Proof-theoretic Semantics for Intuitionistic Linear Logic: Two Approaches
Proof-theoretic semantics is an approach in which the concept of proof, and not of truth, is taken as the basic semantic notion. Different concepts of proof may lead to different proof-theoretic semantics. In particular, semantics for Linear Logic can be obtained by using concepts that take into account the expenditure of limited resources. There are at least two ways to do this: the Formulas-as-Resources approach, in which atomic formulas are interpreted as the main resources used in proofs, and the Inferences-as-Resources approach, in which atomic inferences are interpreted as such resources. In this talk I will present both approaches and comment on their differences and similarities.
Translations between bases in Base-extension Semantics
Girard showed that using the exponentials of linear logic, one may embed classical and intuitionistic sequents into linear logic. In particular, such translations give concrete ways of translating intuitionistic sequents into intuitionistic linear sequents.
Since the introduction of a sound and complete semantics Base-extension Semantics (BeS) for Intuitionistic Linear Logic (ILL) there has been a natural question about the relationship between bases which support intuitionistic sequents (those defined by Sandqvist) and the bases used to support ILL sequents; namely, can one translate a base used to support an intuitionistic sequent into one that supports a linear sequent? In this talk, I aim to shed some light on these base translations and show that in fact, such translations exist and that these base translations allow us to recover the Girard translations.
Base-extension Semantics for Public Announcement Logics
I present a base-extension semantics(B-eS) for public announcement logics (PAL) as a first step in developing B-eS for the larger group of dynamic epistemic logics. This is then used to discuss some examples of PAL (including the famous Muddy Children Puzzle) to highlight some insights an inferential perspective can give on the role of information in the reasoning employed.
Generalised Base-extension Semantics
Since Sandqvist introduced sound and complete base-extension semantics (B-eS) for intuitionistic propositional logic (IPL), there have been several extensions to substructural logics, including fragments of intuitionistic linear logic (ILL) and the logic of bunched implications (BI). We extend these works to a broader class of natural deduction systems, emphasizing a generic approach behind these semantics: elimination rules are derived from introduction rules through definitional reflection, logical connective clauses are formulated in terms of their elimination rules, and completeness is established via atomic encoding. Consequently, the B-eS for IPL and (fragments of) ILL emerge as special cases of this generic framework. Building on these insights, we further explore possible generalizations where sequents exhibit richer algebraic structures, such as bunches, and try to introduce a category-theoretic perspective to the picture where proofs, rather than simple provability, matter.
Truth tables on steroids
Truth tables provide a concise and effective way to represent the meanings of logical operators. However, traditional truth tables are inherently limited and cannot, for example, adequately capture the semantics of intuitionistic negation. In this talk, I will discuss restricted non-deterministic matrix (RNmatrix), a generalization of truth tables, and share recent achievements in using RNmatrices to construct alternative semantics for non-classical logics, such as intuitionistic and ecumenical logic.
Reductive logic, proof-theoretic semantics, and coalgebra
Technologies supporting automated reasoning about things like natural language and the correctness/security of systems are a big part of modern life. Indeed, they underpin society's interaction with the systems delivering commerce and government. Their underlying mathematics is 'reductive' logic, wherein one reasons backwards from putative conclusions to sufficient assumptions. This stands in contrast to 'deductive' logic wherein one reasons forwards from established assumptions to conclusions.
Reductive logic needs a philosophical and mathematical foundation. The appropriate logical theory of inference is 'proof-theoretic semantics'. We will talk about how to use proof-theoretic semantics to deliver a foundation for reductive logic, based on inference, that supports reasoning-based technologies.