Publications
I present a model of infectious disease transmission with asymptomatic carriers, social distancing, and diagnostic testing. First, I study the impact of asymptomatic carriers on the spread of an infectious disease in the absence of testing, to determine when their presence increases the overall prevalence of symptomatic infection and hence unhealthy agents. Then, I consider mass testing and isolation policies to identify and isolate asymptomatic carriers, and incorporate them into my model. I establish that diagnostic testing successfully reduces steady state disease prevalence. I then explore the implications of testing accuracy, explicitly studying the impact of false positive and false negative test results. I find that reducing the rate of false negatives is unambiguously beneficial, since it improves the identification and isolation of asymptomatic carriers. In contrast, reducing the rate of false positives can be detrimental: by limiting the unintended isolation of susceptible individuals, lower rates of false positives reduce the overall level of social distancing in the population and increase disease spread. Hence, I demonstrate how, under certain conditions, false positive results can improve social welfare.
In a basic game of Bayesian persuasion, I let the Receiver display confirmation bias as in Rabin and Schrag (1999). Hence, I assume that the Receiver can misinterpret the signal generated by the Sender’s experiment, if this does not support the most likely state under her prior beliefs. I find that confirmation bias can raise the Receiver’s welfare, as it can lead the Sender to disclose more information. In this case, the Sender is also better-off and confirmation bias generates a Pareto improvement. I show this with a simple example where an online trading platform designs its information environment to induce an investor and user of the platform to invest with higher frequency and in more risky assets. Then, I generalize the analysis, derive sufficient conditions for more information transmission and provide a graphical illustration thereof. The direction of the bias is important, as the Sender must prefer a Bayesian Receiver updating in the direction of her prior, to reveal more information. Finally, I show that, with confirmation bias, even uninformative experiments can be effective at persuasion, and that my results easily extend to the case of imperfect information about the strength of the Receiver’s bias (i.e., her type).
Work in Progress
Polishing for Submission
I survey the emerging literature non-Bayesian updating and strategic information disclosure.