Research 

Published and Forthcoming:

1. The Effect of Privacy on Market Structure and Prices (Joint with Zvika Neeman),  Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization (2025), 41(2):498--526 

2. Money Under the Mattress: Inflation and Lending of Last Resort (Joint with Gadi Barlevy, Daniel Fershtman, and David Weiss),  Journal of Economic Theory (2024), 217:105804

3. Sequential Learning (Joint with Yair Antler and Santiago Oliveros), AEJ Microeconomics (2023), 15(1):399-433​

 Sequential Learning Online Appendix 

4. What Should a Firm Know? Protecting Consumers' Privacy Rents (Joint with Zvika Neeman), AEJ Microeconomics (2022), 14(4):257–95 

5. Monotone Contracts (Joint with Alex Frug)​, Theoretical Economics (2022), 17(3):1041–73

6. Optimal Contracts with Randomly Arriving Tasks (Joint with Alex Frug)​, Economic Journal (2021), 131( 637):1905–18

7. Dynamic Nonmoneatry Incentives (Joint with Alex Frug), AEJ Microeconomics (2019), 11(4):111–50

Working Papers:

Keeping in the Dark with Hard Evidence (Joint with Alex Frug)  ​ 

abstract:  We present a dynamic learning setting in which the periodic data observed by a decision-maker is mediated by an agent. We study when, and to what extent, this mediation can distort the decision-maker’s long-run learning, even though the agent's reports are restricted to consist of verifiable hard evidence and must adhere to certain standards. We first illustrate the extent and mechanisms of manipulation in  specific economic settings. We then derive a general manipulation-proof law of large numbers: when it holds, the decision-maker’s learning is guaranteed in the long-run; when it fails, the scope for manipulation is essentially unrestricted.

Search, Matching, and Dating Apps: Designed to be Deleted, or Designed to be Repeated? (Joint with Yair Antler and Daniel Fershtman)

abstract: Should online matching platforms adopt new technologies that enable faster search and screening for better matches? We study this question through the lens of  a platform-mediated two-sided search model. On the one hand, the platform wishes to provide high-quality search and matching services to attract repeat clientele, but on the other hand, it may wish to avoid inducing matches that are so good that agents never terminate them. We find that the platform benefits from reducing search frictions but suffers from improving the quality of matches, and show that both types of technology advances reduce the platform’s optimal fee.

A Theory of Front-line Management (Joint with Alex Frug)  ​ R&R at Management Science 

abstract: Mid- and low-level managers play a significant role within the organizational hierarchy, far beyond monitoring. It is often their responsibility to respond to opportunities and threats within their units by adjusting their subordinates'  assignments. Most such managers, however, lack the authority to adapt their subordinates' wages. Instead, they rely on other, more restrictive incentive schemes. We study the interaction between a front-line manager and worker, and characterize the ``managerial style'' as a function of the players' relative patience and information. Our analysis also offers insights into broader organizational design problems such as selecting the managers' discretion level, promotion policies, etc. 

Learning in the Marriage Market: The Economics of Dating (Joint with Yair Antler and Daniel Fershtman) R&R at AEJ Microeconomics 

abstract: We develop a search-and-matching model where potential partners can learn about their compatibility as a couple by spending time together (interpreted as dating). We show that a steady-state equilibrium exists and characterize its induced dating patterns. We find that highly attractive individuals are more selective, and we derive conditions under which equilibria induce  positive assortative matching. Furthermore, we show that, even when these conditions hold, the socially optimal outcome can exhibit negative assortative matching. Finally, we apply our framework to study the effect of recent advances in search technologies on dating patterns and the connection between dating and interracial segregation.

Older papers:

​Dynamic Disclosure with Uncertain Disclosure Costs