Seminario de Diversidad Cognitiva

Neurodiversidad / Filosofía de la psiquiatría

Baloyannis, S. (2010). The philosophy of dementia. Encephalos, 47(3), 109-130.

Barnbaum, D. R. (2008). The ethics of autism: Among them, but not of them. Indiana University Press.

Basham, L. (2011). Conspiracy Theory and Rationality. En C. Jensen & R. Harré (Eds), Beyond Rationality (pp. 49–87). Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

Beeghly, E., & Madva, A. (Eds.). (2020). An introduction to implicit bias: Knowledge, justice, and the social mind. Routledge.

Beresford, P., & Russo, J. (Eds.). (2021). The Routledge international handbook of mad studies. London: Routledge.

Bortolotti, Lisa, "Delusion", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2022/entries/delusion>.

Bortolotti, L. (2009). Delusions and other irrational beliefs.

Bortolotti, L. (2020). The epistemic innocence of irrational beliefs. Oxford University Press.

Brown, J. (2017). Self and identity over time: dementia. Journal of evaluation in clinical practice, 23(5), 1006-1012.

Carlson, L. (2016). Feminist approaches to cognitive disability. Philosophy Compass, 11(10), 541-553.

Catala, A., Faucher, L., & Poirier, P. (2021). Autism, epistemic injustice, and epistemic disablement: a relational account of epistemic agency. Synthese, 199(3), 9013-9039.

Chapman, R. (2019). Neurodiversity theory and its discontents: Autism, schizophrenia, and the social model of disability. The Bloomsbury companion to philosophy of psychiatry, 371.

Chapman, R. (2020). Neurodiversity, disability, wellbeing. En Neurodiversity Studies (pp. 57-72). Routledge.

Chapman, R. (2021). Neurodiversity and the social ecology of mental functions. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 16(6), 1360-1372.

Chapman, R., & Carel, H. (2022). Neurodiversity, epistemic injustice, and the good human life. Journal of Social Philosophy.

Chapman, R., & Botha, M. (2022). Neurodivergence informed therapy. Developmental Medicine & Child Neurology.

Craigie, J., & Bortolotti, L. (2014). Rationality, diagnosis and patient autonomy.

Crichton, P., Carel, H., & Kidd, I. J. (2017). Epistemic injustice in psychiatry. BJPsych bulletin, 41(2), 65-70.

De Haan, S. (2020). Enactive psychiatry. Cambridge University Press.

Demazeux, S., & Singy, P. (Eds.). (2015). The DSM-5 in perspective: philosophical reflections on the psychiatric Babel (Vol. 10). Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Springer.

Dinishak, J. (2019). Autism, aspect-perception, and neurodiversity. Philosophical Psychology, 32(6), 874-897.

Faucher, L., & Blanchette, I. (2011). Fearing new dangers: phobias and the cognitive complexity of human emotions. Maladapting minds: Philosophy, psychiatry, and evolutionary theory, 33-64.

Faucher, L., & Goyer, S. (2015). RDoC: Thinking outside the DSM box without falling into a reductionist trap. En The DSM-5 in perspective (pp. 199-224). Springer, Dordrecht.

Flores, C. (2021). Delusional evidence-responsiveness. Synthese, 199(3), 6299-6330.

Forest, D., & Faucher, L. (2013). Discussing the harmful dysfunction view of mental disorders.

Fulford, K. W. M., Davies, M., Gipps, R., Graham, G., Sadler, J., Stanghellini, G., & Thornton, T. (Eds.). (2013). The Oxford handbook of philosophy and psychiatry. OUP Oxford.

Gallagher, S. (2022). Integration and Causality in Enactive Approaches to Psychiatry. Frontiers in Psychiatry, 1415.

Garson, J. (2022). Madness: A Philosophical Exploration. Oxford University Press

Gerrans, P. (2014). The measure of madness: Philosophy of mind, cognitive neuroscience, and delusional thought. MIT Press.

Graham, G. (2013). The disordered mind: An introduction to philosophy of mind and mental illness. Routledge.

Hacking, I. (1998). Rewriting the soul. In Rewriting the Soul. Princeton University Press.

Hacking, I. (2009). Autistic autobiography. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 364(1522), 1467-1473.

Hughes, J., Louw, S., & Sabat, S. R. (Eds.). (2005). Dementia: Mind, meaning, and the person. OUP Oxford.

Johnson, M., & Olson, C. J. (Eds.). (2021). Normalizing mental illness and neurodiversity in entertainment media: Quieting the madness. Taylor & Francis.

Kapp, S. K. (2020). Autistic community and the neurodiversity movement: Stories from the frontline (p. 330). Springer Nature.

Kidd, I. J., Spencer, L., & Carel, H. (2022). Epistemic injustice in psychiatric research and practice. Philosophical Psychology, 1-29.

Krueger, J. (2021). Finding (and losing) one’s way: autism, social impairments, and the politics of space. Phenomenology and Mind, (21), 20-33.

Krueger, J. (2021). Enactivism, other minds, and mental disorders. Synthese, 198(1), 365-389.

Krueger, J. (2020). Schizophrenia and the scaffolded self. Topoi, 39(3), 597-609.

Krueger, J., & Maiese, M. (2018). Mental institutions, habits of mind, and an extended approach to autism. Thaumàzein| Rivista di Filosofia, 6, 10-41.

LeFrancois, B. A. (2019). Philosophical and ethical issues in mental health. Routledge.

Legault, M., Bourdon, J. N., & Poirier, P. (2021). From neurodiversity to neurodivergence: the role of epistemic and cognitive marginalization. Synthese, 199(5), 12843-12868.

Letheby, C. (2021). Philosophy of psychedelics. Oxford University Press.

Murphy, Dominic, "Philosophy of Psychiatry", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/psychiatry>.

Murphy, D. (2012). Psychiatry in the scientific image. MIT Press.

Murphy, D., & Woolfolk, R. L. (2000). The harmful dysfunction analysis of mental disorder. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, 7(4), 241-252.

Nešić, J. (2023). Ecological-enactive account of autism spectrum disorder. Synthese, 201(2), 67.

Pipes, D. (1999). Conspiracy: How the paranoid style flourishes and where it comes from. Simon and Schuster.

Radden, J. (Ed.). (2006). The philosophy of psychiatry: A companion. Oxford University Press.

Rashed, M. A. (2019). Madness and the demand for recognition: A philosophical inquiry into identity and mental health activism. Oxford University Press.

Ratcliffe, M. (2014). Experiences of depression: A study in phenomenology. OUP Oxford.

Rosqvist, H. B., Chown, N., & Stenning, A. (Eds.). (2020). Neurodiversity studies: A new critical paradigm. Routledge.

Russell, G. (2020). Critiques of the neurodiversity movement. Autistic community and the neurodiversity movement, 287.

Sass, L. A., & Pienkos, E. (2019). The paradoxes of delusion: Wittgenstein, Schreber, and the schizophrenic mind. Oxford University Press.

Sedgwick, P. (1982). Psycho politics: Laing, Foucault, Goffman, Szasz, and the future of mass psychiatry.

Silberman, S. (2017). Neurotribes: The legacy of autism and how to think smarter about people who think differently. Atlantic Books.

Stanghellini, G., Broome, M., Raballo, A., Fernandez, A. V., Fusar-Poli, P., & Rosfort, R. (Eds.). (2019). The Oxford handbook of phenomenological psychopathology. Oxford University Press, USA.

Szasz, Thomas S. (1974). The Myth of Mental Illness: Foundations of a Theory of Personal Conduct. Harper & Row.

Tsou, J. Y. (2021). Philosophy of psychiatry. Cambridge University Press.

Varga, S. (2015). Naturalism, interpretation, and mental disorder. Oxford University Press.

Wakefield, J. C. (1992). The concept of mental disorder: On the boundary between biological facts and social values. American psychologist, 47(3), 373.

Wakefield, J. C. (2006). What makes a mental disorder mental?. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, 13(2), 123-131.

Wakefield, J. C. (2016). The nature of mental disorders. Oxford University Press.

Weiskopf, D. A. (2017). An ideal disorder? Autism as a psychiatric kind. Philosophical Explorations, 20(2), 175-190.

Whitaker, R. (2001). Mad in America: Bad science, bad medicine, and the enduring mistreatment of the mentally ill. Basic Books.

Wilkinson, S. (2022). Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Contemporary Introduction. Taylor & Francis.

Yébenes, Z. (2014). Los espíritus y sus mundos. Locura y subjetividad en el México moderno y contemporáneo. México, Gedisa/Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana.

Prejuicios, disonancia e ideología

Allot, N. (2005). The role of misused concepts in manufacturing consent. Manipulation and ideologies in the twentieth century: Discourse, language, mind, 147-168.

Beeghly, E. (2021). Stereotyping as Discrimination: Why Thoughts Can Be Discriminatory. Social Epistemology, 35(6), 547-563.

Bentley, V. (2020). Feminism and Cognitive Neuroscience. En The Routledge Handbook of Feminist Philosophy of Science (pp. 328-339). Routledge.

Bianchin, M. (2020). Explaining ideology: Mechanisms and metaphysics. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 50(4), 313-337.

Bluhm, R., Maibom, H. L., & Jacobson, A. J. (2012). Neurofeminism: Issues at the intersection of feminist theory and cognitive science. Springer.

Brogaard, B., & Gatzia, D. E. (Eds.). (2020). The philosophy and psychology of ambivalence: Being of two minds. Routledge.

Brownstein, M., & Saul, J. (Eds.). (2016). Implicit bias and philosophy, volume 1: Metaphysics and epistemology. Oxford University Press.

Brownstein, M., & Saul, J. (Eds.). (2016). Implicit bias and philosophy, volume 2: Moral responsibility, structural injustice, and ethics. Oxford University Press.

Buckwalter, W. (2019). Epistemic injustice in social cognition. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 97(2), 294-308.

De Saussure, L., & Schulz, P. (Eds.). (2005). Manipulation and ideologies in the twentieth century: Discourse, language, mind (Vol. 17). John Benjamins Publishing.

Faucher, L. (2012). Unity of science and pluralism: Cognitive neurosciences of racial prejudice as a case study. In Special sciences and the unity of science (pp. 177-204). Springer, Dordrecht.

Faucher, L., & Forest, D. (Eds.). (2021). Defining mental disorder: Jerome Wakefield and his critics. MIT Press.

Frith, C. D. (2015). The cognitive neuropsychology of schizophrenia: Classic edition. Psychology press.

Frith, U. (2003). Autism: Explaining the enigma. Blackwell Publishing.

Gallagher, S., & Ransom, T. G. (2016). Artifacting minds: Material engagement theory and joint action. Embodiment in evolution and culture, 337-351.

Gerrans, P. (2005). Tacit knowledge, rule following and Pierre Bourdieu’s philosophy of social science. Anthropological Theory, 5(1), 53-74.

Haslanger, S. (2019). Cognition as a social skill. Australasian Philosophical Review, 3(1), 5-25.

Haslanger, S. (2019). Disciplined Bodies and Ideology Critique. Glass Bead, 2(1).

Haslanger, S. (2017). Racism, ideology, and social movements. Res Philosophica, 94(1), 1-22.

Haslanger, S. (2014). The normal, the natural and the good: Generics and ideology. Politica & Società, 3(3), 365-392.

Hoffman, G. A., & Bluhm, R. (2016). Neurosexism and neurofeminism. Philosophy Compass, 11(11), 716-729.

Frankish, K. (2007). Mind and supermind. Cambridge University Press.

Jefferson, A., & Sifferd, K. (2022). Practical wisdom and the value of cognitive diversity. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements, 92, 149-166.

Lakoff, G. (2008). Women, fire, and dangerous things: What categories reveal about the mind. University of Chicago press.

Levy, N. (2021). Bad beliefs: Why they happen to good people. Oxford University Press.

Levy, N. (2021). Fake News: Rebuilding the Epistemic Landscape.

Lizardo, O. (2019). Pierre Bourdieu as cognitive sociologist. The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Sociology, OUP.

Lizardo, O. (2004). The cognitive origins of Bourdieu's habitus. Journal for the theory of social behaviour, 34(4), 375-401.

Maiese, M. (2022). Mindshaping, Enactivism, and Ideological Oppression. Topoi, 41(2), 341-354.

Maiese, M., & Hanna, R. (2019). The mind-body politic. Springer.

Maillat, D., & Oswald, S. (2009). Defining manipulative discourse: The pragmatics of cognitive illusions. International Review of Pragmatics, 1(2), 348-370.

Maitra K. & McWeeny J. (Eds.) (2022). Feminist Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.

McKinney, R. A. (2018). Emancipatory political dissent in practice: insights from social theory. En Voicing Dissent (pp. 140-163). Routledge.

McKinnon, R. (2019). Gaslighting as epistemic violence. Overcoming epistemic injustice: Social and psychological perspectives, 285-302.

Pickel, A. (2005). The habitus process: A biopsychosocial conception. Journal for the theory of social behaviour, 35(4), 437-461.

Puddifoot, K. (2021). How stereotypes deceive us. Oxford University Press.

Quaranto, A. (2022). Dog whistles, covertly coded speech, and the practices that enable them. Synthese, 200(4), 1-34.

Ranalli, C. (2022). Political hinge epistemology. Extending hinge epistemology, 127-148.

Sankaran, K. (2020). What’s new in the new ideology critique?. Philosophical Studies, 177(5), 1441-1462.

Saul, J. M. (2012). Lying, misleading, and what is said: An exploration in philosophy of language and in ethics. Oxford University Press.

Siegel, S. (2016). The rationality of perception. Oxford University Press.

Soon, V. (2021). Social structural explanation. Philosophy Compass, 16(10), e12782.

Stanley, J. (2015). How propaganda works. Princeton University Press.

Tanesini, A. (2020). Ignorance, arrogance, and privilege: Vice epistemology and the epistemology of ignorance. En Vice Epistemology (pp. 53-68). Routledge.

Thompson, J. R. (Ed.). (2022). The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Implicit Cognition. Taylor & Francis.

Zmigrod, L. (2022). A psychology of ideology: Unpacking the psychological structure of ideological thinking. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 17(4), 1072-1092.

Pensamiento conspirativo

Andrade, G. (2020). Medical conspiracy theories: cognitive science and implications for ethics. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, 23, 505-518.

Basham, L. (2011). Conspiracy Theory and Rationality. En Beyond rationality: Contemporary issues. Cambridge Scholars.

Basham, L. (2019). Malevolent global conspiracy. En Conspiracy Theories (pp. 93-105). Routledge.

Basham, L. (2019). Living with the conspiracy. En Conspiracy theories. Routledge.

Bjerg, O. and T. Presskorn-Thygesen (2017). Conspiracy Theory: Truth Claim or Language Game?, Theory, Culture and Society, vol. 34, no. 1, p.137-159.

Bortolotti, L. (2023). Are conspiracy beliefs epistemically innocent?. Philosophical Topics, 51(2), 73-91.

Bortolotti, L. (2024). Is it pathological to believe conspiracy theories?. Transcultural Psychiatry, 61(5), 749-755.

Bortolotti, L. (2024). The Ant and the Grasshopper: Does Biased Cognition Compromise Agency in the Case of Delusions and Conspiracy Theories?. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 1-16.

Brooks, P. (2023). On the origin of conspiracy theories. Philosophical Studies, 180(12), 3279-3299.

Boudry, M. (2023). Why we should be suspicious of conspiracy theories: A novel demarcation problem. Episteme, 20(3), 611-631.

Buentig, J. & Taylor, J. Conspiracy Theories and Fortuitous Data. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 40 (4):567-578 (2010)

Butter, Michael; Knight, Peter (2019), The History of Conspiracy Theory Research. En Conspiracy Theories and the People Who Believe Them, Oxford University Press, p. 39,

Butter, M., & Knight, P. (Eds.). (2020). Routledge Handbook of Conspiracy Theories. Routledge.

Clarke, S. (2002). Conspiracy Theories and Conspiracy Theorizing, Philosophy of the Social Sciences, vol. 32, no. 2, p.131-150.

Clarke, S. (2007). Conspiracy Theories and the Internet – Controlled Demolition and Arrested Development. Episteme, 4(2), 167–180.

Cassam, Q. (2019). Conspiracy Theories. John Wiley & Sons.

Cassam, Q. (2023). Conspiracy theories. Society, 60(2), 190-199.

Coady, D. (2003). Conspiracy Theories and Official Stories, International Journal of Applied Philosophy, vol. 17, no. 2, p.197-209.

Coady, D., ed. (2006). Conspiracy Theories: The Philosophical Debate. Ashgate.

Coady, D. (2007). Are conspiracy theorists irrational?. Episteme, 4(2), 193-204.

Cohnitz, D. (2018). On the rationality of conspiracy theories. Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 18(53), 351-365.

Dentith, M. R. (2014). The philosophy of conspiracy theories . Palgrave Macmillan.

Dentith, M. (2016). When Inferring to a Conspiracy might be the Best Explanation, Social Epistemology, vol. 30, nos. 5-6, p.572-591.

Dentith, M. (2018). Expertise and Conspiracy Theories, Social Epistemology, vol. 32, no. 3, p.196-208.

Dentith, M. R. (Ed.). (2018). Taking conspiracy theories seriously. Rowman & Littlefield.

Dentith, M. (2019). Conspiracy theories on the basis of the evidence, Synthese, vol. 196, no. 6, p.2243-2261.

Dentith, M. R., & Keeley, B. L. (2018). The applied epistemology of conspiracy theories: An overview. The Routledge Handbook of Applied Epistemology, 284-294.

Douglas, K. M., Uscinski, J. E., Sutton, R. M., Cichocka, A., Nefes, T., Ang, C. S., & Deravi, F. (2019). Understanding conspiracy theories. Political psychology, 40, 3-35.

Duetz, J. C. M. (2022). Conspiracy Theories are Not Beliefs. Erkenntnis, 1-15.

Duetz, J. C. M. (2024). What Does It Mean for a Conspiracy Theory to Be a ‘Theory’?. In The Philosophy of Conspiracy Theories (pp. 34-49). Routledge.

Feldman, S. (2011). Counterfact Conspiracy Theories. International Journal of Applied Philosophy. 25 (1):

Galbraith, N. (2021). Delusions and pathologies of belief: Making sense of conspiracy beliefs via the psychosis continuum. Psychopathology and Philosophy of Mind, 117-144.

Gallo, A. M. (2019). Teorías de la conspiración: de la paranoia al genocidio. Estudios Humanísticos. Filología, (41), 217-243.

Goertzel, T. (1994). Belief in conspiracy theories. Political psychology, 731-742.

Hagen, K. (2022). Conspiracy Theories and the Failure of Intellectual Critique. University of Michigan.

Harris, K. (2018). What's epistemically wrong with conspiracy theorising?. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements, 84, 235-257.

Hofstadter, R. (2012). The paranoid style in American politics. Vintage.

Hawley, K. (2019). Conspiracy theories, impostor syndrome, and distrust. Philosophical Studies, 176(4), 969-980.

Keeley, B. L. (2007). God as the ultimate conspiracy theory. Episteme, 4(2), 135-149.

Keeley, B. L. (2019). Of conspiracy theories. En Conspiracy theories (pp. 45-60). Routledge.

Keeley, B. L. (2024). Conspiracy theory and (or as) folk psychology. En The Philosophy of Conspiracy Theories (pp. 9-18). Routledge.

Levy, N. (2007). Radically Socialized Knowledge and Conspiracy Theories, Episteme, vol. 4 no. 2, p.181-192.

Locke, S. (2009). Conspiracy culture, blame culture, and rationalisation. The Sociological Review, 57(4), 567-585.

Mandik, P. (2007). Shit Happens. Episteme, 4 (2):205-218.

Meyer, M., & Alfano, M. (2022). Fake news, conspiracy theorizing, and intellectual vice. En Social virtue epistemology (pp. 236-259). Routledge.

Mittendorf, W. (2024). Racist and antiracist conspiracy theories. Inquiry, 1-25.

Napolitano, M. G. (2021). Conspiracy theories and evidential self-insulation. The epistemology of fake news, 82-105.

Napolitano, M. G., & Reuter, K. (2023). What is a conspiracy theory?. Erkenntnis, 88(5), 2035-2062.

Napolitano, M., & Reuter, K. (2023). Is conspiracy theory a case of conceptual domination?. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, 12(11), 74-82.

Noordhof, P. (2025). Sub-Category Generalism About Conspiracy Theories. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 1-27.

Pauly, M., Conspiracy Theories, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy , 21-02-2025.

Peels, R. (2024). Vice explanations for conspiracism, fundamentalism, and extremism. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 15(3), 885-907.

Peels, R., Kindermann, N., & Ranalli, C. (2023). Normativity in studying conspiracy theory belief: Seven guidelines. Philosophical Psychology, 36(6), 1125-1159.

Penella, G. M. (2022). ¿ Están las teorías de la conspiración epistémicamente justificadas? Una aproximación desde el externismo contemporáneo. Dilemata, (38), 103-117.

Pfeifer, N. (2024). Towards a conceptual framework for conspiracy theory theories. En The Philosophy of Conspiracy Theories (pp. 106-117). Routledge.

Pierre, J. M. (2023). Conspiracy Theory Belief: A Sane Response to an Insane World?. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 1-26.

Pierre, J. M. (2023). Delusion and conspiracy theories. En The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Delusion (pp. 544-556). Routledge.

Pigden, C. 1995. Popper Revisited, or What Is Wrong with Conspiracy Theories? Philosophy of the Social Sciences 25 (1): 3–34.

Pigden, C. (2007). Conspiracy theories and the conventional wisdom. Episteme, 4(2), 219-232.

Pigden, C. R. (2016). Are conspiracy theorists epistemically vicious?. A companion to applied philosophy, 120-132.

Popper, K. R. (1945). The Open Society and Its Enemies. Routledge.

Poth, N., & Dolega, K. (2023). Bayesian belief protection: A study of belief in conspiracy theories. Philosophical Psychology, 36(6), 1182-1207.

Räikkä, J. (2009). On Political Conspiracy Theories, Journal of Political Philosophy, vol. 17, no. 2, p.185-201.

Räikkä, J. (2009b). The Ethics of Conspiracy Theorizing, Journal of Value Inquiry, vol. 43, p.457-468.

Räikkä, J., & Ritola, J. (2020). Philosophy and conspiracy theories. Routledge Handbook of Conspiracy Theories, 56-66.

Reuter, K., & Baumgartner, L. (2023). Conspiracy theories are not theories: Time to rename conspiracy theories. En New Perspectives on Conceptual Engineering (en prensa).

Shields, M. (2022). Rethinking conspiracy theories. Synthese, 200(4), 331.

Shoaibi, N. (2024). Conspiracy Theorists’ World and Genealogy. Social Epistemology, 1-16.

Stokes, P. (2023). The Normative Turn in Conspiracy Theory Theory?. Social Epistemology, 37(4), 535-543.

Stout, N. (2023). Conspiracy theories and clinical decision‐making. Bioethics, 37(5), 470-477.

Sunstein, C. & Vermeule, A. (2009). “Conspiracy Theories: Causes and Cures”, Journal of Political Philosophy, vol. 17, no. 2, p.202-227.

Tsapos, M. (2024). Who is a conspiracy theorist?. En The Philosophy of Conspiracy Theories (pp. 50-59). Routledge.

Tsapos, M. (2024). Should we worry about conspiracy theorists rejecting experts?. Inquiry, 1-21.

Van Prooijen, J. W. (2022). Psychological benefits of believing conspiracy theories. Current Opinion in Psychology, 47, 101352.

Wood, G. S. (1982). Conspiracy and the paranoid style: causality and deceit in the eighteenth century. The William and Mary Quarterly: A Magazine of Early American History and Culture, 402-441.

Variabilidad cultural cognitiva

Bluhm, R., Jacobson, A., & Maibom, H. L. (Eds.). (2015). Neurofeminism: Issues at the intersection of feminist theory and cognitive science. Palgrave Macmillan.

Clayton, J. (2006). Religions, reasons and gods: Essays in cross-cultural philosophy of religion. Cambridge University Press.

Dekker, T. M., & Karmiloff-Smith, A. (2011). The dynamics of ontogeny: A neuroconstructivist perspective on genes, brains, cognition and behavior. Progress in brain research, 189, 23-33.

De Oliveira, S., & Nisbett, R. E. (2017). Culture changes how we think about thinking: From “Human Inference” to “Geography of Thought”. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 12(5), 782-790.

Engel, P. (2007). Is there a geography of thought?. Cognitio, 8(2), 197-212.

Farina, M. (2016). Three approaches to human cognitive development: Neo-nativism, neuroconstructivism, and dynamic enskillment. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.

Gendler, T. S. (2011). On the epistemic costs of implicit bias. Philosophical Studies, 156(1), 33-63.

Gerrans, P. (2002). Nativism, neuroconstructivism, and developmental disorder. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 25(6), 757-758.

Haslanger, S. (1999). What knowledge is and what it ought to be: Feminist values and normative epistemology. Philosophical Perspectives, 13, 459-480.

Horst, S. (2016). Cognitive Pluralism. MIT press.

Hutto, D. D. (2012). Folk psychological narratives: The sociocultural basis of understanding reasons. MIT press.

Karmiloff-Smith, A. (2009). Nativism versus neuroconstructivism: rethinking the study of developmental disorders. Developmental psychology, 45(1), 56.

Karmiloff-Smith, A. (2017). Embrace complexity! Multiple factors contributing to cognitive, social, and communicative development.

Karmiloff-Smith, A. (2017). From constructivism to neuroconstructivism: The activity-dependent structuring of the human brain. In After Piaget (pp. 1-14). Routledge.

Kelly, Daniel and Andreas De Block, "Culture and Cognitive Science", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2022/entries/culture-cogsci/>.

Ludwig, D., Koskinen, I., Mncube, Z., Poliseli, L., & Reyes-Galindo, L. (Eds.). (2021). Global Epistemologies and Philosophies of Science. Routeldge.

Malafouris, L. (2010). Metaplasticity and the human becoming: principles of neuroarchaeology. Journal of Anthropological Sciences, 88(4), 49-72.

Mareschal, D., Johnson, M. H., Sirois, S., Spratling, M., Thomas, M. S., & Westermann, G. (2007). Neuroconstructivism-I: How the brain constructs cognition. Oxford University Press.

Masataka, N. (Ed.). (2020). The Origins of Language Revisited: Differentiation from Music and the Emergence of Neurodiversity and Autism. Springer Nature.

Menary, R. (2014). Neural plasticity, neuronal recycling and niche construction. Mind & Language, 29(3), 286-303.

Mizumoto, M., Ganeri, J., & Goddard, C. (Eds.). (2020). Ethno-Epistemology: New Directions for Global Epistemology. Routledge.

Mizumoto, M., Stich, S. P., & McCready, E. S. (Eds.). (2018). Epistemology for the Rest of the World. Oxford University Press.

Nisbett, R. (2004). The geography of thought: How Asians and Westerners think differently... and why. Simon and Schuster.

O’Donovan, M. M. (2010). Cognitive diversity in the global academy: Why the voices of persons with cognitive disabilities are vital to intellectual diversity. Journal of Academic Ethics, 8(3), 171-185.

Rinaldi, L., & Karmiloff-Smith, A. (2017). Intelligence as a developing function: A neuroconstructivist approach. Journal of Intelligence, 5(2), 18.

Rogoff, B. (2003). The Cultural Nature of Human Development. Oxford University Press.

Rolin, K. (2019). The epistemic significance of diversity. The routledge handbook of social epistemology, 158-166.

Proust, J., & Fortier, M. (Eds.). (2018). Metacognitive diversity: An interdisciplinary approach. Oxford University Press.

Solomon, M. (2006). Norms of epistemic diversity. Episteme, 3(1-2), 23-36.

Stich, S. P. (1990). The fragmentation of reason: Preface to a pragmatic theory of cognitive evaluation. The MIT Press.

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