Research 

Working Papers:

Keeping in the Dark with Hard Evidence (Joint with Alex Frug)  ​ 

abstract:  We present a dynamic learning setting in which the periodic data observed by a decision-maker is mediated by an agent. We study when, and to what extent, this mediation can distort the decision-maker’s long-run learning, even though the agent's reports are restricted to consist of verifiable hard evidence and must adhere to certain standards. We first illustrate the extent and mechanisms of manipulation in  specific economic settings. We then derive a general manipulation-proof law of large numbers: when it holds, the decision-maker’s learning is guaranteed in the long-run; when it fails, the scope for manipulation is essentially unrestricted.

Search, Matching, and Dating Apps: Designed to be Deleted, or Designed to be Repeated? (Joint with Yair Antler and Daniel Fershtman)

abstract: Should online matching platforms adopt new technologies that enable faster search and screening for better matches? We study this question through the lens of  a platform-mediated two-sided search model. On the one hand, the platform wishes to provide high-quality search and matching services to attract repeat clientele, but on the other hand, it may wish to avoid inducing matches that are so good that agents never terminate them. We find that the platform benefits from reducing search frictions but suffers from improving the quality of matches, and show that both types of technology advances reduce the platform’s optimal fee.

Central Bank Digital Currency: When Price and Bank Stability (Don't) Collide (Joint with David Weiss) R&R at Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 

abstract: In a recent influential paper, Schilling, Fernández-Villaverde and Uhlig (2024) caution that the introduction of a central bank digital currency gives rise to a central bank trilemma in a nominal version of the quintessential Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model of bank-runs. Specifically, the central bank can achieve at most two out of three policy objectives: attaining the socially efficient allocation, financial stability, and price stability. We show that the central bank can employ a natural policy to evade their concerns. In particular, the central bank can create debt, backed by assets, to provide to patient runners. Giving patient households the option to save, rather than spend, with a safe asset solves the inflationary pressures of a run. The key mechanism is thus liability composition: accommodating safe- asset demand without monetizing goods-market demand.

Learning in the Marriage Market: The Economics of Dating (Joint with Yair Antler and Daniel Fershtman) R&R at AEJ Microeconomics 

abstract: We develop a search-and-matching model where potential partners can learn about their compatibility as a couple by spending time together (interpreted as dating). We show that a steady-state equilibrium exists and characterize its induced dating patterns. We find that highly attractive individuals are more selective, and we derive conditions under which equilibria induce  positive assortative matching. Furthermore, we show that, even when these conditions hold, the socially optimal outcome can exhibit negative assortative matching. Finally, we apply our framework to study the effect of recent advances in search technologies on dating patterns and the connection between dating and interracial segregation.