Research

We study the psychology of motivation and emotion, employing social and neuroscience approaches. We are interested in the interplay of cognition, emotion, and motivation. The majority of research conducted in the lab is derived from theory. We use multiple measures in our research. Other the last few years, these broad research interests have been realized in several lines of research. 

We became interested in studying anger over 25 years ago because anger provides a way to separate affective valence (positive to negative) from motivational direction (approach to avoidance).  Several prominent theories had posited that affective valence and motivational direction are perfectly associated -- positive affect is associated with approach motivation and negative affect is associated with avoidance motivation. We have found that anger is negative in valence but approach motivating. Anger also increases reward processing, and is associated with bipolar disorder, particularly during manic phases. These discoveries were facilitated by considering anger as approach. 

Following from our interest in anger, we have been conducting research on the relationship between anger and humility. We have found that individuals who score higher in trait (chronic) humility score lower in trait anger.  Moreover, increasing humility decreased anger in experiments. We are now testing whether increasing humility influences event-related brain potentials associated with frustration and reward processing.

Following from our interest in anger, we have been conducting research on the relationship between anger and conspiracy beliefs. We have found that individuals who score higher in trait (chronic) anger are more likely to believe conspiracy theories (measured in several ways). We have also found one mechanism explaining this relationship. That is, angry individuals are more likely to believe them because they perceive the conspiracy theories to contain more evil intentions on the part of the conspirators. This line of work has also revealed that these evil perceptions contribute to conspiracy beliefs even when the events do not already contain conspiracies (entertainment value appraisals do not). We are continuing this line of work by examining variables that may increase or decrease the effect of anger on conspiracy beliefs. 

Another line of research has involved testing predictions derived from the action-based model of cognitive dissonance. Cognitive dissonance theory is one of psychology’s most influential theories and one of the few instances of a cumulative social psychological theory. As demonstrated in the recent volume on the contemporary status of cognitive dissonance theory (Harmon-Jones & Mills, 1999), researchers have expressed a renewed interest in dissonance processes, as they are omnipresent and central to psychological life. Indeed, some scientists have argued that several contemporary “non-dissonance” theories are merely re-statements of dissonance theory (e.g., Aronson, 1992). However, mechanisms underlying production of perceptual, cognitive, affective, and behavioral changes produced by dissonance are not well understood. Understanding these mechanisms has both theoretical and practical implications. Because much past research had demonstrated problems with each revision of dissonance theory, it was important to develop a new theory of dissonance that addresses the motivation underlying dissonance reduction. Understanding of dissonance processes could be improved and extended with an explanation of why cognitive inconsistency arouses negative affect and how and why this negative affect motivates the cognitive and behavior adjustments. The action-based model of cognitive dissonance proposed answers to these questions.

According to cognitive dissonance theory, individuals value what they have suffered for in order to reduce the psychological discomfort from engaging in unpleasant effort. The cognition, “I underwent painful electrical shocks in order to gain admission to this group” is in contradiction with the cognition, “I would prefer not to undergo pain.”  The discomfort from this discrepancy can be reduced by justifying the unpleasant effort by adding the consonant cognition, “The group is interesting and desirable.” We have tested this effort justification prediction using event-related brain potentials and found that effort increases reward valuation. Moreover, this effect occurs when individuals believe that their behavior led to the outcome, but not when they do not.  These results integrate dissonance theory predictions with effort discounting predictions. Moreover, they reveal that dissonance reduction can occur on implicit measures, in contradiction to some previous predictions.

According to cognitive dissonance theory, individuals may experience dissonance when their beliefs are disconfirmed or threatened. One way that they may reduce this dissonance is to increase the intensity of their original belief.  We have found that, in some cases, individuals may reduce this kind of dissonance by pointing other wrongdoings by members of the outgroup.

One research interest concerns the emotive functions of asymmetrical frontal cortical activity. Decades of research have established that the left and right frontal cortices are asymmetrically involved in motivational processes, with the left frontal cortex being involved in approach motivation and the right frontal cortex being involved in withdrawal motivation. This conceptual view of asymmetrical frontal cortex differs from the view that dominated the field of emotion for two decades, that is, the view that the left frontal cortex is involved in positive affect and the right frontal cortex is involved in negative affect. Our published studies on anger revealed that even though anger, even though it is negative in valence, relates to left frontal cortical activation, particularly when the anger is associated with approach motivation. This research is being extended to understand behavioral approach sensitivity, reactance motivation, bipolar disorder, and unipolar depression. 

Over 5 decades of research had suggested that negative affective states narrow cognitive scope, whereas positive affective states broaden cognitive scope. In this research, however, only negative affects of high motivational intensity (e.g., fear, stress) and positive affects of low motivational intensity (e.g., gratitude, amusement) had been examined. Thus, affective valence was confounded with motivational intensity. We have conducted research examining positive and negative affects that are low (e.g., sadness) versus high (e.g., desire) in motivational intensity. This research revealed that affects of low motivational intensity broaden cognitive scope whereas affects of high motivational intensity narrow cognitive scope, regardless of the positivity or negativity of the affective state.