Despite all the enjoyment we all had during the discussion at the last meeting, it was easy to see that, above all the ideas about how to define and specify populism, the question of its causes remained unclear. 

One of the many possible and relevant explanations is provided by the German sociologist Wilhelm Heitmeyer in his work ‘Authoritarian Temptations’. According to Heitmeyer, the global expansion of the capitalist system is responsible for the erosion of democracy and the decline of liberal societies by promoting various processes of social disintegration. Thus, ‘authoritarian capitalism’ leads to a loss of institutional, political and individual control. This loss of control in an increasingly complex and non-transparent world must now be overcome, which often leads to individuals reacting in an authoritarian or violent manner and displaying an increased potential for xenophobia (cf. Heitmeyer, 2020). 

Even if it may sound paradoxical, phenomena such as growing populism and xenophobia are therefore coping mechanisms that are ultimately a desperate attempt to regain control of a world that has long since become alien to many people. This perspective inevitably raises a broader question: To what extent should neoliberal societies themselves be scrutinised—not only for their outcomes, but for the very notion of freedom they promote? Is this model of freedom truly beneficial for democratic cohesion, or does it come at the cost of social stability and inclusion?

To give you an overview of Heitmeyer's idea, I have attached an interview that briefly summarises his ideas: https://www.goethe.de/ins/be/en/kul/eur/uzg/21984381.html

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz is known for occasionally resorting to populist rhetoric that sometimes comes across as choleric and clumsy. In principle, the pattern is always the same: Merz says something very controversial that could easily be interpreted as racist, and then backtracks after strong criticism. 

One such example is currently dividing German public opinion. When asked about the issue of migration, Merz said that although progress had been made, there were still problems in the ‘cityscape’. Progressives have interpreted these comments as racist criticism of a German culture that is becoming increasingly diverse. It is such a sensitive issue and statement because Germany was rebuilt both by Turkish immigrants in the 1960s and by late socialist immigrants after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Migration is part of our national identity, and yet there is still debate about who is considered ‘German’ and who is not. Who is a likely seen part of the ‘cityscape’ and who is not. Nowadays, one often has the impression that democratic citizenship is increasingly being replaced by naturalistic and racist criteria. 

What we see here fits in very well with what we heard this week about ‘affective populism,’ which to me seems primarily destructive. It must be possible to adress the topic of migration without resorting to such moronic rhetorical devices as Merz does. The way the discourse is currently being conducted in Germany, polarisation is becoming increasingly drastic. Right-wingers and conservatives are becoming more and more aggressive in their statements, to which left-wingers and progressives are responding more and more vehemently. The end result is a completely dysfunctional discourse on migration that never benefits society, but always benefits the right wing. 

Here is the link for you: https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-friedrich-merz-backlash-migrant-deportations-problem-cityscape/

Merz should be given the opportunity to clarify his statement. When he was finally asked what the problem with the ‘cityscape’ was, he replied: ‘Ask your daughters’. 

Merz is thus making use of a very powerful narrative, namely that of the unrestrained, violent, young, male migrant who assaults native girls. Mayer et al. argue f.e.: ‘The most important discursive construction is the (young) “foreign” criminal and violent perpetrator’ (Mayer/Šori/Sauer, 2016: 13). 

This patriarchal protective mechanism represents an inseparable mixture of racism and sexism. Dietze, for example, argues that this narrative has its roots as far back as 1865, after the liberation of slaves in the USA. There, it was the unsubstantiated myth of the ‘black’ man assaulting the ‘white’ woman that ultimately led to violent excesses such as lynchings. Today, a new form of male white protection has emerged, in which the sexual integrity and freedom of ‘white’ women is threatened by the supposedly ‘unbridled sexuality’ of male migrants (cf. Dietze, 2016). 

This narrative essentially serves to legitimise deportation and is an effective narrative of populist tactics. It stokes fear and promises improvement, while the actual cause of the problem remains untouched. Are women disproportionately exposed to violence? Undoubtedly. However, the problem lies in the roots of patriarchal society – not in migration. In this respect, this narrative fulfils two functions: it divides society through racist narratives and at the same time maintains the patriarchal status quo by ethnicising internalised sexism in the Western world. This ultimately naturalises and legitimises racism because it is attributed a necessity.

For thoose who are interested: 

Dietze, Gabriele (2016): ‚Das Ereignis Köln‘. In: Femina politica: Zeitschrift für feministi- sche Politikwissenschaft, 25 (1), S.93-102.

Dietze, Gabriele (2017): Sexualpolitik. Verflechtung von Race und Gender. Frankfurt/New York: Campus Verlag.

Mayer, Stefanie/Šori, Itzok/Sauer, Birgit (2016): Gendering ‘the People’. Heteronormativity and ‘Ethnomasochism’ in Populist Imaginary. In: Ranieri, Maria (Hrsg.), Populism, Media, and Education. Challenging Discrimination in Contemporary Digital Societies (S.84-102). New York: Routledge. Taylor & Francis Group.

Populist leaders present themselves as agents of radical change — as those who will finally break the power of the elites and return sovereignty to “the people.” Yet beneath this rhetoric of renewal lies a striking continuity. Figures such as Donald Trump, Giorgia Meloni, or Friedrich Merz mobilise social frustration and promise rupture, but the structures of inequality they denounce remain fundamentally untouched.

To make sense of this paradox, Antonio Gramsci’s concept of passive revolution proves highly illuminating. For Gramsci, fundamental political change does not always occur through open revolution, but can also unfold through gradual and controlled transformation from above. A passive revolution describes moments in which ruling groups integrate elements of popular demands into their own project, neutralising opposition while preserving the core of their dominance. Reform and conservation thus coincide: the appearance of renewal conceals the reproduction of power. 

According to that Gramsci describes the concept of passive revolution as a process in which apparent change conceals continuity in power structures. The aim of a passive revolution is “to change everything so that, in essence, everything remains the same” (Becker et al., 2013: 303). In other words, it is a form of transformation that preserves the political and economic dominance of the ruling classes while giving the appearance of reform.

From this perspective, contemporary populism can be read as a late-modern form of passive revolution. Populists absorb the language of protest and discontent, translating it into moral or national narratives that leave economic and social hierarchies intact. Their rhetoric of “taking back control” replaces the demand for structural change with the emotional satisfaction of belonging. Instead of dismantling domination, they reorganise consent — a symbolic transformation that stabilises rather than subverts the established order.

What emerges from this process is not the renewal of democracy but its gradual erosion. Under the guise of popular sovereignty, emancipatory values such as equality, pluralism, and social justice are rolled back. Populism transforms democratic energy into a tool of restoration: it mobilises the many to strengthen the few. The outcome is a hollowed-out political form that retains democratic appearance while concentrating power within narrow economic and political elites. What once claimed to speak for the people now governs in the interest of the privileged — signalling a shift not toward new democratic horizons, but toward renewed plutocratic and aristocratic orders disguised as democracy.

Bibliography:
Becker, Lia/ Candeias, Mario/ Niggemann, Janek/ Steckner, Anne (Hrsg.) (2013): Gramsci lesen. Einstiege in die Gefängnishefte. 6. Auflage. Hamburg: Argument Verlag.

At the end of the sessions on populism and democratic backsliding, I was reminded of an essay by a German philosopher named Hermann Heller. As I may have already mentioned here in this blog, I believe that economic inequality plays a major role in political and social polarization. Heller's concept of social homogeneity may be a more accurate way of explaining this idea than my own words. 

For Hermann Heller, social homogeneity was a key prerequisite for the stable functioning of a modern democratic state. By this he did not mean ethnic or cultural uniformity, but rather a political and social form of commonality. Heller argued that democratic societies need a certain basic consensus on core values and principles – e.g. on the legitimacy of the constitution, democratic procedures, or the legal system. Without this minimum consensus, the political community disintegrates. For Heller, democracy was only possible if social differences did not become so great that they destroyed the community.

And when you think about it carefully, Heller is picking up on fundamental ideas from Locke and Rousseau, who repeatedly emphasize that a free and equal society ultimately guarantees the freedom of the individual. Perhaps it is time to admit honestly that the original ideas of the French Revolution have been completely distorted in the neoliberal era. As inequality grows and grows, we see countries such as the US developing in a plutocratic direction. Therefore, people's anger is entirely understandable. What they fail to see is that by voting for far-right parties, they are not helping to improve their circumstances, but rather contributing to the stabilization of their own oppression.

But as Heller said, we should not simply bury our heads in the sand, but fight for democracy. And fighting for democracy also means fighting for equality and the liberation of people from oppression. 

If you're interested, here's the book: https://www.amazon.de/Kämpfen-für-die-Demokratie-politische/dp/386393167X

Colin Crouch’s idea of post-democracy describes political systems where democratic institutions still exist, but real power shifts to elites, technocrats and corporate interests. Citizens retain the right to vote, yet their ability to influence policy meaningfully declines.

This perspective helps explain the European Union’s democratic deficit. EU governance is often dominated by complex, opaque processes led by bodies such as the Commission, Council and ECB, all of which are only indirectly accountable to voters. Decision-making frequently takes place among experts and specialists, creating a distance between institutions and ordinary citizens.

Corporate influence is another parallel. Brussels’ large lobbying industry gives well-resourced private actors disproportionate access to policymakers, reflecting the post-democratic pattern of business shaping public agendas more than voters do.

Although EU elections occur regularly, they have limited impact on major policy directions, reinforcing Crouch’s notion that democratic rituals persist while their substantive power weakens. Through this lens, the EU’s democratic deficit can be seen as a specific expression of the broader post-democratic shift in advanced democracies.

If you're interested at the issue regarding the democratic deficict of the EU, I highly recommend you reading the Essay of Colin Crouch.

In The Weight of National Public Opinion in Brussels, Fabio Franchino advances the thesis that the European Union cannot be adequately described as suffering from a democratic deficit. He argues that, despite the transfer of important decision-making powers to the European level, democratic representation remains intact because national governments continue to act in line with domestic public opinion when negotiating in Brussels. According to Franchino, ministers in the EU Council are electorally accountable actors whose positions largely reflect voter preferences, particularly under conditions of electoral competition.

From this perspective, EU policy outcomes are not detached from citizens’ interests but instead emerge from a system in which responsiveness varies with political context, much like in national democracies. Franchino therefore suggests that claims of a structural democratic deficit in the EU are misleading and fail to account for the conditional but systematic mechanisms through which public opinion influences European decision-making.

For further readings: https://www.naspread.eu/en/contributions-en/articles-en/why-the-european-union-does-not-suffer-from-a-democracy-deficit.html

A republican critique of Franchino’s position would question not the empirical finding that governments sometimes respond to public opinion in Brussels, but the underlying assumption that responsiveness alone suffices for democratic legitimacy. From a republican perspective, democracy presupposes a political community whose members share a minimum level of social, economic, and normative cohesion. Without such cohesion, political rule risks becoming external domination rather than collective self-government.

This concern is already clearly articulated in Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s On the Social Contract (1762). Rousseau famously argues that legitimate law can only arise where citizens collectively will the law as an expression of the volonté générale. Such collective self-legislation, however, presupposes a political community whose members are sufficiently equal in their material conditions and share a common civic outlook. Rousseau repeatedly warns that extreme economic inequality and deep social divisions undermine the general will, because citizens then begin to pursue partial interests rather than the common good. In Book II of The Social Contract, he explicitly notes that good laws are possible only for a people that is neither too large nor too internally divided, and that political institutions must be adapted to the character, customs, and circumstances of a specific people. From this perspective, democracy is inseparable from a bounded political community, and political rule that extends beyond such shared conditions risks losing its republican legitimacy.

Thinkers such as the already mentioned Hermann Heller developed this republican intuition further in the context of modern mass democracies. For Heller, social homogeneity was a key prerequisite for the stable functioning of a democratic state. By this he did not mean ethnic or cultural uniformity, but a political and social form of commonality grounded in shared values, social expectations, and a basic consensus on constitutional legitimacy. Where social and economic differences become too pronounced, democratic decision-making loses its integrative force and the political community begins to fragment.

Applied to the European Union, this line of reasoning exposes a fundamental problem that Franchino’s account tends to understate. Even if national governments frequently act in line with domestic public opinion when negotiating in Brussels, the EU as a whole lacks the degree of social and economic homogeneity required for genuinely collective self-rule. Member states differ profoundly in their levels of economic development, welfare regimes, historical experiences, and political cultures. As a result, common European rules often impose asymmetric burdens and are interpreted through fundamentally different normative frameworks.

From a republican viewpoint, it is therefore questionable whether it makes democratic sense for citizens in one member state—such as Germany—to effectively shape binding rules for societies, where economic conditions, political priorities, and conceptions of social justice may diverge substantially. In such cases, European integration risks transforming democratic decision-making into a form of cross-national domination, even when formal procedures remain intact.

The central problem, then, is not simply a lack of responsiveness, but a lack of political unity. Democratic legitimacy requires more than accountability mechanisms and electorally constrained governments; it requires a shared political horizon within which citizens can plausibly regard laws as expressions of their own collective will. Where this horizon is absent, integration may undermine rather than strengthen democracy. From this republican perspective, the question is not whether the EU occasionally responds to public opinion, but whether the conditions for democratic self-government exist at the European level in the first place.

For further reading I highly suggest the mentioned works of Rousseau and Heller.