Research 

Published and Forthcoming:

1. The Effect of Privacy on Market Structure and Prices (Joint with Zvika Neeman),  Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization (2025), 41(2):498--526 

2. Money Under the Mattress: Inflation and Lending of Last Resort (Joint with Gadi Barlevy, Daniel Fershtman, and David Weiss),  Journal of Economic Theory (2024), 217:105804

3. Sequential Learning (Joint with Yair Antler and Santiago Oliveros), AEJ Microeconomics (2023), 15(1):399-433​

 Sequential Learning Online Appendix 

4. What Should a Firm Know? Protecting Consumers' Privacy Rents (Joint with Zvika Neeman), AEJ Microeconomics (2022), 14(4):257–95 

5. Monotone Contracts (Joint with Alex Frug)​, Theoretical Economics (2022), 17(3):1041–73

6. Optimal Contracts with Randomly Arriving Tasks (Joint with Alex Frug)​, Economic Journal (2021), 131( 637):1905–18

7. Dynamic Nonmoneatry Incentives (Joint with Alex Frug), AEJ Microeconomics (2019), 11(4):111–50

Working Papers:

Keeping in the Dark with Hard Evidence (Joint with Alex Frug)  ​ 

abstract:  We examine a dynamic setting where, in each period, an agent privately observes periodic data and submits a report to the principal based on the realized data. We identify conditions under which the Law of Large Numbers, which typically guarantees accurate inference, may fail in this mediated environment. In particular, we characterize when the agent can systematically bias the principal’s long-run beliefs and obstruct her ability to learn the true state. We then study two distinct scenarios —- persuasion and reform avoidance —- demonstrating how strategic disclosure can significantly alter long-term outcomes.

Search, Matching, and Dating Apps: Designed to be Deleted, or Designed to be Repeated? (Joint with Yair Antler and Daniel Fershtman)

abstract: Should online matching platforms adopt new technologies that enable faster search and screening for better matches? We study this question through the lens of  a platform-mediated two-sided search model. On the one hand, the platform wishes to provide high-quality search and matching services to attract repeat clientele, but on the other hand, it may wish to avoid inducing matches that are so good that agents never terminate them. We find that the platform benefits from reducing search frictions but suffers from improving the quality of matches, and show that both types of technology advances reduce the platform’s optimal fee.

A Theory of Front-line Management (Joint with Alex Frug)  ​ R&R at Management Science 

abstract: Mid- and low-level managers play a significant role within the organizational hierarchy, far beyond monitoring. It is often their responsibility to respond to opportunities and threats within their units by adjusting their subordinates'  assignments. Most such managers, however, lack the authority to adapt their subordinates' wages. Instead, they rely on other, more restrictive incentive schemes. We study the interaction between a front-line manager and worker, and characterize the ``managerial style'' as a function of the players' relative patience and information. Our analysis also offers insights into broader organizational design problems such as selecting the managers' discretion level, promotion policies, etc. 

Search, Dating, and Segregation in Marriage (Joint with Yair Antler and Daniel Fershtman) R&R at AEJ Microeconomics 

abstract: We study statistical discrimination in a marriage market where agents, characterized by attractiveness (e.g., wealth) and background (e.g., race, ethnicity), engage in time-consuming search. Upon meeting, couples date to learn about their match's quality. Following Phelps (1972), different backgrounds impede such learning. We show that even absent any bias, equilibrium features segregation. Moreover,  welfare improvements  enhance segregation. In particular, radical improvements in search technologies induce complete segregation and a “dating apocalypse'' where agents replace partners frequently. We show that, in line with empirical findings, segregation is decreasing in couples’ attractiveness, and provide conditions for (probabilistic) positive sorting by attractiveness.

Older papers:

​Dynamic Disclosure with Uncertain Disclosure Costs