Chair: Spyros Galanis (Durham)
Marion Ott (Mannheim & Justus Liebig)
Bid heterogeneity and the winner’s curse in multi-unit auctions
Mustafa Dogan (East Anglia)
Designing Information to Screen
Juan Pereyra (Montevideo)
Diagnostic Agency: Ex-Post Distortions versus Information Design
Kemal Ozbek (Southampton)
Optimal Auction Design under Costly Learning
Chair: Leslie Reinhorn (Durham)
Thomas Norman (Oxford)
Rationality, Forward Induction and the Foundations of Incomplete Contract Theory
Toomas Hinnosaar (Nottingham)
Collusion without Patience
Guilherme Carmona (Surrey)
Pay Caps in Knowledge Economies
Caio Lorecchio (Barcelona)
Multilateral Bargaining with Information Spillovers
Chair: Anastasiia Parakhoniak (Durham)
Daniel Li (Durham)
Bayesian Sequential Search: From Censored Observations to Full Information Revelation
Amirreza Ahmadzadeh (Toulouse)
Trust with evidence & Mechanism Design with Costly Inspection
Dimitri Migrow (Edinburgh)
Voluntary Certification and Project Choice
Philip J. Reny (Chicago)
Natural Language Equilibrium I: Off-Path Conventions
Chair: Nejat Anbarci (Durham)
18:50-21:00 Dinner (by invitation) at Cellar Door
Chair: Daniel Li (Durham)
Xin Wang (Western Ontario)
Convex Order and Moment Persuasion
Zeinab Aboutalebi (EUI)
Reputation And the compliance paradox
Jun Hyun Ji (Pittsburgh)
A Representation of Preference over Preferences and Choices
Giuseppe Puleio (Paris School of Economics)
Getting to Know the Experts
11:00-11:20 Coffee and Tea
Gilat Levy (LSE)
The Selective Participation Problem: Preference Aggregation in Multiple Elections and AI-assisted Voting
Chair: Spyros Galanis (Durham)
Chair: Ayse Yazici (Durham)
Sumit Goel (NYU Abu Dhabi)
TTC Domains
Alexander Rodivilov (Sabanci)
Efficiency and Collusion-Proofness in Dynamic Mechanism Design
Toan Le (Oxford)
Strategy Proofness versus Collusion Proofness