Research
Research
2026 Exclusive Dealing as a Defensive Strategy: Commitment Fees and Antitrust Implications, Simanjuntak D, Liang W J, Lingga D (Accepted for publication at Review of Network Economics)
2025 Tax and Subsidy Policies in a Two-sided Market: An Application to the Digital Healthcare Industry, Dec 2025, Journal of Public Economic Theory 27(6), e70077, Wiley; Lingga D, Fabrizi S, Lippert S
2024 Product Differentiation in Food-Product Markets: Evidence from the Asian Instant Noodles Industry, 30 Jun 2024, Agris on-line Papers in Economics and Informatics 2(June):75-95; Lingga D, Simanjuntak D
2024 Entry Mode in the Presence of International Outsourcing, 1 Apr 2024, Studies in Business and Economics 19(1):317-333, De Gruyter; Lingga D, Simanjuntak D
2022 Location Choice of a Partially–Private Monopoly Supplier, Jun 2022, Studies in Microeconomics 10(1):106-121, SAGE Publications; Lingga D, Simanjuntak D
2022 Analysis of the Gap Between Demand and Supply of Vertical Housing in Magelang City, Indonesia: An Sem Analysis, 1 May 2022, Journal of Architecture and Planning, 22(1-2):53-68; Simanjuntak D, Lingga D
2018 Policy Implication of Price Collusion in a Duopoly Market with Differentiated Products, 1 Apr 2018, Acta Oeconomica Pragensia, 2018(2):56-67, Prague University of Economics and Business; Lingga D, Simanjuntak D
2018 Analysis of Potentials and Strategies of Tourism Development at Mount Telomoyo, 1 Mar 2018, Eko-Regional Jurnal Pengembangan Ekonomi Wilayah, 13(1) Universitas Jenderal Soedirman; Lingga D
2017 Strategic Trade Policy in the Presence of International Outsourcing in a Duopoly Model, 16 Sep 2017, Kinerja 21(2):214-225, Universitas Atma Jaya Yogyakarta; Simanjuntak D, Lingga D
Tax and Subsidy Policies in a Two-sided Market: An Application to the Digital Healthcare Industry
Doriani Lingga, Simona Fabrizi, and Steffen Lippert
Abstract
We model an online health marketplace hosting telehealth services as a two-sided market facilitating doctor-patient interactions. We show that, in the laissez-faire equilibrium, a profit-maximising platform serves too few doctors and patients, compared to the social optimum, because it does not internalise cross-group network externalities. We demonstrate under what conditions introducing a tax-subsidy policy system leads to an increase in the numbers of agents toward the socially optimal levels. We find that implementing such a policy intervention is welfare-enhancing only if the platform tax rate is sufficiently low because only then does it raise the number of interactions.
Note: Published at the Journal of Public Economic Theory, http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70077 .
The News Media Bargaining Code: A Two-sided Market Framework
Doriani Lingga, Simona Fabrizi, and Steffen Lippert
Abstract
The recent News Media Bargaining Code passed by the Australian government mandates giant digital platforms to compensate news media providers in the country for the media providers' snippets of content that the platforms display on their outlets. This study explores the possible implications of such a policy and extends the analysis to an alternative compensation scheme, per-view compensation, to provide a reference for policymakers considering adopting similar legislation in their media and advertising industries. Combining a two-sided market and Nash bargaining models, this study shows that the default lump-sum compensation scheme is associated with an insignificant amount of compensation and negligible welfare implications under the benchmark and that per-view compensation can marginally improve the outcomes. It further demonstrates that unsupervised bargaining may lead to undesirable outcomes, where the media must instead compensate the platform, especially if the media has low bargaining power and relies heavily on the platform for visibility. The progression of the Code to the News Media Bargaining Incentive, which requires the platform to renew the contracts and prevents it from opting out, changes the platform's disagreement payoff, leading to significantly higher compensation and social welfare. With this Incentive, per-view compensation may lead to more efficient outcomes relative to lump-sum compensation.
Note: This work was awarded the David Teece Prize in Industrial Organisation and Firm Behaviour, and the Seamus Hogan Research Prize for the best public policy paper at the 2023 NZAE Conference.
Content Quota, Tariff, and Investment Obligation in the Audiovisual Market
[Job Market Paper]
Doriani Lingga
Abstract
The rise of online streaming platforms, led by US giants like Netflix and Amazon, poses economic and cultural challenges. Policymakers globally, including European Union (EU) Member States, have implemented protective measures, such as content quotas and investment obligations, to preserve local content and cultural identity. These measures have also been advocated for in other countries, such as Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Mexico, and South Africa. We develop a model evaluating the implications of those policies on social welfare, with the goal of comparing the relative effectiveness of each intervention in promoting local content and exploring possible conflicts that might arise against other welfare measures. In the extension, we consider a content tariff as an alternative measure, which becomes relevant especially with the United States (US) government recently contemplating a 100% tariff on foreign movies and those produced outside the country as a reaction to related policies by other countries. We demonstrate how the outcomes of each intervention, with varying degrees, depend on viewers' composition in a country regarding their preferences for domestic and foreign content. In particular, we show how those instruments may raise the share of domestic content featured by a streaming platform but do not necessarily increase domestic consumer welfare, especially if domestic viewers, in general, prefer foreign content over domestic content. Our findings highlight the importance of tailoring cultural policy to audience preferences and suggest how those policies can be more effectively designed.
Note: This work was awarded the Seamus Hogan Research Prize for the best public policy paper at the 2025 NZAE Conference.
The Economics of Data Spaces: Inter-Platform Externalities and Governance
Doriani Lingga, Damien Mayaux
Abstract
Data spaces are networks of independent and interoperable platforms with shared rules enabling their participants to exchange data. They exhibit inter-platform externality: participants value cross-side interactions both within and across platforms to a different extent. However, platforms price independently, leading to an inefficient level of participation. We develop a model of two-sided platforms to study how data space governance mechanisms address this coordination problem. We find that a monopolist outperforms several forms of decentralized governance. A price coordination mechanism can improve on this benchmark while making the platforms better off.
Competition for Exclusivity in Asymmetric Markets
Doriani Lingga, Damiana Simanjuntak
Abstract
This paper studies competition for exclusive dealing contracts in vertically related markets. We show that exclusive dealing can generate either common or separate sourcing, depending on the intensity of downstream competition. In particular, exclusivity does not always eliminate upstream rivalry, as competing suppliers may each secure an exclusive relationship with a different downstream firm in different markets. Moreover, the dominant supplier does not necessarily prevail: a smaller rival can secure both exclusive contracts when its market-specific advantage is sufficiently strong relative to the dominant supplier's market-size advantage. Exclusive dealing may also improve total welfare relative to No ED by changing upstream pricing incentives and expanding downstream output, both under separate sourcing and, for some parameter values, under common sourcing. These results highlight that the competitive and welfare effects of exclusive dealing depend on competition for exclusivity and on the sourcing configuration that emerges in equilibrium.
Right time, right mode: MFN entry to foreign markets with demand uncertainty under tariff and non-tariff policies (Doriani Lingga, Damiana Simanjuntak)
Regulating startups (Doriani Lingga, Mark Van Lokeren)