Publications

Abstract: We address the problem of monopoly in general equilibrium in a mixed version of a monopolistic two-commodity exchange economy where the monopolist, represented as an atom, is endowed with one commodity and “small traders,” represented by an atomless part, are endowed only with the other. First we provide an economic theoretical foundation of the monopoly solution in this bilateral framework through a formalization of an explicit trading process inspired by Pareto (Cours d’économie politique. F. Rouge Editeur, Lausanne, 1896) for an exchange economy with a finite number of commodities, and we give the conditions under which our monopoly solution has the geometric characterization proposed by Schydlowsky and Siamwalla (Q J Econ 80:147–153, 1966). Then, we provide a game theoretical foundation of our monopoly solution through a two-stage reformulation of our model. This allows us to prove that the set of the allocations corresponding to a monopoly equilibrium and the set of the allocations corresponding to a subgame perfect equilibrium of the two-stage game coincide. Finally, we compare our model of monopoly with a bilateral exchange version of a pioneering model proposed by Forchheimer (Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirschafts im Deutschen Reich 32:1–12, 1908), known as a model of “partial monopoly” since there a monopolist shares a market with a“competitive fringe.” 


Research projects

Abstract We study the existence of a monopoly equilibrium in the bilateral mixed exchange framework introduced by Busetto et al.(2023). Non existence examples in which small traders have CES utility functions are provided and a link between the existence of an equilibrium and the degree of substitutability of the goods is explored. Therefore, the existence result is proved by introducing a sufficient assumption on the utilities of the small traders, stressing that we need them to be locally equivalent to linear utilities.

Absract: We consider a mixed version of the Shapley window model, where large traders are represented as atoms and small traders are represented by an atomless part. Motivated by the result that a countable infinity of atoms is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for a Cournot-Nash allocation to be a Walras allocation, we analyze the asymptotic relationship between the set of the Cournot-Nash allocations of the strategic market game and the Walras allocations of the exchange economy with which it is associated. Our main theorem shows that any sequence of Cournot-Nash allocations of the strategic market games associated with the partial replications of the exchange economy has a limit point for each trader and that the assignment determined by these limit points is a Walrasian allocation of the original economy. Instead of relying on restrictive assumptions on the characteristics of atoms, as in Busetto et al. (2017), our limit theorem relies on the characteristics of agents in the atomless part and their endogenously price-taking behavior.

Abstract: What is the appropriate economic welfare standard for antitrust in general equilibrium? In this paper, we address this question in an Edgeworth box economy model of monopoly introduced by Busetto et al. (2023), where one commodity is held only by the monopolist, represented as an atom, and the other is held only by small traders, represented by an atomless part. In this framework, we reconcile the different approaches characterizing the so-called Chicago School, on one hand, and the so-called New Brandeis School, on the other. Moreover, we readapt to our context a paradox, first formulated by Shitovitz (1997), which shows that the Brandeisian “curse of bigness” overwhelms the direct exercise of market power by the monopolist. 

Abstract: Aiming at relaxing internal constraints, much research focuses on the effectiveness of changing aspirations. Yet little is known about how these aspirations change over time. This project studies aspiration adaptation and whether hope can function as a capability - fuelling and sustaining aspirations. We develop a theoretical framework to predict the process of aspiration formation and development, and offer insight into the role of hope in such process. By combining experimental evidence, this project attempts to shed light on the relationship between aspiration adaptation and hope. Focusing on a cohort of students in the University of Glasgow, a randomised controlled trial (RCT) is designed to provide support for the predictions arising from the theory and assess the effects on hope and aspirations by exposure to role-models