The previous literature finds a positive effect of institutional (relative to other investors') ownership on firms' innovation output (Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales, 2013). We study the impact of increases in the concentration of institutional investors' ownership on firms’ decisions to invest in innovation and their innovation output. By reducing short-term earnings pressure, concentrated institutional investors' ownership increases managers' incentives to invest in R\&D. However, it decreases firms' acquisitions of external innovation due to empire-building and dilution concerns. Overall, firms' future patents and citations decrease. Our results indicate that the previously found positive effect of institutional investors on innovation declines as the ownership of these investors becomes more concentrated. Despite that, we find that blockholder institutional ownership increases firm value. Hence, large institutional investors take measures to preserve the value of their ownership interests, even if they result in reduced innovation.
Firms increasingly rely on markets for technology to acquire innovations developed outside their boundaries, yet acquiring intellectual property rights alone often does not guarantee successful implementation. Many technologies depend on tacit know-how that must be supplied by the provider after the transaction is completed. This paper examines whether common ownership between a technology provider and a potential adopter mitigates this implementation problem. I develop a model in which overlapping institutional investors cause the provider to partially internalize the adopter’s gains from successful implementation, strengthening incentives to transfer tacit know-how. This mechanism operates only when know-how is unverifiable – absent this friction, common ownership leaves matching and outcomes unchanged. Under moral hazard, the model predicts that common ownership increases the likelihood of technology transfer to a given adopter, that this effect is stronger when tacit know-how is more important, and that common ownership improves post-transfer outcomes conditional on adoption. I test these predictions using U.S. patent reassignments between publicly traded firms. Using within-deal variation across competing potential adopters and plausibly exogenous variation from passive index-fund holdings, I show that common ownership increases the likelihood that a firm acquires a technology, particularly when the transferred bundle is more tacit. Common ownership predicts stronger subsequent innovation and higher future firm value, especially when ownership overlap is concentrated among investors with stronger incentives to monitor the provider. These findings show how ownership structure shapes interfirm technology transfer by affecting not only who acquires a technology, but also how much value is created.
We study whether common ownership affects the direction of technological change. We develop a task-based model with multiple local labor markets in which commonly owned firms internalize wage externalities from portfolio rivals when hiring from the same labor pool, increasing incentives to automate. We establish causality by exploiting institutional investor mergers in a dynamic DiD design, using U.S. data on institutional ownership, establishment-level employment, and text-classified automation patents. Increases in common ownership among local labor-market rivals raise firms’ propensity to automate by 22.7 percentage points and reduce employment growth. The effect disappears when firms do not compete within labor markets.
This paper examines whether common institutional ownership is associated with CEO selection across portfolio firms. We document that higher common ownership between two same-industry firms predicts a greater likelihood that a newly appointed CEO has preexisting social ties to the incumbent CEO of the peer firm. To address endogeneity, we use mergers among institutional investors in a stacked difference-in-differences design. In a hiring-firm--peer panel that carries connection status forward from the most recent appointment, exposure to a merger-induced common blockholder approximately doubles the probability that the pair is observed in a connected-CEO state. In a broader firm-pair panel, it increases the probability of CEO connections by 48.7%. We further document that gaining CEO connections through another firm's CEO appointment is associated with improvements in peer firms' returns on assets and Tobin's Q, in both OLS and IV specifications. Peer firms that gain such a connection also experience positive abnormal returns around CEO hiring announcements, corresponding to an average increase of $112.5 million in shareholder value. These performance patterns suggest that CEO connections may be valuable from a portfolio-level perspective. Consistent with this interpretation, the association between common ownership and CEO connections is concentrated among product-similar and organizationally complex firms and strengthens after the 2008-2009 financial crisis, when connections appear more valuable. Our findings point to CEO selection as a potential governance channel through which common institutional ownership is linked to firm outcomes, complementing prior work on executive compensation, shareholder voting, and board interlocks.
Empirical evidence in Dauth et al. (J Eur Econ Assoc, 2021) suggests that industrial robot adoption in Germany has led to a sectoral reallocation of employment from manufacturing to services, leaving total employment unaffected. We rationalize this evidence through the lens of a general equilibrium model with two sectors, matching frictions and endogenous participation. Automation induces firms to create fewer vacancies and job seekers to search less in the automatable sector (manufacturing). The service sector expands due to the sectoral complementarity in the production of the final good and a positive wealth effect for the household. Analysis across steady states shows that the reduction in manufacturing employment can be offset by the increase in service employment. The model can also replicate the magnitude of the decline in the ratio of manufacturing employment to service employment in Germany between 1994 and 2014.