Accepted Papers:

• Incentivizing Exploration with Unbiased Histories

Authors: Nicole Immorlica, Jieming Mao, Aleksandrs Slivkins and Zhiwei Wu

• Learning and Planning in Feature Deception Games

Authors: Zheyuan Ryan Shi, Ariel D. Procaccia, Kevin S. Chan, Sridhar Venkatesan, Noam Ben-Asher, Nandi O. Leslie, Charles Kamhoua and Fei Fang

• Incentivizing the Dynamic Workforce: Learning Contracts in the Gig-Economy

Authors: Alon Cohen, Argyrios Deligkas and Moran Koren

• The Role of Randomness and Noise in Strategic Classification

Authors: Mark Braverman and Sumegha Garg

• How Do Classifiers Induce Agents to Invest Effort Strategically?

Authors: Jon Kleinberg and Manish Raghavan

• Dynamic learning and market making in spread betting markets with informed bettors

Authors: John Birge, Yifan Feng, Bora Keskin and Adam Schultz

• Strategic Investments in Stochastic Bandits

Authors: Zhe Feng, David Parkes and Haifeng Xu

• The Sample Complexity of Up-to-ε Multi-Dimensional Revenue Maximization

Authors: Yannai A. Gonczarowski and S. Matthew Weinberg

• Learning Optimal Reserve Price against Non-myopic Bidders

Authors: Zhiyi Huang, Jinyan Liu and Xiangning Wang

• Distinguishing Distributions When Samples Are Strategically Transformed

Authors: Hanrui Zhang, Yu Cheng and Vincent Conitzer

• The Perils of Exploration under Competition: A Computational Modeling Approach

Authors: Guy Aridor, Kevin Liu, Alex Slivkins and Zhiwei Steven Wu

• Estimating Approximate Incentive Compatibility

Authors: Maria-Florina Balcan, Tuomas Sandholm and Ellen Vitercik

• Robust Pricing in Non-clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism Design

Authors: Yuan Deng, Sebastien Lahaie and Vahab Mirrokni

• Bias-Variance Games

Authors: Yiding Feng, Ronen Gradwohl, Jason Hartline, Aleck Johnsen and Denis Nekipelov

• On the Futility of Dynamics in Robust Mechanism Design

Authors: Santiago Balseiro, Anthony Kim and Daniel Russo

• Competitive Statistical Estimation with Strategic Data Sources

Authors: Tyler Westenbroek, Roy Dong and Lillian Ratliff

• Imitative Follower Deception in Stackelberg Games

Authors: Jiarui Gan, Haifeng Xu, Qingyu Guo, Long Tran-Thanh, Zinovi Rabinovich and Michael Wooldridge

• Contextual bandits with Cross-learning

Authors: Santiago Balseiro, Negin Golrezaei, Mohammad Mahdian, Vahab Mirrokni and Jon Schneider

• Sequential Procurement with Contractual and Experimental Learning

Authors: Yonatan Gur, Gregory Macnamara and Daniela Saban

• Grinding the Space: Learning to Classify Against Strategic Agents

Authors: Yiling Chen, Yang Liu and Chara Podimata

• Evaluating Models of Human Adversarial Behavior Against Defense Algorithms in a Contextual Multi-Armed Bandit Task

Authors: Marcus Gutierrez, Jakub Černý, Noam Ben-Asher, Efrat Aharonov, Branislav Bošanský, Christopher Kiekintveld and Cleotilde Gonzalez

• Bypassing Differential Privacy in Mechanism Design and Beyond

Authors: Alessandro Epasto, Mohammad Mahdian, Vahab Mirrokni and Manolis Zampetakis

• Learning Auctions with Incentive Guarantees

Authors: Jacob Abernethy, Rachel Cummings, Bhuvesh Kumar, Jamie Morgenstern and Samuel Taggart

• Multi-Agent Bandits in Matching Markets

Authors: Lydia T. Liu, Horia Mania and Mike Jordan

• Crowdsourcing and Optimal Market Design

Authors: Bobby Pakzad-Hurson

• Efficient Candidate Screening under Multiple Tests and Implications for Statistical Discrimination

Authors: Lee Cohen, Zachary Lipton and Yishay Mansour

• Linear Regression from Strategic Data Sources

Authors: Nicoas Gast, Stratis Ioannidis, Patrick Loiseau and Benjamin Roussillon

• Strategic Inference Under Private Sampling

Authors: Erik Miehling, Roy Dong, Cédric Langbort and Tamer Başar

• Anywhere but a Nash Equilibrium: Follow-the-Regularized Leader in Zero-Sum Games (The Stochastic Case)

Authors: James Bailey, Sai Ganesh Nagarajan and Georgios Piliouras

• A Learning Framework for Distribution-Based Game-Theoretic Solution Concepts

Authors: Tushant Jha and Yair Zick

• The route to chaos in routing games: Population increase drives period-doubling instability and chaos with Price of Anarchy equal to one

Authors: Thiparat Chotibut, Fryderyk Falniowski, Michal Misiurewicz and Georgios Piliouras

• Scoring Strategic Agents

Authors: Ian Ball

• The bidder's standpoint : a simple way to improve bidding strategies in revenue-maximizing auctions

Authors: Thomas Nedelec, Marc Abeille, Clément Calauzènes, Vianey Perchet and Noureddine El Karoui

• Forming Probably Stable Communities with Limited Interactions

Authors: Ayumi Igarashi, Jakub Sliwinski and Yair Zick