Download Windows Boot Manager [EXCLUSIVE]

A device running Windows 10 has several requirements for booting into the OS. After the device's firmware initializes all the hardware, the device needs to ensure that there's enough power to boot. Afterwards, the device needs to ensure that the device is booting into the appropriate OS depending on if the user wants to perform an update or a restore on the device, or if the user wants to boot the device into the main OS.

The firmware boot loaders boot the UEFI environment and hands over control to UEFI applications written by the SoC vendor, Microsoft, and OEMs. These applications can utilize UEFI drivers and services.

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The SoC firmware boot loaders initialize the minimal set of hardware required for the device to run. The SoC firmware boot loaders are designed to finish as fast as possible, and nothing is drawn to the screen while they're running. After the SoC firmware boot loaders finish, the device is booted into the UEFI environment.

The SoC firmware boot loaders also contain an emergency flashing capability that allows devices to be flashed when the boot environment isn't stable and Full Flash Update (FFU) image-based flashing using the Microsoft-provided flashing tool isn't possible. Emergency flashing requires tools specific to the SoC. For more information, contact the SoC vendor.

Windows 10 utilizes the Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) to support the handoff of system control from the SoC firmware boot loader to the OS. The UEFI environment is a minimal boot OS upon which devices are booted and the Windows 10 OS runs. For more information, see UEFI in Windows.

The Windows Boot Manager is a Microsoft-provided UEFI application that sets up the boot environment. Inside the boot environment, individual boot applications started by the Boot Manager provide functionality for all customer-facing scenarios before the device boots.

After the UEFI environment launches the Boot Manager, the Boot Manager initializes boot libraries, reads the boot configuration database to determine which boot applications to run and in which order to run them. The Boot Manager launches boot applications sequentially, and each application exits back to the Boot Manager after finishing.

Boot libraries are libraries of functions that extend upon existing UEFI functionality, and are designed to be used within the boot environment. Only boot applications, which are launched by the Boot Manager, have access to the boot libraries.

In non-retail OS images, the Boot Manager next runs an offline crash dump boot application that allows the device to capture a snapshot of physical memory from the previous OS session. When the device resets abnormally, the previous OS session's memory is preserved across the reset. When this happens, the offline crash dump application saves that memory and turn it into an offline crash dump file, which can be transferred off the device and analyzed. If the device didn't reset abnormally in the previous OS session, the offline crash dump application exits immediately.

In all OS images, the Boot Manager next runs mobilestartup.efi. This application runs several boot libraries, some of which are only run on first boot (for example, to provision the secure boot policy) or only in non-retail images (for example, to enter USB mass storage mode). The following libraries are always run:

First, mobilestartup.efi runs the library that implements UEFI battery charging. This library allows the user to charge their device while the device is in the boot environment (or is perceived as being turned off). This library is run first to ensure that the device has enough power to fully boot. For more information about scenarios involving the battery charging application, see Battery charging in the boot environment.

Next, mobilestartup.efi runs the libraries that implement flashing, device reset, and updates. These libraries determine whether the device should boot to flashing or device reset mode, or if the device should continue to the Update OS or Main OS.

IMPORTANT All customers should apply the July 11, 2023 Windows security updates. This article applies to customers who should take additional steps to implement security mitigations for a publicly disclosed Secure Boot bypass leveraged by the BlackLotus UEFI bootkit which requires physical or administrative access to the device.

This article describes the protection against the publicly disclosed Secure Boot security feature bypass by using the BlackLotus UEFI bootkit tracked by CVE-2023-24932, how to enable the protections, and guidance to update bootable media. A bootkit is a malicious program that is designed to load as early as possible in a devices boot sequence to control the operating system start.

Before you enable these protections, you should review closely the details in this article and determine whether you need to enable the protections or wait for a future update from Microsoft. If you choose to enable the protections manually, you must verify your devices and all bootable media are updated and ready for this security hardening change. The second set of protections coming in the first half of 2024 will also require updates to offline media. Customers who use Microsoft cloud-based solutions should follow the guidance in Updating Bootable Media/Azure Cloud.

UPDATE your bootable media with Windows security updates released on or after July 11, 2023. If you do not create your own media, you will need to get the updated official media from Microsoft or contact your device manufacturer (OEM).

For the BlackLotus UEFI bootkit exploit described in this article to be possible, an attacker must gain administrative privileges on a device or gain physical access to the device. This can be done by accessing the device physically or remotely, such as by using a hypervisor to access VMs/cloud. An attacker will commonly use this vulnerability to continue controlling a device that they can already access and possibly manipulate. Mitigations in this article are preventive and not corrective. If your device is already compromised, contact your security provider for help.

If you use Secure Boot and incorrectly perform the steps on this article, you might be unable to start or recover your device from media. This can prevent you from using recovery media, such as discs or external drives, or network boot recovery, if the media has not been correctly updated.

Because of the security changes that are required for CVE-2023-24932 and described in this article, revocations must be applied to supported Windows devices. After these revocations are applied, the devices will intentionally become unable to start by using recovery or installation media, unless this media has been updated with the security updates released on or after May 9, 2023. This includes both bootable media, such as discs, external drives, network boot recovery, and restore images.

a. Enable the Secure Boot UEFI Forbidden List (DBX) and the Code Integrity Boot Policy

The UEFI Forbidden List (DBX) is used to block untrusted UEFI modules from loading. The Code Integrity Boot Policy (SKUSiPolicy.p7b) uses the Code Integrity feature of Windows to prevent untrusted Windows boot managers from loading when Secure Boot is turned on.

After installing the Windows updates released on or after July 11, 2023, open a Command Prompt window running as an Administrator, type the following command and then press Enter:

Updating bootable media is important to make sure that the new boot manager and other supporting files are installed to allow for starting the device after the mitigations are applied. Ideally, the bootable media should be updated before applying the revocations on your device.

NOTE Downloadable Windows media (ISO files) from Microsoft, updated with the latest Cumulative Updates, are available through familiar channels including Microsoft Software Download, Visual Studio Subscriptions, and the Volume Licensing Service Center. If this media works with your device and configuration, there is no need to follow the manual steps below to create updated bootable media.

If you support network boot or recovery scenarios in your environment, you will need to update all media and images with updates released on or after July 11, 2023. This can include the following boot or recovery options:

One way to do this is by using DISM offline package installation on the images that are being served by these scenarios. This includes updating the boot files that are being offered by these services.

Media using Windows Preinstallation Environment (Windows PE) and Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE) based on Windows Server 2012, Windows 8.1, or Windows Server 2012 R2 will only need the boot manager files bootmgfw.efi and bootx64.efi or bootia32.efi (depending on the device architecture). Do not use this method of updating media for any other version of Windows.

Azure laaS For IaaS based services, customers that need to mitigate this vulnerability can install the Windows updates released on or after July 11, 2023 and configure the revocation setting. Note that this fix and the associated configuration will provide protection for customers that have Secure Boot enabled. If customers need to protect against bootkit style attacks, they can enable Secure Boot. See Deploy a VM with trusted launch enabled for more details.

Otherwise, to start Windows so you can investigate further, press the ENTER key to display the boot menu, press FS for Advanced Boot Options, and select Last Known Good. If you understand why the digital signature cannot be verified and want to start Windows without this file, temporarily disable driver signature enforcement.

Windows Boot Manager (BOOTMGR), a small piece of software, is loaded from the volume boot code that is a part of the volume boot record. It enables you to boot Windows 10/8/7 or Windows Vista operating system. Besides, MiniTool will offer more information to you. 2351a5e196