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Abstract
This chapter extends the model of Matros and Rietzke (2024) to a setting where contenders incur participation costs for each contest they join. Participants exert identical effort across all entered contests while bearing separate costs per contest. Contrary to the established result in Matros and Rietzke (2024), we show that the complete bipartite network no longer maximizes aggregate effort under this modified cost structure.
Through numerical analysis of a three-player, two-contest game with asymmetric prize values, we evaluate aggregate effort across all possible bipartite networks. We find that a designer can maximize total effort by structuring the network so that one player specializes exclusively in the highest-value contest while others compete across multiple contests. This configuration induces the specialist to exert significantly higher effort in the high-value contest; although it reduces effort from the remaining players, the net effect is an increase in aggregate effort. Our results underscore the critical role of participation costs in optimal contest design and offer new insights for organizers seeking to maximize total activity through network structuring.
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