Publications
Abraham, D., Glejtková, K., & Krčál, O. (2025). The hidden costs of imposing minimum contributions to a global public good. Ecological Economics, 227, 108346. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2024.108346
Abraham, D., Greiner, B., & Stephanides, M. (2023). On the Internet you can be anyone: An experiment on strategic avatar choice in online marketplaces. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 206, 251-261. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2022.11.033
Abraham, D., Corazzini, L., Fišar, M., & Reggiani, T. (2023). Coordinating donations via an intermediary: The destructive effect of a sunk overhead cost. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 211, 287-304. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2023.05.006
Working Papers
"Motivational Effects of Feeling Trusted" (with Ondřej Krčál) link. Under Review.
We investigate how workers’ motivation is influenced by whether they feel trusted by managers. In a laboratory experiment, responsibility for a manager’s earnings is divided unequally between two workers. We vary whether this decision is made by the manager or a random device on the manager’s behalf. Importantly, having more/less responsibility does not affect workers’ wages. Despite this, we find workers provide less effort when they are deliberately, vs. randomly, assigned lower responsibility. We find no positive effect of being trusted (i.e., being deliberately assigned more responsibility). We examine potential mechanisms and show that both beliefs about expected effort as well as negative emotions when learning about the manager's decision explain our main treatment effect.
"Dictator giving when recipients can opt out" (with Ondřej Krčál) link
Participants' willingness to give in the dictator game has been found to be very sensitive to extending their choice set so that they can also take from recipients. To reduce this choice-set effect, we make the game less abstract by permitting potential recipients to opt out of it. Across four treatments, we vary whether taking is permitted and whether recipients can opt out of the game. Results suggest that while the choice-set effect is replicated when recipients cannot opt out, it plays less of a role when recipients enter the game voluntarily. We rule out a competing reciprocity-based explanation for this result, and conclude that the modified opt-in dictator game may provide a less sensitive measure of other-regarding preferences.
"Does Discrimination Beget Discrimination? The Effect of Exclusion on Ingroup Bias" (with Astrid Hopfensitz) link
We examine whether being included in or excluded from a group based on a given dimension of one's identity increases the salience of this identity dimension in two unrelated interactions. Using a laboratory experiment, we induce two ex-ante equally relevant dimensions of identity and have one member of a three-member team excluded, ostensibly because they do not share a given dimension of their identity with the other two (included) members of the team. We subsequently measure ingroup bias of all participants on both identity dimensions using a disinterested dictator game. We find that while there is no effect of exclusion, being included increases ingroup bias on the identity dimension that was the basis for inclusion. Included individuals are also more likely to want to interact with those who share their identity on the included dimension relative to participants in a separate baseline condition. These results suggest that being included calls more attention to the aspect of one's identity that was the basis for inclusion resulting in stronger ingroup bias on this dimension.
Selected Work-in-Progress
"Upstream Corrections and Team Performance" (with Maria Polipciuc and Oliver Kirchkamp)
"Institutional Factors and the Extraction of Limited Health Resources" (with Jonathan Stäbler and Ondřej Krčál)
Other
Fišar, M., Greiner, B., Huber, C., Katok, E., Ozkes, A. I., & Management Science Reproducibility Collaboration. (2024). Reproducibility in Management Science. Management Science, 70(3), 1343-1356. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.03556
Note: Member of the Management Science Reproducibility Collaboration