removing elected officials and how these actions are justified and contested. We argue that trustee appointments function not merely as security measures, but as a sophisticated form of ex ante electoral manipulation designed to engineer subnational political outcomes. We propose two mechanisms driving this strategy: first, a "legitimation mechanism" where the state instrumentalizes security and efficiency narratives to mask electoral motives, while the opposition frames the issue as a crisis of democratic representation; and second, a "cost-aversion mechanism" where appointments are strategically targeted at municipalities with narrow electoral margins to maximize future victory prospects while minimizing political risk. To test this, we employ a mixed-methods approach, utilizing an original dataset of all trustee appointments since 2014 and an AI-assisted quantitative content analysis of official state and opposition reports. Our findings suggest that official justifications show no significant correlation with objective security metrics, whereas electoral competitiveness strongly predicts appointment locations.
Unseating Autocrats: Candidate Selection and Opposition Breakthroughs in Turkish Metropolitan Mayoral Elections Presented at APSA 2026 Iposter Session
Party Nomination Strategies in Closed-List Proportional Representation Systems: Evidence from Turkey
Defensive Mirroring: Municipal Politics and Local Electoral Competition in Turkey
Removal of Elected Opposition Mayors: Evidence from Turkey’s Trusteeship Interventions with Ozlem Tuncel
When Democracy Is Suspended: Evaluating Public Support for Trustee Governance in Turkey with Ozlem Tuncel
Does Symbolic Leverage Work? The Electoral Impact of (Non)Veiled Women Candidates on Party Vote Share in Turkey with Ozlem Tuncel
Is Gender Diplomacy Effective? Women’s Representation and Public Diplomacy in Authoritarian Regimes with Lindsay Benstead