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Secure two-party neural network inference (2PC-NN) can offer privacy protection for both the client and the server and is a promising technique in the machine-learning-as-a-service setting. However, the large overhead of the current 2PC-NN inference systems is still being a headache, especially when applied to deep neural networks such as ResNet50. In this work, we present Cheetah, a new 2PC-NN inference system that is faster and more communication-efficient than state-of-the-arts. The main contributions of Cheetah are two-fold: the first part includes carefully designed homomorphic encryption-based protocols that can evaluate the linear layers (namely convolution, batch normalization, and fully-connection) without any expensive rotation operation. The second part includes several lean and communication-efficient primitives for the non-linear functions (e.g., ReLU and truncation). Using Cheetah, we present intensive benchmarks over several large-scale deep neural networks. Take ResNet50 for an example, an end-to-end execution of Cheetah under a WAN setting costs less than 2.5 minutes and 2.3 gigabytes of communication, which outperforms CrypTFlow2 (ACM CCS 2020) by about 5.6 and 12.9, respectively.

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Kostas Rigas leads the development of new products and services based on overlay services including SD-WAN, security and NFV capability for BT dynamic network services portfolio. In his current role, he is responsible for developing innovative, managed and co-managed secure SD-WAN solutions globally supporting large enterprises through their network transformation. Prior to this, Kostas worked in business development and subsequently as Business Improvement Manager heading up the transformation of Global Telecom Market unit within BT. He also worked in the consultancy space helping operators understand the potential business case associated to new technology. Kostas has always worked in complex, high tech B2B markets.

Mark Oakton is the founder of Infosec Partners, a leading cyber security consultancy providing expertise to government, global organisations, and high-profile individuals. A recognised expert in Information Security, Mark has a wealth of experience in keeping organisations secure.

Amit have 20 years+ experience in IT & Security Services Sector. Amit joined Fortinet EMEA team in 2019 and has responsibility to develop MSSP footprint with Tier 1 Carriers & Partners, and build a successful strategy with the sales team to grow faster our revenue.

This document describes the different types of wireless roaming and fast-secure roaming methods available for IEEE 802.11 Wireless LANs (WLANs) supported on the Cisco Unified Wireless Network (CUWN).

Before a description of the different fast-secure roaming methods available for WLANs is given, it is important to understand how the WLAN association process works, and how a regular roaming event occurs when there is no security configured on the Service Set Identifier (SSID).

When an 802.1X/EAP method is used in order to authenticate the clients on a secure SSID, there are even more frames required before the client begins to pass traffic. These extra frames are used in order to authenticate the client credentials, and dependent upon the EAP method, there can be between four and twenty frames. These come after the Association/Reassociation, but before the WPA/WPA2 4-Way handshake, because the authentication phase derives the MSK used as the seed for the final encryption key generation in the key management process (4-Way handshake).

When the wireless client performs a regular roaming here (the normal behavior, without implementation of a fast-secure roaming method), the client must go through the exact same process and perform a full authentication against the Authentication Server, as shown in the images. The only difference is that the client uses a Reassociation Request in order to inform the new AP that it is actually roaming from another AP, but the client still has to go through full validation and new key generation:

This is the way that 802.1X/EAP and the WPA/WPA2 security framework work. In order to prevent the application/service impact on delays from a regular roaming event, multiple fast-secure roaming methods are developed and implemented by the WiFi industry in order to accelerate the roaming process when security is used on the WLAN/SSID. The clients face some latency when they continue to pass traffic while roaming around between APs via deployment of high-level security on the WLAN. This is due to the EAP authentication and key-management frame exchanges required by the security setup, as previously explained.

It is important to understand that fast-secure roaming is just the term used by the industry in reference to the implementation of a method/scheme that accelerates the roaming process when security is configured on the WLAN. The different fast-secure roaming methods/schemes that are available for WLANs, and are supported by the CUWN, are explained in the next section.

Cisco Centralized Key Management (CCKM) is the first fast-secure roaming method developed and implemented on enterprise WLANs, created by Cisco as the solution used in order to mitigate the delays explained thus far, when 802.1X/EAP security is used on the WLAN. As this is a Cisco proprietary protocol, it is only supported by Cisco WLAN infrastructure devices and wireless clients (from multiple vendors) that are Cisco Compatible Extension (CCX)-compatible for CCKM.

With CCKM, the initial association to the WLAN is similar to the regular WPA/WPA2, where an MSK (also known here as the Network Session Key (NSK)) is mutually derived with the client and the RADIUS Server. This primary key is sent from the server to the WLC after a successful authentication, and is cached as the basis for derivation of all subsequent keys for the lifetime of the client association with this WLAN. From here, the WLC and the client derive the seed information that is used for fast-secure roaming based on CCKM, this goes through a 4-Way handshake similar to that of WPA/WPA2, in order to derive the unicast (PTK) and multicast/broadcast (GTK) encryption keys with the first AP.

As shown, fast-secure roaming is performed while the EAP authentication frames are avoided and even more 4-Way handshakes, because the new encryption keys are still derived, but based on the CCKM negotiation scheme. This is completed with the roaming Reassociation frames and the information previously-cached by the client and the WLC.

Pairwise think Key ID (PMKID) caching, or Sticky Key Caching (SKC), is the first fast-secure roaming method suggested by the IEEE 802.11 standard within the 802.11i security amendment, where the main purpose is to standardize a high level of security for WLANs. This fast-secure roaming technique was added as an optional method for WPA2 devices in order to improve roaming when this security was implemented.

With this method, the AP and wireless client cache the PMKs of the secure associations already established. Therefore, if the wireless client roams to a new AP where it has never associated, the client must perform a full EAP authentication again, as shown in this image where the client roams to a new AP:

Opportunistic Key Caching (OKC), also known as Proactive Key Caching (PKC) (this term is explained in greater detail in a note that is next), is basically an enhancement of the WPA2 PMKID caching method described previously, which is why it is also named Proactive/Opportunistic PMKID Caching. Hence, it is important to note that this is not a fast-secure roaming method defined by the 802.11 standard and is not supported by many devices, but just like PMKID caching, it works with WPA2-EAP.

With this method, the wireless client and the WLC (for all the managed APs) cache the one original PMK of the secure association that is initially established. Basically, every time the wireless client connects to a specific AP, a PMKID is hashed based on: the client MAC address, the AP MAC address (BSSID of the WLAN), and the PMK derived with that AP. Therefore, since OKC caches the same original PMK for all of the APs and the specific client, when this client (re)associates to another AP, the only value that changes in order to hash the new PMKID is the new AP MAC address.

When the client initiates roaming to a new AP and sends the Reassociation Request frame, it adds the PMKID on the WPA2 RSN Information Element if it wants to inform the AP that a cached PMK is used for fast-secure roaming. It already knows the MAC address of the BSSID (AP) for where it roams, then the client simply hashes the new PMKID that is used on this Reassociation Request. When the AP receives this request from the client, it also hashes the PMKID with the values that it already has (the cached PMK, the client MAC address, and its own AP MAC address), and responds with the successful Reassociation Response that confirms the PMKIDs matched. The cached PMK can be used as the seed that starts a WPA2 4-Way handshake in order to derive the new encryption keys (and skip EAP):

As shown at the beginning of the debugs, the PMKID must be computed after the Reassociation Request from the client is received. This is needed in order to validate the PMKID and confirm that the cached PMK is used with the WPA2 4-Way handshake to derive the encryption keys and finish the fast-secure roaming. Do not confuse the CCKM entries on the debugs; this is not used in order to perform CCKM, but OKC, as previously explained. CCKM here is simply a name used by the WLC for those outputs, such as the name of a function that handles the values in order to compute the PMKID. e24fc04721