"Why is a raven like a writing-desk" and When is a Triangle not a Triangle?

I have been invited to consider the shape to the left.

Exercises of this kind often prompt a degree of eye-rolling for me, as they can feel like word-association disguised as philosophy. This skepticism is not meant as dismissal, but as an honest account of how I engage with ambiguity in educational contexts. Still, skepticism does not preclude participation, and I am willing to engage to see what might emerge. I see a triangle — specifically, an isosceles triangle — though its orientation also evokes a play button on a VCR. That this association comes so readily likely reveals as much about my generational context as it does about my perception.

Ontologically, the image represents an isosceles triangle as defined within Euclidean geometry. However, it is not a physical “thing,” but a representation of a conceptual form. Its meaning is not fixed; depending on orientation and personal context, it may also be perceived as a media icon. This suggests that reality here is layered — both formal and interpretive.

Moving forward — but not too fast, as that would require a second, overlaid triangle — epistemologically-speaking, I know this image represents an isosceles triangle because I rely on prior formal education in geometry and shared mathematical conventions. I did not verify measurements; instead, I trusted perceptual cues and established assumptions (e.g., symmetry and angle sums). My confidence reflects learned consensus rather than direct empirical verification, highlighting the role of prior knowledge in shaping perception.

From an axiological perspective — the one I anticipate will be my thought-disruptor — the triangle does not hold inherent moral or practical value. While I find aesthetic appeal in its symmetry, I do not believe usefulness or importance must be assigned for an object to exist. The assumption that every artifact requires justification reflects a value system I do not fully share.

While I find ontological and epistemological analysis relatively straightforward, axiology challenges me to confront my resistance to assigning value where I perceive none. This discomfort, however, is productive: it surfaces assumptions about why and how we are asked to engage with knowledge in the first place.

Methodologically, I am not interested in further analyzing the object itself. Instead, I am curious about how others respond to it and what those responses reveal about individual perspectives and interpretive frameworks. Reading peers’ reflections offers insight into both shared and divergent processes of meaning-making.

Taken together, this exercise highlights how even a simple image can be approached through multiple philosophical lenses, each revealing different assumptions about reality, knowledge, value, and inquiry. While I remain skeptical of tasks that invite meaning-making from minimal stimuli, that skepticism itself has proven instructive. Engaging ontologically and epistemologically felt familiar and comfortable, while axiology disrupted my inclination to withhold value where none seems necessary. Ultimately, my interest lies less in the triangle itself than in the varied interpretations it elicits, reminding me that learning often occurs not in the object of study, but in how we and others respond to it.

"Why is a raven like a writing-desk?" Selected text and imagery from Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking-Glass by Lewis Carroll (public domain).

Thought experiments — and indeed, the education system — can sometimes feel like riddles with no answers. They invite speculation, frustration, and meaning-making regardless. The value may lie not in solving it, but in noticing how we respond to being asked.

Selected text and imagery from Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking-Glass by Lewis Carroll (public domain).

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