Research
Publications
Joint with Natalia Fabra.
RAND Journal of Economics, 54 (1), 3-53
We assess how firms' incentives to operate and invest in energy storage depend on the market structure. For this purpose, we characterize equilibrium market outcomes allowing for market power in storage and/or production, as well as for vertical integration between storage and production. Market power reduces overall efficiency through two channels: it induces an inefficient use of the storage facilities, and it distorts investment incentives. The worst outcome for consumers and total welfare occurs under vertical integration. The results are key to understanding how to regulate energy storage, an issue which is critical for the deployment of renewables.
Joint with Milena Almagro.
Theoretical Economics, 15 (2), 763-810
This paper explores the dynamics of nation-building policies and the conditions under which a state can promote a shared national identity on its territory. A forward-looking central government that internalizes identity dynamics shapes them by choosing the level of state centralization. Homogenization attempts are constrained by political unrest, electoral competition and the intergenerational transmission of identities within the family. We find nation-building efforts are generally characterized by fast interventions. We show that a zero-sum conflict over resources pushes long-run dynamics toward homogeneous steady states and extreme levels of (de)centralization. We also find the ability to foster a common identity is highly dependent on initial conditions, and that country-specific historical factors can have a lasting impact on the long-run distribution of identities.
Working Papers
Joint with Natalia Fabra.
Conventional wisdom claims that renewables and storage are complements. However, we show that this relationship does not always hold. In markets where renewables availability moves procyclically in relation to demand and renewable capacity is small, increasing storage (renewable) capacity negatively impacts renewable (storage) firms and total welfare. The same applies to the ``scarce'' renewable technology in multi-technology markets with both procyclical and countercyclical technologies. These findings have policy implications for the optimal timing and effectiveness of mandates or subsidies for renewables and storage. Simulations of the Spanish wholesale electricity market illustrate our results.
CLIMATE POLITICS AND THE DYNAMICS OF GREEN PREFERENCES
We analyze whether societies will adopt the environmental values and lifestyles required for tackling climate change. In particular, the paper studies how the co-evolution between consumers’ environmental concerns and the politics of environmental policies can achieve the energy transition. The results show that interventions by lobbying firms and environmental activists, even when short-lived, can have long-lasting effects.
BRIGHT GREEN OR PALE GREEN? DESIGNING THE GREEN HYDROGEN REGULATION
Joint with Natalia Fabra.
THE DYNAMIC POLITICS OF ADAPTATION AND MITIGATION
Joint with Antoine Loeper and Álvaro Delgado-Vega.
ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVISTS, ELECTORAL POLITICS, AND THE GRETA EFFECT