Matching with Nonexclusive Contracts
A variety of empirical papers document the coexistence of exclusive and non-exclusive contracts within a given market across a multitude of industries. However, the theoretical literature has not been able to generate a model with the coexistence of these contracts. I rectify the gap in the literature by developing a theoretical model of two-sided matching, in which principals and agents choose between exclusive and non-exclusive contracts with cost of effort inefficiencies. I find that coexistence of contracts relies on cost-sharing between principals, relative bargaining power, and an endogenous outside option. In addition to contract coexistence, I show the pattern of contracts in the market is monotonic with regard to the type distribution.
Two-Sided Productivity Heterogeneity, Firm Boundaries, and Assortative Matching with Kaniska Dam and Konstantinos Serfes
We study markets where production requires the coordination of two complementary units. The market consists of a continuum of units on each side that are vertically ranked with respect to their productivities. Units match one-to-one to form an enterprise. An enterprise can choose a centralized or a decentralized form of organization and managerial actions are non-contractible. The choice between two organizational modes gives rise to non-smooth Pareto frontiers. There is ample empirical evidence that this is the prevailing structure in many markets and matching is positive assortative. We provide a novel condition, in addition to the standard type-type and type-payoff complementarities, for positive assortative matching in this non-smooth imperfectly transferable utility (ITU) environment, which we term type-organization complementarity. Higher enterprise revenue makes integration more likely, but how the surplus is shared within an enterprise also affects the incentives to integrate. There are equilibria where more productive enterprises integrate and equilibria where more productive enterprises choose non-integration. These patterns have implications about the enterprise productivity. We investigate the effect of model primitives on the market productivity distribution.
ML Methods for Cloud Computing Contract Price Index Estimation
Estimating Depreciation Rates for Smartphones
Welfare and Wealth: Two-Sided Heterogeneity and Incentive Contracts under UBI