Published and Forthcoming Papers
"Using List Prices to Collude or to Compete?" (with Juan-Pablo Montero). Economic Journal (2024).
[Slides] [Accepted manuscript] [Policy coverage]
Abstract: It is often argued that collusion is not possible in wholesale markets where suppliers and buyers privately bargain over discounts off list prices and sales quotas are unfeasible. In many wholesale markets, however, there are buyers of varying sizes and bargaining powers who compete for final consumers in the retail market. We study the role of public announcements of list prices in this wholesale-retail setting, whether suppliers collude or compete. Two effects are at work. When suppliers collude, public announcements of list prices further extend the possibility of collusion from small to large buyers (the multibuyer contact effect). When suppliers compete, these public announcements provide them with commitment to negotiate better terms with large buyers (the commitment effect).
Working Papers
"Nash-in-Nash Equilibrium with Inefficient Contracts"
Abstract: I prove existence and uniqueness of a Nash-in-Nash bargaining equilibrium in vertical relations models with inefficient contracts. Inefficient contracts do not maximize gains from trade, and evidence shows they are widespread. This setting is pervasive in empirical industrial organization, but extant proofs of existence and uniqueness are limited to efficient contracts. Nonexistence and multiplicity of equilibria threaten identification, so I add to the literature by showing conditions under which bargaining models can be point identified. For empirical work, I show how to check my assumptions hold in a model. The results also matter for counterfactual computation and antitrust policy analysis.
Work in Progress
"Determinants of Fiscal Capacity in Early Modern Europe".