Working Papers and Selected Publications
Recent:
"Bargaining and Exclusion with Multiple Buyers", with M. Manea, May 2023.
"Bargaining Foundations for the Outside Option Principle" with M. Manea, July 2022.
"Bargaining with Exclusionary Commitments", with M. Manea, April 2021.
“Algorithm for Stochastic Games with Perfect Monitoring”, with B. Brooks and Y. Sannikov, Econometrica 2020.
“Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games with Patient Players”, with D. Pearce, preliminary draft.
Dynamic Games:
“Algorithm for Stochastic Games with Perfect Monitoring”, with B. Brooks and Y. Sannikov, Econometrica 2020.
“A 'Pencil-Sharpening' Algorithm for Two-Player Stochastic Games with Perfect Monitoring”, with B. Brooks and Y. Sannikov, 2016.
“An Algorithm for Two Player Repeated Games with Perfect Monitoring”, with Y. Sannikov, Theoretical Economics 9.2 (2014): 313-338.
“Implementing the Nash Program in Stochastic Games”, with D. Pearce, mimeo, ETC WP (2013).
“Bargaining, Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games with Contracts”, with David G. Pearce, Econometrica 75.3 (2007): 653-710.
“Bargaining, Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games”, with David G. Pearce, September, 2002.
“A Perspective on Renegotiation in Repeated Games”, with David G. Pearce, in Game equilibrium models, R. Selten (ed.), Berlin, Springer Verlag, 1991.
“The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A NEU Condition”, with Prajit K. Dutta and Lones Smith, Econometrica, 62.4 (1994): 939-948 (in Notes and Comments).
“Renegotiation and Symmetry in Repeated Games”, with David G. Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti, Journal of Economic Theory 60.2 (1993): 217-240.
“Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships”, with Paul Milgrom and David G. Pearce, Econometrica 59.6 (1991): 1713-1733.
“Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring”, with David G. Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti, Econometrica 58.5 (1990): 1041-1063.
“The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata”, with Ariel Rubinstein, Econometrica 56.6 (1988): 1259-1281.
“On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting”, Econometrica 56.3 (1988): 383-396.
“Extremal Equilibria of Oligopolistic Supergames”, Journal of Economic Theory 39.1 (1986): 191-225.
“Optimal Cartel Equilibria with Imperfect Monitoring”, with David G. Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti, Journal of Economic Theory 39.1 (1986): 251-269.
Inefficient Markets:
“Bubbles and Crashes”, with Markus K. Brunnermeier, Econometrica 71.1 (2003): 173-204.
“Synchronization Risk and Delayed Arbitrage”, with Markus K. Brunnermeier, Journal of Financial Economics 66.2-3 (2002): 341-360.
Bargaining:
"Bargaining with Exclusionary Commitments", with M. Manea, April 2021.
“One Sided Uncertainty and Delay in Reputational Bargaining”, with D. Pearce and E. Stacchetti, Theoretical Economics 10.3 (2015): 719-773.
“A Dynamic Reinterpretation of Nash Bargaining with Endogenous Threats”, with D. Pearce, Econometrica 83.4 (2015): 1641-1655.
“Implementing the Nash Program in Stochastic Games”, with D. Pearce, mimeo, ETC WP (2013).
“Bargaining and Efficiency in Networks”, with M. Manea, Journal of Economic Theory 147.1 (2012): 43-70.
“Markov Perfect Equilibria in a Model of Bargaining in Networks”, with M. Manea, Games and Economic Behavior 75.1 (2012): 1-16.
“Bargaining, Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games with Contracts”, with David G. Pearce, Econometrica 75.3 (2007): 653-710.
“A Behavioral Model of Bargaining with Endogenous Types”, with David G. Pearce, November, 2003.
“Bargaining, Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games”, with David G. Pearce, September, 2002.
“Evolutionary Stability in a Reputational Model of Bargaining”, with Rajiv Sethi, Games and Economic Behavior 44.2 (2003): 195-216.
“Bargaining and Reputation”, with Faruk Gul, Econometrica 68.1 (2000): 85-117.
Implementation:
“Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Incomplete Information”, with Hitoshi Matsushima, mimeo, August 1992.
“Exact Implementation”, with Hitoshi Matsushima, Journal of Economic Theory 64.1 (1994): 1-19.
“Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information”, with Hitoshi Matsushima, Econometrica 60.5 (1992): 993-1008.
“A Response to Glazer and Rosenthal”, with Hitoshi Matsushima, Econometrica 60.6 (1992): 1439 (in Notes and Comments).
“Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium”, with Arunava Sen, Econometrica 59.4 (1991): 997-1021.
“Subgame Perfect Implementation: A Necessary and Almost Sufficient Condition”, with Arunava Sen, Journal of Economic theory 50.2 (1990): 285-299.
Networks:
“Bargaining and Efficiency in Networks”, with M. Manea, Journal of Economic Theory 147.1 (2012): 43-70.
“Markov Perfect Equilibria in a Model of Bargaining in Networks”, with M. Manea, Games and Economic Behavior 75.1 (2012): 1-16.