The root certificate is usually made trustworthy by some mechanism other than a certificate, such as by secure physical distribution. For example, some of the best-known root certificates are distributed in operating systems by their manufacturers. Microsoft distributes root certificates belonging to members of the Microsoft Root Certificate Program to Windows desktops and Windows Phone 8.[2] Apple distributes root certificates belonging to members of its own root program.
In 2011, the Dutch certificate authority DigiNotar suffered a security breach. This led to the issuing of various fraudulent certificates, which was among others abused to target Iranian Gmail users. The trust in DigiNotar certificates was retracted and the operational management of the company was taken over by the Dutch government.
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In 2009, an employee of the China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC) applied to Mozilla to add CNNIC to Mozilla's root certificate list[3] and was approved. Later, Microsoft also added CNNIC to the root certificate list of Windows.
In 2015, many users chose not to trust the digital certificates issued by CNNIC because an intermediate CA issued by CNNIC was found to have issued fake certificates for Google domain names[4] and raised concerns about CNNIC's abuse of certificate issuing power.[5]
On April 2, 2015, Google announced that it no longer recognized the electronic certificate issued by CNNIC.[6][7][8] on April 4, following Google, Mozilla also announced that it no longer recognized the electronic certificate issued by CNNIC.[9][10]
In 2016, WoSign, China's largest CA certificate issuer owned by Qihoo 360[11] and its Israeli subsidiary StartCom, were denied recognition of their certificates by Google. Microsoft removed the relevant certificates in 2017.[12]
WoSign and StartCom issued hundreds of certificates with the same serial number in just five days, as well as issuing backdating certificates.[13] WoSign and StartCom issued a fake GitHub certificate.[14]
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) supports a number of security-related services, including data confidentiality, data integrity, and end-entity authentication. Fundamentally, these services are based on the proper use of public/private key pairs. The public component of this key pair is issued in the form of a public key certificate and, in association with the appropriate algorithm(s), it may be used to verify a digital signature, encrypt data, or both.
A public key certificate is a signed statement that is used to establish an association between an identity and a public key. The entity that vouches for this association and signs the certificate is the issuer of the certificate and the identity whose public key is being vouched for is the subject of the certificate. In order to associate the identity and the public key, a chain of certificates is used. Certificate chain is also called certification path or chain of trust.
A certificate chain is a list of certificates (usually starting with an end-entity certificate) followed by one or more CA certificates (usually the last one being a self-signed certificate), with the following properties:
Certificate chains are used in order to check that the public key and other data contained in an end-entity certificate (the first certificate in the chain) effectively belong to its subject. In order to ascertain this, the signature on the end-target certificate is verified by using the public key contained in the following certificate, whose signature is verified using the next certificate, and so on until the last certificate in the chain is reached. As the last certificate is a trust anchor, successfully reaching it will prove that the end-entity certificate can be trusted.
Every device includes a so-called root store. A root store is a collection of pre-downloaded root certificates, along with their public keys, that reside on the device. Devices use either the root store built into its operating system, or a third-party root store via an application like a web browser. The root stores are part of root programs, like the ones from Microsoft, Apple, Google and Mozilla. Microsoft users make use of the Microsoft root store, and so on.
The reason for this is simple: trust. A root certificate is invaluable, because any certificate signed with its private key will be automatically trusted by the browsers. The strict requirements that CAs must adhere to, the audits, the public scrutiny are required to ensure that the CAs maintain enough social trust to merit the technical trust that comes with having a trusted root.
When a CA is being established, it is not trusted a priori. For a given time, that CA does business through a cross-signed intermediate certificate, issued by an already trusted CA. A cross-certificate is a digital certificate issued by one CA that is used to sign the public key for the root certificate of another CA. Cross-certificates provide a means to create a chain of trust from a single, trusted, root CA to multiple other CAs. Once a CA has had its application accepted and proved itself trustworthy, then it gets its roots added to the root store.
All certificates below root certificate put trust into the root certificate and the public key of root certificate is used to sign other certificates. Many software applications inherit the reliability of this root certificate like the browsers verify the SSL/TLS connections on the basis of root certificate trustworthiness. Because of the value of these root certificates, and the risks that come with having one compromised, they are rarely used to issue end entity certificates. Instead we use intermediate certificates.
This chain works as follows: The root CA signs the intermediate certificate with its private key, establishing its trustworthiness. Then, this intermediate certificate's private key is used to sign and issue end-user SSL certificates. This process can be repeated, creating a succession of trusted links from the root, through intermediates, and ultimately to the end-entity certificate. This series of trust-establishing links, known as the certificate chain, ensures secure and trustworthy data exchange on the internet.
All major Certificate Authorities use intermediate certificates because of the additional security level. This helps to minimize and compartmentalize damage in the event of a mis-issuance or security event. Rather than revoke the root certificate and literally every certificate that it had signed, you just revoke the intermediate, which only causes the group of certificates issued off that intermediate to get distrusted.
How do I disable all Kaspersky Security Cloud features that would rely on this certificate, and prevent Kaspersky from re-inserting that certificate into the Trusted Root CA Certificates Store (Windows)?
Unfortunately, I've tried all of that, and at each reboot, Kaspersky puts that root certificate back into the Trusted Root CA Certificates (machine) store. That's really unacceptable. AVG went through a public nightmare with this years ago, and if I recall correctly, they made it easier to control.
However, this isn't do I want a Trusted Root CA Certificate from a vendor's piece of software which, if compromised (as we've seen happen repeatedly over the years) will make me, well, dead, versus similar from an open source piece of software".
DigiCert strongly recommends including each of these roots in all applications and hardware that support X.509 certificate functionality, including Internet browsers, email clients, VPN clients, mobile devices, operating systems, etc.
DigiCert discloses all of its public root and intermediate certificates on Common CA Database. If you do not see the root certificate or cross-certificate that you need, have any questions, or would like to be added to our supported applications list, please contact us at roots@digicert.com.
DigiCert is the sole operator of all intermediates and root certificates issued.Each publicly trusted intermediate and root certificate is operated under themost current version of the DigiCert CPS and audited under DigiCert'scurrent Webtrust audit.
DigiCert root certificates are among the most widely-trusted authority certificates in the world. As such, they are automatically recognized by all common web browsers, mobile devices, and mail clients.
DigiCert does not charge or require any special license agreement for the use and/or distribution of our root certificates. However, if your organization requires that you obtain a license agreement in order to include the DigiCert roots in your application, please email us at roots@digicert.com.
I am using the exact same certificate that was being used without issue before the upgrade. I confirmed the root is trusted on the machine, and it is a wildcard cert so the 3rd part of the of the error message does not apply.
Why would 10.9.1 not like this cert if it was valid for 10.7? is there another step I am missing to complete the federated server validation process after an upgrade?
I am able to access server admin, portal admin, and portal home without issue, but server manager will not load after the sign in page.
Yes, there were some enhancements in 10.9.1 to validate the certificate used in the Server admin url. We didn't do this in 10.7 and while things still worked, there were some workflows that would fail if Portal did not trust the Server admin url certificate.
Since you are receiving that error message, I would double-check that the root certificate and any intermediate certificates from the CA that signed your wildcard cert are imported into the portaladmin api under sslCertificates/importRootOrIntermediate. Once imported, make sure the Portal service restarts for the new certs to take effect. 152ee80cbc
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