My work centers on theoretical research on digital platforms. I believe analytical and model-based approaches are crucial for capturing the intricate dynamics between consumers, firms, and the platform itself. At UT Dallas, I have had the opportunity to receive in-depth theoretical training, which has significantly enhanced my expertise in this area. Below, you can find the abstracts for some of my research papers.

-Automated Bidding for Sponsored Ads on E-commerce Platforms

We examine the implications of an automated bidding system for sponsored ads on e-commerce platforms, namely dynamic bidding, that optimizes seller bids for sponsored ads to individual consumers by predicting their likelihood of purchasing from that seller. We analyze an e-commerce platform where horizontally differentiated sellers compete for consumer attention through sponsored ads. In this setting, we find that the platform's main source of value from helping sellers better manage sponsored ads through dynamic bidding may come not from its ad revenue but from the improvement in its sales revenue. We show that dynamic bidding can create a strategic incentive for sellers to set higher prices to limit their sponsored ad competition. As a result of this endogenous market interaction, and in contrast to prior work on targeted bidding in standalone auctions, dynamic bidding may hurt the platform's ad revenue even when there are many sellers. Furthermore, while the platform can attract more sellers when it offers dynamic bidding, ironically, this may drive consumers away and hurt platform profit. Interestingly, dynamic bidding can be more profitable for the platform when fewer consumers are ad-driven (i.e., always attracted by the ad).

-Same Price as In-Store: Pricing Disclosure on Delivery Platforms

Delivery platforms have been rapidly growing in popularity, although prices that retailers set on these platforms can be substantially higher than in-store prices. Interestingly, food delivery and grocery delivery platforms have very different policies regarding the amount of information they provide. Whereas grocery delivery platforms (e.g. Instacart) disclose which retailers set the same prices as in-store, food delivery platforms (e.g. DoorDash) do not provide such disclosure. We analyze the incentives for delivery platforms to disclose retailers’ pricing policies. Disclosure intensifies price competition on the platform, which reduces the commission that the platform extracts per consumer. At the same time, the lower prices under disclosure induce more consumers to shop at the platform (instead of incurring the inconvenience costs associated with visiting retailers’ stores). We find that the relative increase in demand due to disclosure is larger the lower the variance on the distribution of consumers’ inconvenience costs. When buying groceries, consumers can plan their shopping trips ahead. By contrast, when ordering food the purchase must be made when the consumption need arises. Therefore, the distribution of inconvenience costs for ordering food has plausibly larger variance, which explains why food delivery platforms are reluctant to disclose restaurants’ pricing policies.

-Disclosure of Position Values in Sponsored Search Advertising on E-commerce Platforms

E-commerce platforms allow sellers to sponsor their products by placing them in the top of the search result page through an auction. In general, managers have uncertainty about the value of positions when bidding in the auction. The platform, however, has a more accurate estimate of this information and therefore, an important question for platform’ managers is whether or not to share this information with sellers. We investigate this question in a setting where two vertically differentiated sellers compete for the advertisement slot in an e-commerce platform. We find that if the platforms’ share from sales revenue is not too high, the platform is better off by disclosing the information. Interestingly, we find that both sellers would be strictly worse off if the information is disclosed due to intensified competition.