Interests: Microeconomic Theory, Information Economics, Political Economy, Behavioral and Experimental Economics
Information Design with Competing Receivers (with Andreas Asseyer)
Competing Persuaders in Zero-Sum Games (with Zhihan Cui)
A Better Test for Choice Overload (with Mark Dean and Jörg Stoye)
Information Aggregation with Delegation of Votes (with Amrita Dhillon, Grammateia Kotsialou, and Dimitrios Xefteris) -- Revise and Resubsmit at International Economic Review
[Supercedes my earlier working paper Liquid Democracy]
Two Experiments on Delegation in Voting (with Joe Campbell, Alessandra Casella, Lucas de Lara, and Victoria Mooers)
Competition for Choice Overloaded Consumers [draft soon]
We study a model of firm competition with choice overloaded consumers. When consumers exhibit choice overload, a firm entering the market has an externality on competitors: consumers become more likely to be overloaded and less likely to buy a product. As a consequence, there is inefficient over entry into the market; we study how this inefficiency changes in consumers' tendencies to be overloaded. When there is an incumbent firm whose product the consumer buys as a default when overloaded, this firm benefits from overload and hence may deliberately offer an unattractive product to encourage competitor entry.
Competing to Persuade a Receiver with Small Action Sets [draft soon]
We characterize when competition between (Bayesian) persuaders using conditionally independent experiments (and possibly others) benefits a receiver choosing between up to three actions. With multiple senders, there is full revelation in all equilibria if and only if, given any prior, some two senders disagree on their Bayesian Persuasion solution if they were the sole persuader. Hence disagreement needed for competition to increase information provision is characterized by senders' actions as `monopolists'.