Die drei Raben

The late James Mace once wrote, "[e]ven an archival document reflects how the person who drafted it understood (or was supposed to understand) something and remains something less than the unvarnished truth". [1] Documents are often compiled in a euphemized manner. Sometimes this is in a more obvious manner, like this example of Himmler's letter of July 5, 1943:

The transit camp Sobibor in the District of Lublin has to be transformed into a concentration camp. In the concentration camp a depot for booty ammunition has to be established. [2]

I'd hope most would be aware that its contents are a deliberate deception, as Sobibor was in actuality an extermination camp (one of three Einsatz Reinhardt camps - the name originating from Reinhard Heydrich who died on June 4, 1942). [3] What I want to focus on are documents that are a reflection of what the author was "supposed to understand", i.e. euphemistic composition.

A man betrayed by his diary.

William J. Chase in his book "Enemies within the gates?" notes on page 147 that there are those who "may have harbored doubts about the [moscow] trial" of August 1936, and if such doubts existed "they kept them to themselves and behaved as though the charges were real." One prime example appears to be Georgi Dimitrov. Chase summarizes Dimitirov's Communist International article "Defending Base Terrorists Means Helping Fascism” as follows:

The man who during the 1933 Leipzig trial had learned how prosecutors can distort and falsify evidence, now proclaimed the clarity of the “documents, facts, real proof” presented at the August [1936] trial. Dimitrov argued that because the defendants had the right to defend themselves, their confessions stood as proof of their guilt. He went on to vilify those Social Democratic leaders of the Socialist Workers International and the International Association of Trade Unions who had sent a telegram to the Soviet government protesting the August trial. Such rhetoric and accusations alienated Social Democrats and other non-Communists and weakened Popular Front coalitions in various countries. By defending the legitimacy of the August trial, Dimitrov and the ECCI undermined the policy deemed essential to the defeat of fascism and the defense of the USSR. [4]

Also of interest here are the records of his meetings with Lion Feuchtwanger and Maria Osten on December 18, 1936. Feuchtwanger's "Moskau 1937: ein Reisebericht für meine Freunde" is worthless as a source, which is thankfully demonstrable via the accounts of his interpreter D. Karavkina, "an employee of the VOKS Second Western Department". [5] Without Karavkina's report we would be left to the entry in Dimitirov's diary, but what's important here are the emphasized bits:

19.12.1936. He told me of his visit to Dimitrov. He had gone there specially to discuss the Trotskyist trial. Said that Dimitrov was very agitated when speaking on this subject, explaining for half an hour, but not convincingly. Feuchtwanger told me that a very hostile attitude was taken to the trial abroad and that nobody believed that fifteen highly-principled revolutionaries who had risked their lives by participating in conspiracies, would all suddenly and of one accord confess and voluntarily do penance. [6]

What's worth noting is that Dimitrov appeared to be uncomfortable discussing the trial, but attempted to convince Feuchtwanger of its authenticity and failed to persuade him. But Dimitrov's diary entry is more revealing of his actual opinions, where he states: "The records of the trial are carelessly compiled, full of contradictions, [and] unconvincing. The trial [was] conducted monstrously." [6] Contrary to this opinion, in both public and private Dimitrov continued to act as if he believed these trials were valid. What one should consider here are the beliefs of Sovietologist Vadim Rogovin that even in "personal correspondence" Stalin and his team "expressed themselves in a conventional code" that was "designed" to make it appear "that they believed in the amalgams they were creating". [7] While there is good reason to object to this characterization, i.e. it seems Stalin, Molotov, Ezhov, and Kaganovich actually believed in these "conspiracies", [8] his point of view stands as a good explanation for Dimitrov's behavior.

Heart attack and the blabber mouth.

Back in 2008, a Turkish scholar, Yusuf Sarinay, published a paper under the title "What Happened on April 24, 1915?". In this article Sarinay follows the usual bullet points of Turkish denialism, [9] but the key point I want to focus on are the murders of Krikor Zohrab and Vartkes Serengulian. According to the conventional understandings, Zohrab and Vartkes were deported from Istanbul and on July 19th, 1915 had arrived in Urfa. On July 20th, they were escorted out of Urfa and killed by members of the Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa. [10] According to Zohrab's death certificate, he had died of natural causes:

Upon hearing that he had died en route I proceeded to the spot where his body was, and identified it as that of Knkor Zohrab. My examination showed that he had succumbed to a heart attack. [11]

In fact, two other documents can be produced to corroborate this and are now reproduced on Clark University website. One is a clergy report attesting to religious burial and death from a heart attack. [12] The other is an Interior Ministry cable saying that Zohrab had died from an "accident". [13]

But a few things remain odd about this very incident. One would imagine with the above documents that Zohrab had died of a heart attack, but on the very same day the district governor Haidar Bey reported that Zohrab and Vartges had died in a clash along with their escort. [14] Zohrab's watch and ring were on sale in Urfa the very next day. [15] What happened, in reality, was that Talaat Pasha had ordered Haidar to compile fabricated materials a month after the incident. [16] Zohrab and Vartkes's killer, Çerkez Ahmed, bragged to Ahmet Refik Altınay:

I blew up the brains of Vartkes with my Mauser pistol, then I grabbed Zohrab, and having trampled him, I smashed and smashed his head with a big rock until I killed him off. [17]

Something to hide?

On January 18, 1943 Himmler commissioned the German statistician Dr. Richard Korherr to compile a statistical report on "die Endlösung der europäischen Judenfrage". The report was finished on March 23, 1943 and contains the following key line:

4. transportation of Jews from the Eastern provinces to the Russian East: ............................1 449 692 "

The following were guided through [durchgeschleust] the camps in the General-government..................... 1 274 166 Jews

through the camps in the Warthegau..... 145 301 Jews [18]

The wording was altered from "Sonderbehandlung der Juden" to "es wurden durchgeschleust durch die Lager" on Himmlers instructions, [19] for "camouflage purposes". [20] However, what further complicates the issue is another document known as the Höfle telegram:

Secret matter of the Reich! To the Commander of the Secret Police, for the attention of SS Obersturmbannführer HEIM, KRAKAU.

Concerning the 14-day report on REINHART's deployment. Reference: radio telegram from there. Recorded influx [zugang] by 31.12.42, L 12761,B 0, S 515, T 10335 together 23611.

Status ... 12/31/42, L 24733, B 434508, S 101370, T 71355, together 1274166. [21]

As Jonathan Harrison argues, the two documents contain "two contradictory forms of camouflage". [22] In the Korherr report, the Einsatz Reinhardt camps are represented as "transit camps", while in Höfle's telegram they were labour camps. "The contradiction reveals why it is absurd [...] to claim that documents should be read literally. The only explanation that makes sense is that camouflage terms are being used, as the same populations of Jews could not have been simultaneously admitted as labourers and sent to the USSR because they were unfit for labour." [23]