"The Time Sensitivity of Aspirational Interventions: Evidence from a Role-Modeling RCT ", (2026), with P.Bhan, J.Wen and M.Schroeder, Accepted PLOS One. AEA RCT Registry
"Noncooperative Oligopoly in Markets with a Continuum of Traders and a Strongly Connected Set of Commodities: A Limit Theorem", (2026) with F.Busetto, G. Codognato, S. Ghosal and L. Julien. Games and Economics Behaviour
"Monopoly in Bilateral Exchange: Some Historico-Analytical Remarks", (2025) with F.Busetto, G. Codognato, F. Donzelli and S. Ghosal. Journal of Public Economic Theory
"On three welfare properties of monopoly in bilateral exchange" (2025), with F.Busetto, G. Codognato and S. Ghosal. Journal of Mathematical Economics
"On the foundation of monopoly in bilateral exchange" (2023) , with F.Busetto, G. Codognato and S. Ghosal, International Journal of Game Theory
"Disadvantage and Beliefs" with P.Dalton and S. Ghosal. Submitted. Latest draft available upon request.
Abstract: We study how structural disadvantage (e.g., race, class, gender) shapes the formation of subjective beliefs about the returns to effort. We formalize and distinguish between psychological constructs such as locus of control, self-efficacy, and grit, and study their response to structural disadvantage and policy interventions. In our model, individuals share the same (unknown) innate ability, and beliefs about success can only be updated through effort. However, agents fail to internalize the dynamic feedback between effort and belief formation. Structural disadvantage raises the threshold of belief required to justify effort, increasing the likelihood of falling into a pessimistic low-effort trap. We characterize the conditions under which psychological interventions that bound beliefs from below and enhance grit improve welfare, and when such interventions must be complemented by policies that relax external constraints to be effective.
Abstract: We study the existence of a monopoly equilibrium in the bilateral mixed exchange framework introduced by Busetto et al.(2023). Non existence examples in which small traders have CES utility functions are provided and a link between the existence of an equilibrium and the degree of substitutability of the goods is explored. Therefore, the existence result is proved by introducing a sufficient assumption on the utilities of the small traders, stressing that we need them to be locally equivalent to linear utilities.
"A Note on Double Marginalisation in Mixed Bilateral Oligopolies" in Recent Developments in General Equilibrium, Game Theory, and Social Choice: A Festschrift for Giulio Codognato