Forthcoming Papers
"Merger Effects and Antitrust Enforcement: Evidence from US Consumer Packaged Goods" (with Vivek Bhattacharya and Gaston Illanes)
January 2026
Forthcoming at the American Economic Review (Online Appendix)
We document the effects of a comprehensive set of mergers of US consumer packaged goods manufacturers on prices, quantities, and product assortment. Across specifications, we find a small average price effect of mergers (-0.5% to 1.1%) but substantial heterogeneity in effects, with a standard deviation between 3.9–7.6 pp. Through a model of enforcement, we find that agencies act as if they challenge mergers they expect would increase prices more than 4.8–6.3%. Increases in stringency would reduce prices and the prevalence of completed price-increasing mergers, with minimal impacts on blocked price-decreasing mergers, at a significantly greater agency burden.
Working Papers
"A Large-Scale Evaluation of Merger Simulations" (with Vivek Bhattacharya, Gaston Illanes, Avner Kreps, and Jose D. Salas)
Last Updated: March 2026
Prospective merger simulations are a commonly used tool in industrial organization and antitrust, but evidence about their accuracy is limited. We study 101 mergers in consumer packaged goods and compare the realizations of price changes with predictions from merger simulations. Predicted price changes from merger simulations are typically larger than realized ones. We explore whether these deviations are consistent with cost synergies or driven by misspecification. Despite the overprediction, we find that merger simulations are more effective than structural presumptions at identifying mergers with large price changes.
"Non-Profits, Competition, and Risk Segmentation in Consumer Lending Markets" (with Andres Shahidinejad and Jordan van Rijn)
Last Updated: February 2026
Revise and Resubmit at the Review of Financial Studies
We study how competition between non- and for-profit lenders shapes the equilibrium distribution of credit risk across lending institutions. Using auto loan data, we document direct competition between banks and credit unions, as well as a degree of risk-based market segmentation: credit unions serve observably and unobservably lower-risk borrowers. Using exposure to bank mergers as variation in market structure, we provide evidence that price differences between credit unions and banks contribute to this segmentation. We interpret this result through a model that incorporates both profit deviation by credit unions and adverse selection on borrower risk.
"Loan Guarantees and Incentives for Information Acquisition"
Last Updated: January 2024
To address credit constraints in small-business lending markets, policymakers frequently use loan guarantees, which insure lenders against default. Guarantees affect loan prices by altering the effective marginal cost of lending but may create a moral hazard problem, weakening lenders’ information-acquisition incentives. I quantify these channels using data from the SBA 7(a) Loan Program. Guarantees benefit borrowers, on average, but redistribute surplus from low- to high-risk borrowers. Fixing government spending, an alternative policy with a 50% guarantee and a subsidy leads to an increase in borrower surplus and 0.1 percentage point (1.1%) decline in the program’s default rate.
"Incentive Structures and Borrower Composition in the Paycheck Protection Program" (with Paul Kim)
Last Updated: November 2021
We study the design of the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP), a loan-forgiveness scheme that is implemented through private lenders and assists small businesses in keeping their employees on payroll during the COVID-19 pandemic. We develop a model of PPP lending to capture the government’s tradeoff between inducing bank participation and targeting funds for use on payroll. Using the model, we establish that both increasing subsidies and relaxing forgiveness standards are effective in expanding credit access to borrowers seeking smaller loans. However, their efficacy in targeting (i.e., providing funds to businesses who will use them on payroll) depends on the correlation between loan amounts and borrowers’ return to payroll. We test the implications of the model using policy variation from the PPP Flexibility Act, legislation that relaxed forgiveness standards. Consistent with the predictions of the model, the average loan amount falls by between 6 and 7% in the period following the policy change. Furthermore, marginal borrowers are more likely than inframarginal borrowers to use funds for payroll, so making forgiveness more accessible increases the average share of funds used for those purposes.
Work in Progress
"Asymmetric Regulation and Competition in Mortgage Lending: Implications for Low- and Moderate-Income Borrowers" (with Andres Shahidinejad)
"How Do Firms Respond to Changes in Investor Demand? The Role of Financial Market Power in Corporate Policy" (with Ali Sanati)