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Download Unified Communications Managed Api 4.0 Runtime

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Unified Communications Managed API (UCMA) 4.0 is a managed-code platform that developers use to build applications that provide access to and control over Microsoft Enhanced Presence information, instant messaging, telephone and video calls, and audio/video conferencing.

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The guidance in this technical deep dive is intended to help developers of managed runtime environments (for example, JavaScript*, Java*, and C# runtimes) and the JIT and AOT compiler frameworks that exist in these runtimes understand the risks and mitigation options for speculative execution side channel attacks.

Side channel analysis methods take advantage of speculative execution that may occur within the same process address space to gain access to secrets. Secrets can be anything that should not be known by other code modules, processes, users, etc. You could separate secrets into different process address spaces and/or use processor-provided security features and technologies for isolation. In general we recommend implementing process isolation, so software components that belong to different security domains run in different processes. Code that belongs to different security domains should preferably be executed in different process address spaces instead of relying on pointer and code flow control to constrain speculative execution.

Sandboxed threads in managed runtimes that execute in the same process and rely on language-based security are more susceptible to speculative execution side channel attacks. Process isolation is the preferred mitigation for managed runtimes that can practicably implement it. To implement process isolation, managed runtimes should convert sandboxed threads to sandboxed processes, move secrets into separate processes, and rely on separate address spaces for protection. For example, on a web browser, code from different sites is assumed to belong to different security domains and therefore needs to be in different address spaces.

However, this strategy could be impractical to implement in some cases. For example, Java Platform*, Enterprise Edition (Java* EE) has a decades-long history of running multiple threads sharing the same address space. For managed runtimes where implementing process isolation is not feasible, you can apply the specific mitigations described in the following sections.

A managed runtime is a software environment that simultaneously hosts one or more distinct code payloads (for example, applets, programs, and applications). These applications are sandboxed (logically isolated from each other) via some combination of language constructs and runtime services. The strength of the sandbox isolation varies depending on the particular managed runtime and how that particular managed runtime is used.

For example, assume a Java* runtime supports Java Native Interface* (JNI), which allows arbitrary C code to execute within the managed runtime process. This arbitrary C code can access arbitrary addresses within the managed runtime process, which breaks the sandbox isolation. A Java runtime might prohibit JNI, or might only allow selected, signed code payloads that are trusted to maintain sandbox isolation to execute the C code.

If a managed runtime provides sandbox isolation, it should implement side-channel mitigation techniques. Because mitigation involves some overhead, if a given managed runtime only occasionally runs in sandbox isolation mode, managed runtime vendors might consider developing both sandbox-capable and non-sandbox-capable release versions of their runtime, and/or adding options that allow users to choose whether to enable sandboxing or not. On startup, managed runtimes might automatically determine whether sandbox isolation is needed and run the appropriate version of the runtime.

A single application environment, like Node.js*, that only runs trusted sources is an example of a runtime environment that you might wish to run without side-channel mitigations. In this case, a sandbox might not be required within the single-process address space.

Mitigations need to be applied to code executing in the same address space as the secret data: the runtime execution engine (for example, a fast/optimizing JIT or AOT compiler, etc.), the runtime environment itself, and the process hosting the runtime. Note that you may also need to apply the mitigation steps outlined in this document to any libraries used by the runtime and hosting process.

The runtime execution engine mitigations help protect code payloads from side channel attacks by other code payloads. Refer to the Software Guidance for Security Advisories for bounds check bypass, branch target injection, and speculative store bypass to learn how to insert these mitigations into the runtime execution engine.

The runtime environment itself should include mitigations whenever sandbox isolation is required to help protect the internal runtime state from side channel attacks by code payloads. In general, runtime environments themselves are native applications. Therefore, you should apply the mitigations for runtime environments described in the bounds check bypass, branch target injection, and speculative store bypass one-pagers.

Additionally, if any inline assembly is included in the managed runtime (for example, for critical lock, allocation, hash, interpreter, etc.), you should analyze the inline assembly as described in the Runtime Developers sections of the bounds check bypass, branch target injection, and speculative store bypass Software Guidance for Security Advisories to determine if you need to apply mitigations. Some managed runtimes encode these critical sequences as compiler intermediate representation (IR) and then use the regular JIT/AOT compiler to emit instruction set architecture (ISA) assembly. In this case, managed runtime developers should use a high enough IR level to encode these sequences so that the IR exercises the mitigation insertion path as it is translated into ISA assembly. For example, if the mitigations are inserted during a mid-level IR to low level IR translation and custom snippets are pre-encoded in low level IR, those snippets would not have any mitigations inserted.

To complete sandbox isolation, the process that hosts the managed runtime (for example, the browser that hosts the web runtime) should include mitigations to help protect the host process from being attacked by code payloads. In general, these host applications themselves are native applications. Therefore, you should apply the mitigations outlined in the Runtime Developers sections of the bounds check bypass, branch target injection, and speculative store bypass Software Guidance for Security Advisories to the host application as well.

Developers can reduce the precision of timers available to users of the runtime as a short term mitigation while long term mitigations are being developed. Another short term mitigation that is worth noting is disabling JITs in cases where doing so is acceptable. Disabling JITs reduces the freedom that attackers have to generate vulnerable code sequences, but it is obviously not practical for some environments.

In managed runtime languages (for example, Java, JavaScript, and C#), the runtime automatically performs data validation, such as array bounds checks, null checks or type checks. While Spectre variant 1 is known as the bounds check bypass vulnerability, code sequences can potentially become data exfiltration gadgets even if there is not an explicit array access or array bounds check. All data validation, including pointer null checks and dynamic object type checks, using conditional branches may need mitigation for bounds check bypass. We expect further research about recognizing and disrupting gadgets based on this variant.

When the managed runtime is used in sandbox mode, the bounds check bypass mitigations need to be handled in the interpreter, JIT compiler, and AOT compilers in the language runtime. Developers should do any optimizations in the runtime compilers carefully to avoid inadvertently removing the associated mitigations.

You can mitigate bounds check bypass attacks by modifying software to constrain speculation in confused deputy code. Specifically, software can insert a barrier that stops speculation between a bounds check and a later operation that could be exploited. The LFENCE instruction can serve as such a barrier. An LFENCE instruction or a serializing instruction will ensure that no later instructions execute, even speculatively, until all prior instructions complete locally. Developers might prefer LFENCE over a serializing instruction because LFENCE may have lower latency. Inserting an LFENCE instruction after a bounds check prevents later operations from executing before the bound check completes. Developers should be judicious when inserting LFENCE instructions. Overapplication of LFENCE can compromise performance.

Alternatively you could use an LFENCE instruction after the validated load but before the loaded value can be used in a way that creates a side channel (for example, to compute a code or data address), thereby preventing attackers from exfiltrating stolen data. 152ee80cbc

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