Research
Social Epistemology (of Science): I am currently working on the nature and implications of various distributions of opinions within scientific communities. In particular, I am becoming increasingly obsessed with the issue of how non-scientists should form beliefs about scientific matters based on scientists' professed opinions (which often conflict). Relatedly, I recently served as a guest editor (with Maria Baghramian) of a special issue of Synthese on the topic of disagreement in science. Relevant published work includes:
Disagreement and Consensus in Science (Routledge Handbook of Disagreement, forthcoming)
Consensus versus Unanimity: Which Carries More Weight? (The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, forthcoming)
Interthematic Polarization (American Philosophical Quarterly, 2024).
Excessive Testimony: When Less Is More (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2023)
We Owe It to Others to Think for Ourselves (Epistemic Autonomy, 2021)
The Epistemic Value of Expert Autonomy (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2020)
Should Scientific Realists Embrace Theoretical Conservatism? (Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 2019)
Divergent Perspectives on Expert Disagreement -- with James Beebe, Maria Baghramian & Luke Drury (Environmental Communication, 2018)
When Expert Disagreement Supports the Consensus (Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2018)
Scientific Progress and Understanding: I am also working on an account of scientific (and philosophical) progress in terms of understanding, building on an account of what scientific understanding amounts to. In 2019, Insa Lawler and I received a generous grant from the Icelandic Research Fund for a closely related project called "Understanding Progress, in Science and Beyond". Relevant published work includes:
Dejustifying Scientific Progress -- with James Norton (Philosophy of Science, forthcoming)
Scientific Progress: By-Whom or For-Whom? (Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 2023)
The Noetic Approach: Scientific Progress as Enabling Understanding (New Philosophical Perspectives on Scientific Progress, 2022).
Scientific Progress without Justification (Scientific Understanding and Representation: Modeling in the Physical Sciences, 2022)
Scientific Progress without Problems (Scientific Understanding and Representation: Modeling in the Physical Sciences, 2022)
Understanding Scientific Progress: The Noetic Account (Synthese, 2021)
Rational Understanding: Toward a Probabilistic Epistemology of Acceptability (Synthese, 2021)
Beyond Explanation: Understanding as Dependency Modeling (The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2020)
Scientific Progress: Four Accounts (Philosophy Compass, 2018)
Scientific Progress, Understanding, and Knowledge: Reply to Park (Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 2018)
Understanding without Justification or Belief (Ratio, 2017)
Deductive Cogency, Understanding, and Acceptance" (Synthese, 2017)
Scientific Progress: Knowledge versus Understanding (Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 2016)
Scientific Reasoning and Scientific Realism: For a while now, I have been developing a comprehensive account of IBE as a heuristic for Bayesian or probabilistic reasoning. Relatedly, I am interested in applying this account to debates about scientific realism, i.e. to what extent we should believe that current theories are correct. Relevant previous work includes:
Abductive Reasoning in Science (Cambridge University Press, 2024).
Inferring to the Best Explanation from Uncertain Evidence (Philosophy of Science, forthcoming)
An Epistemic Advantage of Accommodation over Prediction (Philosophers' Imprint, forthcoming)
Expanding the Empirical Realm: Constructive Empiricism and Augmented Observation (Scientific Theories and Philosophical Stances: Themes from van Fraassen, 2024)
Explanatory Consolidation: From 'Best' to 'Good Enough' (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2021)
The Epistemic Impact of Theorizing: Evaluation Bias Implies Generation Bias (Philosophical Studies, 2020)
Scientific Realism in the Wild: An Empirical Study of Seven Sciences and HPS, with James Beebe (Philosophy of Science, 2020)
The Heuristic Conception of Inference to the Best Explanation (Philosophical Studies, 2018)
Abductively Robust Inference (Analysis, 2017)
Reactionary Responses to the Bad Lot Objection (Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 2017)
Realism and the Absence of Rivals (Synthese, 2017)
Reconstructed Empiricism (Acta Analytica, 2017)
Explanatory Rivals and the Ultimate Argument (Theoria, 2016)
Philosophical Progress and Philosophical Methodology: Recently I have taken an interest in question in metaphilosophy, i.e. the philosophy of philosophy. In particular, I am interested in the nature of philosophical progress and how to achieve it, which in turn has lead to some projects about philosophical methodology. Published work includes:
Philosophical Methodology: A Plea for Tolerance -- with Sam Baron, Tina Firing, and James Norton (Analysis, forthcoming)
What is Philosophical Progress? -- with Tina Firing, Insa Lawler and James Norton (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2024)
Probabilifying Reflective Equilibrium (Synthese, 2024)
Would Disagreement Undermine Progress? -- with Insa Lawler and James Norton (The Journal of Philosophy, 2023)
Thinking about Progress: From Science to Philosophy -- with Insa Lawler and James Norton (Noûs, 2022)
Miscellaneous Other Topics: I also have various other interests in other areas of philosophy that I work on when the opportunity arises. For example, I am very interested in biases and objectivity in science, the relationship between mainstream and formal epistemology, the nature of epistemic and practical normativity, and in the history of philosophy. Relevant work includes:
Promotion as Contrastive Increase in Expected Fit -- with Nate Sharadin (Philosophical Studies, 2018)
The Beliefs and Intentions of Buridan's Ass -- with Nate Sharadin (Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 2018)
Certainty and Explanation in Descartes' Philosophy of Science (HOPOS, 2017)
Philosophy in Icelandic
Finally, I have taken pains to do at least part of my research in my native language, Icelandic. This work is normally, though not exclusively, intended for a slightly wider audience than professional philosophers. So it is one way for me to "reach out" a little (although see also this). I have also contributed to Icelandic philosophy by serving as editor-in-chief of the (only) Icelandic philosophy journal, Hugur, for the past two years (the 2018 & 2019 issues). Relevant work in Icelandic includes:
Fyrir hverja eru fræðin? (Ritið, 2023)
Gildi vísinda og gildin í vísindum -- á tímum heimsfaraldurs (Skírnir, 2020)
Að treysta sérfræðingum: Hvað, hvenær og hvers vegna? (Ritið, 2020)
Frá skoðunum til trúnaðar og aftur til baka: Yfirlit um bayesíska þekkingarfræði (Hugur, 2017)
Hlutdrægni í vísindum: Vanákvörðun, tilleiðsluáhætta og tilurð kenninga (Ritið, 2016)
Gagnrýnin og vísindaleg hugsun (Skírnir, 2016)
Tvö viðhorf til vísindalegrar þekkingar – eða eitt? (Ritið, 2015)