Selection of publications

Books

2014, Semantic Under-determinacy and Communication, London/Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.

2021, Semantica e Pragmatica: un'introduzione. Da Grice ai giorni nostri, Bologna: Clueb. [in Italian] 

Edited works

(in preparation) Special issue of Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy on 'Pluralism and Conceptual Engineering'.

Articles in peer-reviewed journals

2024, ‘You’re changing the subject’: An Unfair Objection to Conceptual Engineering? The Philosophical Quarterly, Early View: https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqae031. 

2023, Conceptual Engineering Between Representational Skepticism and Complacency: Is There a Third Way? Topoi, Early View: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-023-09924-3.

2022, Ontological Disagreements, Reference, and Charity: A Challenge for Hirsch’s Deflationism, Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy, Early View: https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12421.

2021, On Pluralism and Conceptual Engineering: Introduction and Overview, Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, OnlineFirst: DOI: 10.1080/0020174X.2021.1983457.

2021, Ontological disagreements, Reliability and Standoffs: The Pluralist Option, Metaphilosophy, 52, 3-4: 348-362. DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/meta.12497 

2021, Downplaying the Change of Subject Objection to Conceptual Engineering, Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, OnlineFirst: DOI: 10.1080/0020174X.2021.1908161.

2020, Ontological Disputes and the Phenomenon of Metalinguistic Negotiation: Charting the Territory, Philosophy Compass, vol. 15, n. 7, pp. 1-11. DOI: 10.1002/PHC3.12684.

2020, Slurs: Departures from Genuine Uses and Derogation, Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric, 62(75): 9-24. DOI: 10.2478/slgr-2020-0011.

2018, Two Species of Merely Verbal Disputes. Metaphilosophy, vol. 49, n. 5, pp. 691-710.

2017, Verbalism and Metalinguistic Negotiation in Ontological Disputes, Philosophical Studies, 174(9): 2211–2226.

2016, The Underdeterminacy of Sentences and the Expressibility of our Thoughts, dialectica, 70(1): 29-48.

2014, You Can Say What You Think: Vindicating the Effability of Our Thoughts, Synthese, 191(18): 4431-4450.

2014, Disagreement and Dispute, Philosophia, 42 (2): 289-307.

2013, On What is Effable, Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 2(4, Dec): 341–349.

2013, Towards a Unified Notion of Disagreement (with M. Palmira), Grazer Philosophische Studien, 88: 124-139.

2013, Meta-Representation in Utterance Comprehension: the Case of Semantically Incomplete Expressions, Journal of Pragmatics 57(C): 158–169.

Articles in collected volumes

2021, Are Ontological Questions Meaningless? in Miller, J. (ed.), The Language of Ontology, Oxford University Press. ISBN: 9780192895332.

2020, Minimal Substantivity, in Burgess, A., Cappelen, H. and Plunkett, D. (eds.) Conceptual Ethics and Conceptual Engineering, Oxford University Press, pp. 59-78.

2019, Ontological Relativism and the Status of Ontological Disputes, in Kusch, M. (ed.) The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism, London: Routledge, pp. 367-75.

2018, Gettier and Context (with A. Coliva), in Hetherington S. (ed.) Classic Philosophical Arguments – The Gettier Problem, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 78-95.

2017, A Pluralistic Way Out of Epistemic Deflationism about Ontological Disputes, in Coliva, A. and Pedersen, N. (eds.), Epistemic Pluralism, London-Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, pp. 317-44.

Encyclopaedia entries

2022, Engenharia conceitual, in J. Branquinho, R. Santos (eds.) Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica. Lisboa: Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa, DOI: https://doi.org/10.51427/cfi.2021.0089 (in Portuguese).

Reviews

2022, Review of Norms and Necessity, by Amie L. Thomasson (2020, Oxford University Press), in The Philosophical Review, 131 (1): 119–123.

2022, Review of Ontology without Borders by Jody Azzouni (2017, Oxford University Press), in Philosophical Inquiries, Vol. 10 No. 1 (2022).

2016, Review of Meaning Without Representation, ed. by S. Gross, N. Tebben and M. Williams (2015, Oxford University Press), in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. 

2015, Review of The Self and Self Knowledge, ed. by A. Coliva (2012, Oxford University Press), in Philosophical Inquiries Vol. 3 No. 2 (co-written with A. Pasquali).