Embedded Files
My book The Quality of Thought was published by Oxford University Press in 2024. It develops and defends the thesis that thinking is a kind of experience, characterized by a sui generis phenomenology, and draws out the implications of this thesis for dominant views in philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and metaphysics.
Reviewed in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, November 2024
Subject of a New Books in Philosophy podcast, February 2025
Subject of a symposium in The Journal of Consciousness Studies, April 2025
Reviewed the European Journal of Philosophy, December 2025
Critical study by Terry Horgan forthcoming in Grazer Philosophiche Studien
Selected Papers
“3I Cognition”, in Representation in Ab/Use: Representations in Science and Cognition, I. Danka and Z. Kondor, eds., Bloomsbury Publishing, Forthcoming.
“Précis” and “Replies to Siewert, Coleman and Mendelovici,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 32, 2025: 153-157; 214-224.
“A Return to Simple Sentences,” Routledge Handbook of Linguistic Reference, S. Biggs and H. Geirsson, eds., New York: Routledge, 2020: 145-52.
"Loar’s Compromised Internalism,” in A. Sullivan, ed., Sensations, Thoughts, Language: Essays in Honor of Brian Loar, New York: Routledge, 2019: 203-224.
“Acquaintance and Phenomenal Concepts,” in S. Coleman, ed., Cambridge Classic Arguments Series: The Knowledge Argument, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019: 87-101.
“What Kind of Science is Linguistics?” in C. Behme and M. Neef, eds., Essays on Linguistic Realism, John Benjamins, 2018: 7-20.
“The Paraphenomenal Hypothesis,” Analysis 77, October 2017: 735–741.
“Conscious Belief,” Book forum on Tim Crane’s Aspects of Psychologism, Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Pscologia Vol 7, N° 1, 2016: 121-126.
“Indexical Thought,” in U. Kriegel, ed., Phenomenal Intentionality: New Essays, Oxford University Press, 2013: 49-70.
“Introspection, Phenomenality and the Availability of Intentional Content,” in T. Bayne and M. Montague, eds., Cognitive Phenomenology, Oxford University Press, 2011: 141-173.
“Intentional Psychologism,” Philosophical Studies 146, October 2009: 117-138.
“The Phenomenology of Cognition, or, What Is It Like to Think That P?”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LXIX, July 2004 [accepted for publication 2002]: 1-36.
“Alter Egos and Their Names,” The Journal of Philosophy XCVIII, October 2001: 531-552.
“In Defense of Definitions,” Philosophical Psychology 12, June 1999: 139-156.
Work in Progress
"Naive and Direct Realism" (paper)
"Higher-Order Illusionism" (paper)
Objects and Their Phases (book manuscript)
Page updated
Google Sites
Report abuse