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When the Court adjourns, all persons must leave the Courtroom and the Great Hall. If there is an afternoon oral argument, persons attending the afternoon session must line up again front of the building to gain admission.

Each Justice is permitted to have between three and four law clerks per Court term. These are individuals who, fairly recently, graduated from law school, typically, at the top of their class from the best schools. Often, they have served a year or more as a law clerk for a federal judge. Among other things, they do legal research that assists Justices in deciding what cases to accept; help to prepare questions that the Justice may ask during oral arguments; and assist with the drafting of opinions.

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The Court hears oral arguments in cases from October through April. From October through December, arguments are heard during the first two weeks of each month. From January through April, arguments are heard on the last two weeks of each month. During each two-week session, oral arguments are heard on Mondays, Tuesdays, and Wednesdays only (unless the Court directs otherwise).

Oral arguments are open to the public. Typically, two cases are heard each day, beginning at 10 a.m. Each case is allotted an hour for arguments. During this time, lawyers for each party have a half hour to make their best legal case to the Justices. Most of this time, however, is spent answering the Justices' questions. The Justices tend to view oral arguments not as a forum for the lawyers to rehash the merits of the case as found in their briefs, but for answering any questions that the Justices may have developed while reading their briefs.

The cosmological argument is less a particular argument than anargument type. It uses a general pattern of argumentation(logos) that makes an inference from particular alleged factsabout the universe (cosmos) to the existence of a uniquebeing, generally identified with or referred to as God. Among theseinitial facts are that particular beings or events in the universe arecausally dependent or contingent, that the universe (as the totalityof contingent things) is contingent in that it could have been otherthan it is or not existed at all, that the Big Conjunctive ContingentFact possibly has an explanation, or that the universe came intobeing. From these facts philosophers and theologians arguedeductively, inductively, or abductively by inference to the bestexplanation that a first cause, sustaining cause, unmoved mover,necessary being, or personal being (God) exists that caused and/orsustains the universe. The cosmological argument is part of classicalnatural theology, whose goal is to provide evidence for the claim thatGod exists, although contemporary treatments of it generally occuroutside of considerations of natural theology but have generated acottage industry of their own.

On the one hand, the argument arises from human curiosity as to whythere is something rather than nothing or than something else. Itinvokes a concern for some full, complete, ultimate, or bestexplanation of what exists contingently. On the other hand, it raisesintrinsically important philosophical questions about contingency andnecessity, causation and explanation, part/whole relationships(mereology), possible worlds, infinity, sets, the nature of time, andthe nature and origin of the universe. In what follows we will firstsketch out a very brief history of the argument, note the two basictypes of deductive cosmological arguments, and then provide a carefulanalysis of examples of each: first, three arguments from contingency,one based on a relatively strong version of the principle ofsufficient reason and two others based respectively on a very strongand on a weak version of that principle; and second, an argument fromthe alleged fact that the universe had a beginning and theimpossibility of an infinite temporal regress of causes. In the end wewill consider an inductive version of the cosmological argument andwhat it is to be a necessary being.

First, why is there anything at all? This question becomes clearerwhen put in contrastive form, Why is there something rather thannothing? We can ask this question even in the absence of contingentbeings, though in this context it is likely to prove unanswerable. Forexample, if God or the universe is logically or absolutely necessary,it would not only exist but must exist even if nothing else existed.Probably no reason can be given for why logically or absolutelynecessary things exist, if they do at all. (Almeida disagrees; see hisargument below.)

Fourth, if the universe has a beginning, what is the cause of thatbeginning? This is the question that is addressed by thekalm cosmological argument, given its central premisethat everything that begins to exist has a cause. Many, however, denythe antecedent in the conditional, that the universe had abeginning.

Fifth and fundamentally, why are there contingent beings? This may beasked about particular finite beings and, if the universe iscontingent, the universe. Several responses have been given. One isthat particular things exist because of their causes, and their causesbecause of their causes, and so on. Had those causes not existed, theeffect in question would not exist. If one speaks about the universe,then either it exists because it is caused (e.g., brought about by theintentional act of a supernatural being) or it is inexplicable (theuniverse just exists; its existence is a brute fact; it has alwaysexisted, though perhaps through many phases). This is the questionthat traditional cosmological arguments connected to natural theologyaddress.

Two things should be obvious from this discussion. First, questionsabout existence are more nuanced than usually addressed (Heil 2013:177). It is important to be more precise about what one is asking whenone asks this broader metaphysical question about why there issomething rather than nothing. Second, the cosmological argument liesat the heart of attempts to answer the questions, and to this we nowturn.

Defenders of the argument respond that there is a key similaritybetween the cosmos and its content, namely, both are contingent.However, why should we think that the cosmos is contingent? Defendersof the view contend that if the components of the universe arecontingent, the universe itself is contingent. Russell replies thatthe move from the contingency of the components of the universe to thecontingency of the universe commits the Fallacy of Composition, whichmistakenly concludes that since the parts have a certain property, thewhole likewise has that property. Hence, whereas we legitimately canask for the cause of particular things, to require a cause of theuniverse based on the contingency of its parts is mistaken.

Rowe (1975: 166) develops a different argument to support the thesisthat the universe must be contingent. He argues that it is necessarythat if God exists, then it is possible that no dependent beingsexist. Since it is possible that God exists, it is possible that it ispossible that no dependent beings exist. (This conclusion is licensedby the modal principle: If it is necessary that if \(p\) then \(q\),then if it is possible that \(p\), it is possible that \(q\).) Hence,it is possible that there are no dependent beings; that is, that theuniverse is contingent. Rowe takes the conditional as necessarily truein virtue of the classical concept of God, according to which God isfree to decide whether or not to create dependent beings.

Interestingly enough, this approach was anticipated by Aquinas in histhird way in his Summa Theologica (I,q.2,a.3). Once Aquinasconcludes that necessary beings exist, he then goes on to ask whetherthese beings have their existence from themselves or from another. Iffrom another, then we have an unsatisfactory infinite regress ofexplanations. Hence, there must be something whose necessity isuncaused. As Kenny points out, Aquinas understands this necessity interms of being unable to cease to exist (Kenny 1969: 48). AlthoughAquinas understands the uncaused necessary being to be God, Rundletakes this to be matter/energy itself.

Critics of the cosmological argument contend that the Causal Principleor, where applicable, the broader Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR)that underlies versions of the argument, is suspect. As Hume argued,there is no reason for thinking that the Causal Principle is truea priori, for we can conceive of events occurring withoutconceiving of their being caused, and what is conceivable is possiblein reality (1748: IV). Neither can an argument for the application ofthe Causal Principle to the universe be drawn from inductiveexperience. Even if the Causal Principle applies to events in theworld, we cannot extrapolate from the way the world works to the worldas a whole (Mackie 1982: 85; Kant 1787: B638).

Finally, critics have argued that an argument for the application ofthe Causal Principle to the universe cannot be drawn from inductiveexperience. Even if the Causal Principle applies to events in theworld, we cannot extrapolate from the way the world works to the worldas a whole (Mackie 1982: 85). The type of causation we experience inthe empirical world is different from the kind of causation proposedto hold between a necessary being and the cosmos (Kant 1787:B638).

Michael Almeida (2018) builds on the critical arguments of van Inwagenand others regarding the PSR. He contends that the version of the PSRused by defenders of the cosmological argument is inadequate becauseit fails to provide the best explanation for the universe. The bestexplanation, and hence the one required of a sound cosmologicalargument, is an absolute explanation, where everything is explainedcompletely. There are no brute or contingent facts. He notes that inconstructing their respective cosmological arguments, Pruss andSwinburne reject absolute explanation for complete explanations, wherethe effect is explained fully by the cause operating at a given timebut where no explanation of the cause at the time of the occurrence isrequired. According to him, traditional defenders of the cosmologicalargument cannot invoke the requirement of an absolute explanationbecause if they did, given their metaphysic of actualist realism, theywould incur a host of problems. Since all is determined on an absoluteexplanation, they would face the problems of the impossibility oflibertarian free will, of indeterministic quantum effects, of modalimagination about lawless worlds where things pop into existence, andthe collapse of modal distinctions. These problems, he says, arise notfrom an absolutist PSR per se but from its conjunction withactualist realism (only the actual is real). 2351a5e196