Current Research
Working Papers
“How Much Do Firms Drive Healthcare Utilization: Evidence from Multi-Payer Claims Data” [Joint with Daniel Hosken, Tom Koch, and Marshall Thomas]
Draft available upon request
The Effect of Investments on Labor Union Performance [Joint with Ron Yang]
Abstract:
Over the past 40 years, private sector labor union performance has diverged, with some unions expanding while others contract. In this paper, we explore whether this divergence is related to labor unions' financial resources and management. Using U.S. union financial reports, we document that approximately 40 percent of all private sector local union assets are held in cash. Most locals hold no investments, and the decline in private sector unionization since 2000 has been concentrated in locals without investments. Using two research designs, we find that additional financial resources improve union members' wages and union membership. In a quasi-shift-share design, a one percent increase in investment returns increases union members' wages by 0.27 percent and union membership by 0.37 percent. Similarly, a one percent increase in housing prices increases union members' wages and union membership among property-holding unions by approximately 0.12 percent more than unions without property holdings. Exploring mechanisms, we find evidence in favor of additional assets improving unions' bargaining positions and allowing them to spend more. Aggregating these effects, if unions invested 10 percent of their 2001 cash holdings in S&P 500 index funds, in 2021 average wages among union members would be 0.8 percent higher and aggregate membership would be 0.9 percent higher.Abstract:
Firms increasingly use outsourced labor - does outsourcing impact remaining workers in outsourcing firms? Using administrative data, I show Germany’s Hartz reforms induced outsourcing to temporary help contractors. Exploiting this variation in a Stacked Difference-in-Differences design, outsourcing to temp-help contractors: (1) increases remaining workers’ earnings by 3.9% (2) reduces separation hazard by 1.6 percentage points and (3) increases firms’ investment, employment, and revenues. Using Recentered Influence Functions, increasing outsourcing by 10 percentage points decreases the bottom of the wage distribution by 0.4%, but increases the top three-fourths of the wage distribution by 0.2%.Abstract:
This paper examines whether labor market demand shocks explain changes in independent contracting rates. In a simple model with uncertainty and fixed costs, independent contracting allows for shorter-term jobs between mismatched workers and firms. Contracting increases the quantity of jobs but reduces average job quality. I investigate whether the quantity or quality effect dominates using two labor demand shocks, the China Shock and Great Recession. Both shocks reduce contractor share—more contractors become unemployed than employees become contractors. This suggests the quantity effect dominates— allowing contracting means more unemployed workers become contractors than regular employees get shifted to contracting.Abstract:
This paper provides causal evidence on how changing the legal boundaries of employment – whether a worker is defined as a firm's “employee” versus an outside contractor – affects labor market outcomes. We introduce a dataset of all U.S. Circuit Court cases making substantive employment determinations for the years 1990-2018 and link them to state- and occupation-level data on employment and earnings. Our difference-in-differences analysis reveals how employee definitions impact firm structure: when courts give workers additional legal rights by declaring them “employees”, low-wage workers are more likely to be outsourced. For occupations where effort is more easily monitored (e.g. janitors, guards), “is-employee” determinations increase outsourcing and reduce earnings. For occupations where effort cannot be monitored easily (e.g. doctors, scientists, engineers), employment declines and workers are more likely to be independent contractors.Ongoing Projects
How Does Monopsony Affect Workers Entering the Labor Market: Evidence from German Apprenticeships [joint with Miriam Larson-Koester]
Monopoly, Minimum Wages, and Capital Expenditures [joint with Devesh Raval]
What Causes Independent Contracting? Evidence from ABC Laws [joint with Andy Garin]