Ginglinger E. and Q. Moreau, 2023, Climate risk and capital structure, Management Science, 69(12):7492-7516. SSRN version
We use new data that measure forward-looking physical climate risk at the firm level to examine the impact of climate risk on capital structure. We find that greater climate risk leads to lower leverage in the post-2015 period, i.e., after the Paris Agreement. Our results hold after controlling for firm characteristics known to determine leverage, including credit ratings. Our evidence shows that the reduction in leverage related to climate risk is shared between a demand effect (the firm’s optimal leverage decreases) and a supply effect (lenders increase the spreads when lending to firms with the greatest risk).
Media:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TV648MEgQmc
Ginglinger E. and Caroline Raskopf, 2023, Women directors and E&S performance: Evidence from board gender quotas, Journal of Corporate Finance, 83, 102496. SSRN version
Using the natural experiment created by France's 2011 board gender-quota law, we find that the presence of women on boards increases firms’ environmental and social (E&S) performance. Our results are robust to controlling for several directors’ observable characteristics and proxies for values such as benevolence, universalism, and nonconformism. Since the passage of the law, firms are more likely to create an E&S committee. However, E&S committees are not the only channel through which the inclusion of women on boards drives E&S performance. After the quota law, women are increasingly serving as members and chairs of major committees. Our findings suggest that female directors have unique qualities, experiences, and preferences, which, in combination with their enhanced authority, enable them to steer firms toward more E&S oriented policies.
Media:
https://boardagenda.com/2021/04/26/companies-with-female-directors-do-better-on-es-measures/
Belot F., E. Ginglinger and L. Starks, 2024, Encouraging long-term shareholders: The effects of loyalty shares with double voting rights, Finance, 1, 45, 3-61 (Best paper award 2024). SSRN version
Loyalty shares, which are mechanisms designed to encourage long-term share ownership through disproportional voting rights, face questions regarding their benefits and costs. We examine these questions through a natural experiment—the passage of the Florange Act in France—that required firms to adopt loyalty shares unless shareholders voted to opt out. We find differences in market reactions: negative for firms opting out and positive for those newly adopting the shares. Providing comparative evidence across these firms and across the two-thirds of French firms that previously issued loyalty shares, we show how the benefits and costs of loyalty shares vary across firms.
(In French and in English)
Ginglinger E., 2020, Climate risk and finance, Bankers, Markets, Investors, 160, 44-50
This paper has been summarized in: CFA Digest, June 2017, volume 47, Issue 6
Ginglinger E. and J. Hamon, 2012, Ownership, control and market liquidity, Finance, 33, 2, 61-99.