Otras lecturas sobre confianza que pueden ser de interés

• Baker, J. (1987). Trust and rationality. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 68(1), 1-13.

• Bennett, M. (2024). Trusting groups. Philosophical Psychology, 37(1), 196-215.

• Brennan, J. (2021). Recognition trust. Philosophical Studies, 178(11), 3799-3818.

• Carter, J. A. (2020). Trust and its significance in social epistemology. En Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology.

• Carter, J. A. (2022). Trust as performance. Philosophical Issues, 32(1), 120-147.

• Carter, J. A. (2024). Therapeutic trust. Philosophical Psychology, 37(1), 38-61.

• Catala, A. (2015). Democracy, trust, and epistemic justice. The Monist, 98(4), 424-440.

• Clément, F., Koenig, M., & Harris, P. (2004). The ontogenesis of trust. Mind and Language, 19(4), 360–379.

• D’Cruz, J. (2019). Humble trust. Philosophical Studies, 176, 933-953.

• Dormandy, K. (2019). Exploitative epistemic trust. En Trust in Epistemology (pp. 241-264). Routledge.

• Dormandy, K. (2024). Epistemic self-trust: It's personal. Episteme, 21(1), 34-49.

• Estany, A., & Casacuberta, D. (2012). Contributions of socially distributed cognition to social epistemology: the case of testimony. Eidos, (16), 40-68.

• Faulkner, P. (2015). The attitude of trust is basic. Analysis, 75(3), 424-429.

• Fricker, E. (2021). Epistemic Self-Governance and Trusting the Word of Others: Is There a Conflict?. En Epistemic Autonomy (pp. 323-342). Routledge.

• Frost-Arnold, K. (2014). The cognitive attitude of rational trust. Synthese, 191(9), 1957-1974.

• Gallagher, S., & Petracca, E. (2024). Trust as the glue of cognitive institutions. Philosophical Psychology, 37(1), 216-239.

• Greco, J. (2019). The role of trust in testimonial knowledge. En Trust in epistemology (pp. 91-113). Routledge.​

• Hardin, R. (1992). The street-level epistemology of trust. Analyse & Kritik, 14(2), 152-176.

• Hardin, R. (2002). Trust and Trustworthiness. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation.

• Hardwig, J. (1985). Epistemic dependence. The Journal of philosophy, 82(7), 335-349.

• Hardwig, J. (1991). The role of trust in knowledge. The Journal of Philosophy, 88(12), 693-708.

• Hawley, K. (2017). Trust, distrust, and epistemic injustice. En The Routledge Handbook on Trust and Philosophy. Routledge.

• Hawley, K. (2019). How to be trustworthy. Oxford University Press, USA.

• Hawley, K. (2017). Trust, distrust, and epistemic injustice. En The Routledge Handbook on Trust and Philosophy. Routledge.

• Hawley, K. (2014). Trust, distrust and commitment. Noûs, 48(1), 1-20.

• Hieronymi, P. (2008). The reasons of trust. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 86(2), 213-236.

• Hinchman, E. S. (2020). Trust and will. In J. Simon (Ed.), Routledge Handbook on Trust and Philosophy (pp. 133–146). Routledge.

• Holton, R. (1994). Deciding to trust, coming to believe. Australasian journal of philosophy, 72(1), 63-76.

• Jones, K. (1996). Trust as an affective attitude. Ethics, 107(1), 4-25.

• Jones, K. (2012). The politics of intellectual self-trust. Social Epistemology, 26(2), 237-251.

• Kelp, C., & Simion, M. (2023). What is trustworthiness? Noûs, 57(3), 667-683.

• Koenig, M. A., & Harris, P. L. (2005). The role of social cognition in early trust. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 9(10), 457-459.

• Koenig, M. A., Li, P. H., & McMyler, B. (2022). Interpersonal trust in children's testimonial learning. Mind & Language, 37(5), 955-974.

• Lahno, B., Faulkner, P., & Simpson, T. (2017). Trust and collective agency. En The Philosophy of Trust (pp. 129-148).

• Lascaux, A. (2020). Of kids and unicorns: How rational is children's trust in testimonial knowledge? Cognitive Science, 44(3), e12819.

• Lehrer, K. (2006). Testimony and trustworthiness. The epistemology of testimony, 145-59.

• Levy, N. (2022). In trust we trust: Epistemic vigilance and responsibility. Social Epistemology, 36(3), 283-298.

• Maiese, M. Social Anxiety, Affordances, and Habitual Trust. The Moral Psychology of Anxiety, 125.

• McGlynn, A. (2024). Making life more interesting: Trust, trustworthiness, and testimonial injustice. Philosophical Psychology, 37(1), 126-147.

• McLeod, C. (2020). Trust. In E. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

• Medina, J. (2020). Trust and epistemic injustice. En The Routledge Handbook of Trust and Philosophy (pp. 52-63). Routledge.

• Michaelian, K. (2012). (Social) metacognition and (self-) trust. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 3, 481-514.

• Miller, B., & Freiman, O. (2020). Trust and distributed epistemic labor. En The routledge handbook of trust and philosophy (pp. 341-353). Routledge.

• Origgi, G. (2012). Epistemic injustice and epistemic trust. Social Epistemology, 26(2), 221-235.

• Pritchard, D. (2023). Hinge commitments and trust. Synthese, 202(5), 149.

• Schoeller, F., Miller, M., Salomon, R., & Friston, K. J. (2021). Trust as extended control: Human-machine interactions as active inference. Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience, 15, 669810.

• Simpson, T. W. (2018). Trust, belief, and the second-personal. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 96(3), 447-459.

• Tanesini, A. (2019). Virtuous and vicious intellectual self-trust. En Trust in Epistemology (pp. 218-238). Routledge.

• Tuomela, M. (2006). Rational social normative trust as rational genuine trust. Philosophy and Ethics: New Research, 1-56.

• Zagzebski, L. (2009). Confianza epistémica y conflicto epistémico. Diánoia, 54(62), 27-45.

• Zak, P. J. (2008). The neurobiology of trust. Scientific American, 298(6), 88-95.