Human Nature and Ethical Obligations
According to the Late Pythagoreans

In their writings on human nature and ethical obligations, Late Pythagorean women philosophers Aesara of Lucania, Phintys of Sparta, and Perictione I meditate on social harmony with particular attention to the roles of men and women in society. Together, their views offer insight into the divine, structured, and mathematical morality implied by the natural law theory they propound.

In her Book on Human Nature, Aesara of Lucania introduces a tripartite natural law theory which governs the individual, the family, and larger societal institutions as a reflection of the soul itself. Law and justice, she writes, reflect “the orderly arrangement of the soul” in three distinct functions: 1) the mind executing judgment and thoughtfulness, 2) high-spiritedness executing strength and ability, and 3) desire executing love and kindliness (20). Aesara affirms that no part of the soul could exist without another, nor would it have cause to in the pursuit of a complete life: “By virtue of these things the best life for man seems to me to be whenever the pleasant should be mixed with the earnest, and pleasure with virtue” (21). The soul’s components must interact if the soul is to be whole. However, while they are interdependent and equally necessary, Aesara believes that the soul’s composite parts are not fundamentally equal. Depending on the “things to be done” (or the task at hand—for example, an activity to be undertaken or decision to be made), “[The composite parts] are all disposed relatively to one another that the best part is in command, the most inferior is governed, and the one in between holds a middle place; it both governs and is governed” (20). Law and justice, then, are also tripartite, drawing on each of the soul’s functions. Like the mind, law and justice “...make decisions decisions about matters of fact and questions of obligation and duty” (23); like high-spiritedness, they are “...able and effective: they do in fact deter, they do in fact provide incentives, and they do in fact serve as guides to action” (23); like desire, the “...affective component of law and justice is fair and is considerate of special needs and concerns… compassionate and forgiving; it is individualistic in the sense that it can take into account extenuating circumstances and reasons for non-compliance” (23). If such a soul is unique to humans and the sole basis for rationalizing law and justice (20), and if men and women are apparently furnished with a soul structured to the same degree, it follows that she is as capable as he of understanding "...the nature of law and of justice at the individual, familial, and social levels" (19). 

However, if society is a reflection of the soul, and if it is true that the soul could not function if each of its composite parts were given the same status (despite being fundamentally unequal), and if it is also true that law, justice, and harmony are tasks to be undertaken, it also follows that society itself necessitates a natural order—a willing recognition of inequality among its composite parts to avoid “great folly and disorder” (21). That the three parts of the soul are equally necessary but do not enjoy, situationally, “an equal share of power and honor” (21) begs the question, who occupies the low, middle, and high places? As Aesara writes, the “things to be done” in any society must include setting and upholding an authoritative standard of law, justice, and honorable behavior, both in the home and for the city. We must ask, who is best suited to which roles? As her complete Book is lost, it is unclear whether Aesara addresses this issue as it relates to the roles of men and women in society. However, Phintys of Sparta and Perictione I write with a similar view of seemingly “unequal” equality and maintain that ethical obligations to uphold a functional community fall neatly along gender lines.

In their writings, both Phintys (On the Moderation of Women) and Perictione I (On the Harmony of Women) argue that, like Aesara’s soul, society could not survive if its participants did not recognize and accept their place in it. These views necessitate a complementarian, rather than egalitarian, view of gender relations. Prescriptive recommendations for women, like staying indoors, maintaining silence in public, practicing modesty and frugality, and forgiving husbands’ infidelity (35), assert the roles of men as leaders and protectors and women as nurturers and caregivers—roles that are equally necessary, but necessarily unequal in power and status. Perictione writes, “One must deem a harmonious woman to be full of wisdom and self-control… worthwhile things come to a woman from these—for herself, her husband, her children and household, perhaps even for a city” (32). Even the author’s structure mirrors Aesara’s inside-out understanding of the soul, wherein social organization springs from the organization of the soul itself. The woman’s moral role begins internally and extends to her family, but direct interaction with the city is of lesser importance. Her influence on society is felt in the private sphere—through the wholeness and sanctity of her family—rather than the more direct contributions to the public sphere men are entrusted with. Returning to Aesara’s assumptions regarding a separate individual, familial, and societal morality within natural law theory, and with context from Phintys and Perictione, it seems that both men and women hold ultimate responsibility for their individual morality. Even in the case of women, whose actions in the public sphere seem to be wholly governed by men’s laws, texts like On the Moderation of Women and Harmony of Women are addressed to women and assume that women must make certain choices regarding their behavior in order to benefit the social order. Although men and women share certain virtues essential to both the public and private sphere (like “courage, justice, and wisdom” (27)), Phintys would agree that the ways these traits are displayed differ depending on the intended ends. Perhaps it is the demands of natural gender roles themselves that are “the different things to be done,” to use Aesara’s language. With this in mind, those traits that are not common between men and women must be especially cultivated, as it is the diversity among composite parts that strengthens both the soul and society. 

According to Late Pythagorean understanding, women bear responsibility for maintaining harmony and justice in the home in their roles as wives and mothers and men bear that same responsibility in the public sphere. For this reason, it might be understood that, from a broad social perspective, women represent the Aesara’s portion of the soul that is governed and men represent the portion that governs; however, both are called to be that which “both governs and is governed” (20) because each is ultimately responsible for his or her own morality. Men are called upon to administer the public sphere, creating and upholding law for the benefit of society (including women), while women are called upon to administer the private sphere and their own morality in order to maintain the health and integrity of the home and family. In this way, both men and women are entrusted with a piece of society to govern, but in a way are necessarily governed by the work of the opposite sex in order to enjoy harmony and purpose. Like the soul, society would crumble if any of its composite parts should refuse to execute its role—thus, in the complex interconnectedness of natural law theory, all are called upon to play their part.