Research

Essay 1

Tax and Subsidy Policies in a Two-sided Market: An Application to the Digital Healthcare Industry

Doriani Lingga, Simona Fabrizi, and Steffen Lippert

Abstract

We model an online health marketplace hosting telehealth services as a two-sided market facilitating doctor-patient interactions. We show that, in the laissez-faire equilibrium, a profit-maximising platform serves too few doctors and patients, compared to the social optimum, because it does not internalise cross-group network externalities. We demonstrate under what conditions introducing a tax-subsidy policy system leads to an increase in the numbers of agents toward the socially optimal levels. We find that implementing such a policy intervention is welfare-enhancing only if the platform tax rate is sufficiently low because only then does it raise the number of interactions.

Note: This work is currently under Revise & Resubmit (R&R) at the Journal of Public Economic Theory.

Essay 2

The News Media Bargaining Code: A Two-sided Market Framework

Doriani Lingga, Simona Fabrizi, and Steffen Lippert

Abstract

The recent News Media Bargaining Code passed by the Australian government mandates giant digital platforms to compensate news media providers in the country for the media providers' snippets of content that the platforms display on their outlets. This study explores the possible implications of such a policy and extends the analysis to an alternative compensation scheme, per-view compensation, to provide a reference for policymakers considering adopting similar legislation in their media and advertising industries. Combining a two-sided market and Nash bargaining models, this study shows that the default lump-sum compensation scheme is associated with an insignificant amount of compensation and negligible welfare implications under the benchmark and that per-view compensation can marginally improve the outcomes. It further demonstrates that unsupervised bargaining may lead to undesirable outcomes, where the media must instead compensate the platform, especially if the media has low bargaining power and relies heavily on the platform for visibility. The progression of the Code to the News Media Bargaining Incentive, which requires the platform to renew the contracts and prevents it from opting out, changes the platform's disagreement payoff, leading to significantly higher compensation and social welfare. With this Incentive, per-view compensation may lead to more efficient outcomes relative to lump-sum compensation.

Note: This work was awarded the David Teece Prize in Industrial Organisation and Firm Behaviour, and the Seamus Hogan Research Prize for the best public policy paper at the 2023 NZAE Conference.

Essay 3

Content Quota, Tariff, and Investment Obligation in the Audiovisual Market

[Job Market Paper]

Doriani Lingga

Abstract

The rise of online streaming platforms, led by US giants like Netflix and Amazon, poses economic and cultural challenges. Policymakers globally, including European Union (EU) Member States, have implemented protective measures, such as content quotas and investment obligations, to preserve local content and cultural identity. These measures have also been advocated for in other countries, such as Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Mexico, and South Africa. We develop a model evaluating the implications of those policies on social welfare, with the goal of comparing the relative effectiveness of each intervention in promoting local content and exploring possible conflicts that might arise against other welfare measures. In the extension, we consider a content tariff as an alternative measure, which becomes relevant especially with the United States (US) government recently contemplating a 100% tariff on foreign movies and those produced outside the country as a reaction to related policies by other countries. We demonstrate how the outcomes of each intervention, with varying degrees, depend on viewers' composition in a country regarding their preferences for domestic and foreign content. In particular, we show how those instruments may raise the share of domestic content featured by a streaming platform but do not necessarily increase domestic consumer welfare, especially if domestic viewers, in general, prefer foreign content over domestic content. Our findings highlight the importance of tailoring cultural policy to audience preferences and suggest how those policies can be more effectively designed.

Note: This work was awarded the Seamus Hogan Research Prize for the best public policy paper at the 2025 NZAE Conference.