How to fund nonprofits? [Job Market Paper] [Revise and Resubmit at Journal of Public Economics] [Draft]
Abract: This paper studies the optimal mix of direct grants and tax incentives when households allocate donations across multiple charitable causes. Tax incentives are less distortionary but government grants are easier to tailor across causes. I show that when fundraising costs are low, an unconstrained planner relies primarily on cause-specific tax incentives. In contrast, a planner facing constraints on cause-specific tax instruments makes substantial use of grants. In a calibrated example, the optimal grant share varies from 0 to 60% solely due to restrictions on tax differentiation across causes. As fundraising costs increase, the policy wedge between constrained and unconstrained planners narrows. In the limit case of uniform fundraising costs, both planners combine a single tax credit with cause-specific grants. These results hold regardless of whether nonprofit provision is socially optimal.
Distortions for Nothing: Optimal Taxation of (Un)Distributed Profits (with Etienne Lehmann)[Submitted][CESifo Working Paper No.12424]
Abract: We study the optimal taxation of corporate and dividend income when entrepreneurs can use retained earnings to reduce their tax burden. We show that eliminating dividend taxes while increasing the corporate income tax (CIT) to keep investment unchanged raises total tax revenue. Our simulations suggest net revenue gains of 0.1-0.4% of GDP. In an infinite-horizon model, the optimal policy sets dividend taxes to zero in every period. As the discount factor approaches one and when the planner values only workers' welfare, the optimal steady-state CIT converges to a standard inverse-elasticity rule.
Scale-dependent and risky returns to savings : Consequences for optimal capital taxation.
Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2023, vol. 25, no 3, p. 532-569 [Published Version ]
Faut-il mettre au barème les dividendes? (avec Marie-Noëlle Lefebvre, Etienne Lehmann et Michael Sicsic)
Revue française d’économie, 2021, vol. 36, no 1, p. 57-98. [Article Publié]
Wealth and Income Responses to Dividend Taxation : Evidence from France (with Marie-Noëlle Lefebvre). [Preliminary Draft ]
Optimal Nonlinear Taxation of Charitable Giving