Publications:
European Journal of Operational Research, 2025
The paper studies how common ownership (CO) affects the magnitude and dynamics of investments in a duopoly with exogenous or endogenous roles. In all cases CO is detrimental to consumer surplus and welfare.
Annals of Operations Research, 2023.
The paper shows that operational flexibility guarantees earlier investment in flexible cogeneration systems but has an ambiguous effect in terms of capacity.
European Review of Agricultural Economics, 2022.
The paper shows that decoupled payments (i) induce earlier investment with lower productive capacity; (ii) increase the value of the investment option associated with land and (iii) reduce the volatility of farm income.
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2021.
The paper shows that overlapping ownership arrangements delay follower entry implying longer incumbency which intensifies the race to lead.
Economic Modelling, 2021.
The paper discusses the optimal design of Public Private Partnerships under moral hazard when the private party has bargaining power.
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2021.
The paper shows that reliability options can have adverse effects on investment timing and value.
Review of Industrial Organization, 2021.
The paper shows that the optimal time for exercising a jointly held investment option depends on the bargaining power distribution between the option holders as well as the upstream market power. The latter is always prevailing.
International Game Theory Review, 2021.
The paper discusses the effect of demand and investment cost uncertainty as well as upstream market power on investment timing.
International Review of Economics & Finance, 2020.
The paper discusses the effect of downstream information asymmetries on upstream suppliers.
Working Papers:
R&R (a preliminary version is available here)
The paper discusses how the threat of nationalization affects the timing and scale of foreign investments, and how do these two factors impact the exercise of the nationalization option on the host country side. I show that an increase in the nationalization risk, e.g. due to lower sanctions towards the local government, will result in underinvestment, both in terms of timing and in terms of scale, as well as hastened nationalization. Hence the threat of nationalization leads to premature and undersized investments, rather than deterring them entirely.