Schedule

CTW (Contract Theory Workshop) is generally held on the third Saturday of every month, mainly in Kyoto and Osaka.  CTW mailing list distributes e-mail announcements about the workshop. Participants, please join this mailing list from here.

• Note: From April 2020 to February 2023, CTW was held in an online or hybrid format using Zoom. The online format of CTW was called  "CTWZ (Contract Theory Workshop on Zoom),"  and the schedules were posted on this website. However, since the CTW returned to a face-to-face format in principle from March 2023, the title of this homepage was changed from "CTWZ" to "CTW Schedule" (March 21, 2023). 

CTW（契約理論研究会）は、原則毎月第３土曜日に大阪または京都を中心に開催される研究会です。本研究会の連絡（懇親会の予約等）は、CTWメーリングリストで行われます。よろしければこちらからご登録をよろしくお願いいたします。

All times listed are Japan time.

Date: Saturday, July 20, 2024

• Please be aware that the first presentation will start earlier than usual, as detailed below. 

• Workshop format: in-person

• Workshop venue: 2nd Lecture Room on the 4th floor of Campus Plaza Kyoto

• Access map: https://www.consortium.or.jp/en/about-cp-kyoto/access 

• Presentation 1: 14:15~15:30 (75 minutes)　

  • Speaker: Shuichi Tsugawa (Ryukoku University)

  • Title: TBA

  • Abstract: TBA

  • Language: English

• 20 minutes break

• Presentation 2: 15:45~17:00 (75 minutes), 

  • Speaker: Yu Awaya (University of Rochester)

  • Title: TBA

  • Abstract:  TBA

  • Language: English

• The workshop in July 2024 is co-hosted by Kyoto Sangyo University

Date: Saturday, June 15, 2024

• Workshop format: in-person

• Workshop venue: Room B22, Building B, Osumi Campus, Osaka University of Economics

• Access map: https://www.osaka-ue.ac.jp/_img/english/access.jpg

• Presentation 1:  14:40 ~ 15:55 (75 minutes), 

  • Speaker: Fumitoshi Moriya (Kobe City University of Foreign Studies)

  • Title: An Optimal Structure of Help

  • Abstract: TBA

  • Language: Japanese

• 20 minutes break

• Presentation 2: 16:15 ~ 17:30 (75 minutes)

  • Speaker: Shigehiro Serizawa (Osaka University of Economics)

  • Title: Efficiency, fairness, and strategy-proofness in constrained package assignment problems with money (with Hiroki Shinozaki) 

  • Abstract:  We consider the constrained package assignment problem with money where the set of admissible object allocations is restricted by a given constraint. Each agent receives a package of objects, and has a (possibly) non-quasi-linear preference on the set of pairs consisting of a package and a payment.

  First, we show that there is a rule satisfying constrained efficiency, anonymity in welfare, and strategy-proofness if and only if the constraint is a bundling unit-demand constraint. Then, we establish that a rule satisfies constrained efficiency, anonymity in welfare, strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and no subsidy if and only if (i) the constraint is a bundling unit-demand constraint, and (ii) the rule is a bundling minimum price Warlasian rule associated with the constraint. We further show that our results remain true even if we replace anonymity in welfare by no envy. Our results indicate that the bundling unit-demand property is not only sufficient but also necessary for a constraint to admit the existence of a rule satisfying (constrained) efficiency, fairness, and strategy-proofness in a constrained package assignment model with money for non-quasi-linear preferences.

• • Language: Japanese

Date: Saturday, May 18, 2024

• Workshop format: in-person

• Workshop venue: Room B22, Building B, Osumi Campus, Osaka University of Economics

• Access map: https://www.osaka-ue.ac.jp/_img/english/access.jpg

• Presentation 1:  14:40 ~ 15:55 (75 minutes), 

  • Speaker: Hayato Kanayama (Waseda University)

  • Title: The Value of Drinking Bosses: Evidence from a Large Manufacturing Company (with Yuji Kawata and Ritsu Kitagawa) 

  • Abstract: We estimate employee returns to socializing with drinking bosses on their career. We leverage administrative data consisting of personnel records and annual health check results provided by a large manufacturing company and exploit quasi-random variations in boss switches driven by periodic personnel transfers across divisions.  Our findings suggest that when male employees start reporting to a drinking boss, their annual salary increases by 2.7–3.6 percent and promotion likelihood increases by 33–58 percent over the following 8 years. We find no evidence for the drinker-to-drinker advantage. Namely, we do not find any clear differences in the effects between drinking and non-drinking male employees.

  • Language: TBA

• 20 minutes break

• Presentation 2: 16:15 ~ 17:30 (75 minutes)

  • Speaker: Takuma Kamada (OSIPP, Osaka University)

  • Title: Blessing or Curse for Organized Crime? The Long-Term Effects of an Energy Transition from Coal to Oil on the Yakuza

  • Abstract:  This study investigates the long-term effects of a negative labor demand shock in the coal mining industry on the supply of organized crime. The setting is Japanese criminal organizations called the yakuza. In the 1960s, an energy transition from coal to oil diminished coal mining jobs, thereby depriving mining-associated yakuza, previously involved as labor brokers or protection racketeers, of revenues. I show that, in the short run, following the energy transition, yakuza arrests increased in coal-rich areas, a finding that cannot be explained by changes in enforcement levels. The immediate increase in yakuza-involved crime is likely due to mining yakuza shifting their economic criminal activities, rather than coal miners joining yakuza organizations. As mining yakuza's power waned, non-mining yakuza gained prominence, shifting the yakuza power dynamics. Consequently, conflicts among different yakuza organizations intensified in coal-rich areas, which persisted for over half a century. Today, areas with greater mining job loss due to the energy transition are characterized by a greater number of yakuza members and yakuza organizations. These areas also experienced juvenile delinquency in the medium and long run, hinting at the new labor supply for the yakuza, which may explain the persistent effect. Taken together, this study reveals that a labor demand shock can have long-lasting effects on organized crime.

  • Language: English

Date: Saturday, April 20, 2024

• Workshop format: in-person

• Workshop venue:  Room AS358, on the 3rd floor of Building A,  Osaka Ibaraki Campus, Ritsumeikan University

• Access map:  https://en.ritsumei.ac.jp/file.jsp?id=246773&f=.pdf.. 

• Presentation 1:  14:40 ~ 15:55 (75 minutes), 

  • Speaker: Shintaro Miura (Kanagawa University)

  • Title: Minimal Prep Correspondence as Sharp Robust Prediction (with Takuro Yamashita)

  • Abstract: We consider a robust prediction in games where the true information structure for payoff-relevant parameters is uncertain. A robust prediction is defined by a set of action profiles containing a plausible Bayesian Nash equilibrium for any admissible information structures. We show the equivalence between a sharp robust prediction and a minimal prep correspondence, which is a subset of action profiles characterized by the product structure and the best-reply property. We then show that it is sufficient to focus on the canonical type space, a Harsanyi type space constructed as an analogy of level-k theory, for deriving a sharp robust prediction with respect to baseline prediction. As applications of our approach, we derive the constrained sharp robust predictions in Cournot competition, Diamond search games, and auctions.

  • Language: English

• 20 minutes break

• Presentation 2: 16:15 ~ 17:30 (75 minutes)

  • Speaker: Benson Tsz Kin Leung (Hong Kong Baptist University)

  • Title: Distracted from Comparison: Product Design and Advertisement with Limited Attention (with Johannes Johnen)

  • Abstract: We study how firms choose designs－of products or information－to direct consumers' limited attention. Consumers with limited attention either study fewer products carefully to learn match values, or supercially browse prices of more products. We highlight a novel distraction effect: to distract consumers from price-comparison, firms combine larger prices with designs that disperse match values. Thus, firms disclose excessively-detailed product information: information improves matches, but distracts consumers from price-comparison, relaxing competition. Interventions that make information coarser and easily-available－e.g. front-package-food labels like nutriscores－increase competition and consumer surplus. Our results connect evidence on various informational interventions.

  • Language: English

Date: Saturday, March 16, 2024

• Workshop format: in-person

• Workshop venue: Room 1405 on the 14th floor at  the Osaka Umeda campus of  Kwansei Gakuin University

• Access: https://global.kwansei.ac.jp/about/access/campus_access

  • Presentation 1:  14:40 ~ 15:55 (75 minutes), 

    • Speaker: Junichiro Ishida (ISER, Osaka University)

    • Title: Overcoming Free-Riding in Collective Experimentation: A Dynamic Model of Feedback-Based Information Release (with Chia-Hui Chen, Hulya Eraslan, and Takuro Yamashita)

    • Abstract: We consider a dynamic model in which a benevolent principal decides what information to release about a product of unknown quality (e.g., a vaccine) to incentivize agents to experiment with the product.  Assuming that the agents are long-lived and forward-looking, their incentive to free-ride on other agents' experiments poses a major obstacle to social learning.  In the environment where information arrives in the form of bad news (a ``breakdown''), we show that the optimal feedback mechanism to mitigate free-riding takes a strikingly simple form: she recommends adoption as long as she observes no bad news, but only with some probability; once she does not recommend at some point, then she stays silent forever after that.  Our analysis suggests the optimality of premature termination, which in turn implies that: (i) false positives (termination in the good state) are more acceptable than false positives (continuation in the bad state); (ii) overly cautious mechanisms that are biased toward termination can be welfare-enhancing.

    • Language: English

  • 20 minutes break

  • Presentation 2: 16:15 ~ 17:30 (75 minutes)

    • Speaker: Katsuya Takii (OSIPP, Osaka University)

    • Title (tentative): The Role of Coarse Information on the Success Probability in College Application Behavior

    • Abstract (tentative):  This paper examines whether people can be inattentive in the face of once-in-a-lifetime events.  Using data at Japanese entrance examination, we show that even in situations where it is immediately understandable that there is no significant change in the actual likelihood of acceptance, candidates will change their school of choice simply because the label that broadly describes the likelihood of acceptance changes. In order to understand the mechanism behind this result, we model the application decision of students with inattention.  The results suggest that people seem to observe information relatively carefully because the attribute importance is large, although they cannot be completely attentive even in once-in-a-lifetime situations. The results also suggest that people who are better able to process information and who are accustomed to processing more information on a daily basis pay more attention to information when faced with a once-in-a-lifetime event.

    • Language: English

The 45th

• Date: Saturday, February 17, 2024

• Workshop format: in-person

• Workshop venue: Room B275 or B276, on the 2nd floor of Building B,  Osaka Ibaraki Campus, Ritsumeikan University 

  • Access map:  https://en.ritsumei.ac.jp/file.jsp?id=246773&f=.pdf.. 

  • Presentation 1:  14:40 ~ 15:55 (75 minutes), 

    • Speaker: Harry Pei (Northwestern University)

    • Title: Community Enforcement with Endogenous Records

    • Abstract: I study repeated games with anonymous random matching where players can erase signals from their records. When players are sufficiently long-lived and have strictly dominant actions, they will play their dominant actions with probability close to one in all equilibria. When players’ expected lifespans are intermediate, there exist purifiable equilibria with a positive level of cooperation in the submodular prisoner’s dilemma but not in the supermodular prisoner’s dilemma. Therefore, the maximal level of cooperation a community can sustain is not monotone with respect to players’ expected lifespans and the complementarity in players’ actions can undermine their abilities to sustain cooperation.

    • Language: English

  • 20 minutes break

  • Presentation 2: 16:15 ~ 17:30 (75 minutes)

    • Speaker: Yuta Yasui (Kochi University of Technology)

    • Title:  Controlling Fake Reviews

    • Abstract: This paper theoretically analyzes fake reviews on a platform market using models where a seller creates fake reviews through incentivized transactions, and its sales depend on its rating based on a review history. The platform can control the incentive for fake reviews by changing the parameters of the rating system, such as weights placed on old and new reviews and its filtering policy. At equilibrium, the number of fake reviews increases as quality increases but decreases as reputation improves. Since fake reviews have a positive relationship with a product’s underlying quality, rational consumers find a rating more informative when fake reviews exist, while credulous consumers suffer from a bias caused by boosted reputation. A stringent filtering policy can decrease the expected amount of fake reviews and the bias of credulous consumers, but at the same time, it can decrease the informativeness of a rating system for rational consumers. In terms of the weight placed on the review history, rational consumers benefit from higher weights on past reviews than from optimal weights without fake reviews.

    • Language: English

The 44th

• Date: Saturday, January 20, 2024

• Workshop format: in-person

• Workshop venue: Room B22, Building B, Osumi Campus, Osaka University of Economics

  • Access map: https://www.osaka-ue.ac.jp/_img/english/access.jpg

• Presentation 1:  14:40 ~ 15:55 (75 minutes), 

  • • Speaker: Takashi Shimizu  (Kobe University)　

    • Title: On the Combination of Biased Members

    • Abstract:  We consider the information transmission problem within organization, and especially we focus on how to combine biased subordinates to elicit truthful information from them. We assume that the directions of subordinates' biases are common knowledge, but not their sizes. This leads to the results that homogeneous combination of subordinates are better than heterogeneous one. This is because in the case of homogeneous subordinates, the effect of one's false report might be accelerated by another false report and this anxiety reduces an incentive for Subordinates to send a false report.

    • Language: English

  • 20 minutes break

  • Presentation 2: 16:15 ~ 17:30 (75 minutes)

    • Speaker: Tomoya Tajika ( Nihon University)

    • Title:  Evolution of Information Projection Bias through Costly Communication in OLG Organizations

    • Abstract:  In organizations with overlapping generations, behavioral bias affects performance through promotion decisions. This study focuses on information projection bias and examines its effects on communication efforts and the overall performance of an organization adopting a performance-based promotion system to select the next-generation manager among current subordinates. We show that the bias generally disrupts communication between an incumbent manager and subordinates and that the expected overall performance is single-peaked with respect to the manager's bias. When considering the bias distribution among newly promoted managers, we find that a more biased group is likely to select a more biased manager, and this trend becomes stronger over generations when the variety of the bias degree is restricted. Additionally, when communication efforts are complements, the expected overall performance increases if the manager's bias is highly sufficient. By contrast, when the variety of the bias degree is sufficient, the manager's bias diminishes over generations. Nonetheless, the overall performance decreases in a large organization. Our results contribute to an understanding of the effects of diversity in an organization on its performance.

    • Language: English

The 43rd

• Date: Saturday, November 18, 2023

• Workshop format: in-person

• Workshop venue: Room AN316  on the 3rd floor of Building A,  Osaka Ibaraki Campus, Ritsumeikan University 

• Access map:  https://en.ritsumei.ac.jp/file.jsp?id=246773&f=.pdf.. 

• Presentation 1:  14:40 ~ 15:55 (75 minutes), 

  • Speaker:  Shingo Ishiguro (Osaka University)

  • Title: Relational Contracts and Subjective Evaluation with Endogenous Wealth Accumulation 

  • Abstract: This paper studies relational contracts with the moral hazard problem constrained by subjective evaluation and risk sharing: a risk averse principal and a risk averse agent engage in a long-term relationship in which the agent chooses unobservable actions while the principal privately observes agent's performance　 in each period.   In contrast to the previous literature about relational contracts with subjective evaluation, we allow the contracting parties to accumulate wealth endogenously over time by private  savings/borrowings.  We then present a new insight that endogenous wealth accumulation can mitigate the efficiency loss of subjective evaluation in dynamic contracting.  More specifically,  we show that all the problems of moral hazard, risk sharing and subjective evaluation can be approximately resolved in the limit as players become sufficiently patient and interest rates go to zero.  We also show that an equilibrium contract resembles the company-sponsored savings plans commonly used in practice. 

  • Language: English

• 20 minutes break

• Presentation 2: 16:15 ~ 17:30 (75 minutes)

  • Speaker:  Takashi Onoda (Japan Bank for International Cooperation)

  • Title: Gradual Development and Rough Transition of Cooperation with Reference Dependence

  • Abstract: I study cooperation among reference-dependent and loss-averse players in a dynamic game with complete information. Every period, players choose their cooperation levels that determine their intrinsic payoffs and update their reference points in a backward-looking way. I characterize the subgame-perfect equilibrium that maximizes the utility with Nash reversion and show that the development of cooperation exhibits gradualism. After initiating cooperation, players experience higher payoffs than their initial reference points. Consequently, the reference points rise, making a penalty more severe for a deviation and enabling further cooperation. This paper additionally illustrates how the developed cooperation responds to a structural shock. When a steady-state cooperation level shifts down, transitioning to the new level entails a loss. This loss generates an additional deviation incentive, and the players undergo cooperation lower than the new steady-state level.

  • Language: English

The 42nd

• Date: Saturday, October 21, 2023

• Time: 16:00 ~ 17:30 

• Workshop format: in-person

• Workshop venue: Room B22, Building B, Osumi Campus, Osaka University of Economics

• Access map: https://www.osaka-ue.ac.jp/_img/english/access.jpg

• Presenter: Takuro Yamashita (Osaka University)

• Presentation title: A Mediator Approach to Mechanism Design with Limited Commitment (with Niccolo Lomys)

• Abstract: We study mechanism design with limited commitment. In each period, a principal offers a (possibly long-term) contract to a privately informed agent without committing to future contracts. We reformulate this problem as a dynamic mechanism design problem with full commitment and endogenous outside options. In the durable-good monopoly application, we characterize the seller-optimal equilibrium trade dynamics, which is quite different from the classical Coase conjecture dynamic: in the seller-optimal equilibrium, the seller offers a discount to the high-valuation buyer in the initial period, followed by the high surplus-extracting price until an endogenous deadline, at which point the buyer's information is revealed without noise (as opposed to the gradual price decrease in the Coasian dynamic). In particular, the Coase conjecture fails and the seller earns a strictly positive rent.

• Language: English

CTW Summer Camp 

• Dates: Thursday, August 17, 2023, 14:00 - Saturday, August 19, 2023, 12:30

• See the homepage of CTW Summer Camp for detail.

The 41th

• Date: Saturday, July 8, 2023

• Time: 16:00 ~ 17:30 

• Workshop format: in-person

• Workshop venue: Room G44, Building G, Osumi Campus, Osaka University of Economics

• Access map: https://www.osaka-ue.ac.jp/_img/english/access.jpg

• Presenter: Yu Aawaya (University of Rochester)

• Presentation title: Rational Exuberance and Bubbles 

• Abstract: We study a model of dynamic adverse selection in which a large group of sellers sell an asset of uncertain quality to a larger group of buyers. The quality is known to the sellers but unknown to the buyers. There is, however, the possibility that if the asset is of low quality, this will be revealed via public news at a random time. We show that there is a unique equilibrium satisfying forward induction. In this equilibrium a bubble develops. Even a worthless asset is traded at rapidly increasing prices. This is because in the absence of bad news, buyers become more and more optimisticó they exhibit rational exuberance.

• Language: Japanese

The 40th

• Date: Saturday, June 17, 2023

• Time: 16:00 ~ 17:30 

• Workshop format: in-person

• Workshop venue: Room E61, Building E, Osumi Campus, Osaka University of Economics

• Access map: https://www.osaka-ue.ac.jp/_img/english/access.jpg

• Presenter: Atsushi Ohyama (Hitotsubashi University)

• Presentation title: Business Expectations, Forecast Errors, and Firm Performances in an Interconnected Economy 

• Abstract: Business expectations and uncertainty have received a great deal of attention from both micro- and macro-economists recently. Several empirical studies demonstrate that business expectations and uncertainty have real impacts on the performance and resource allocation of both firms and the whole economy (Bloom, 2009; David et al., 2016; Massenot and Pettinicchi, 2018; Tanaka et al., 2019). However, it remains silent on whether and how the formation of a firm’s business expectation is affected by the business expectations of other firms and how business expectations and forecast errors affect firm performance when they are connected to each other through business transaction networks. We create a novel data set that merges sources on business expectations, forecast errors, and transaction partners of firms to examine these issues. Our main findings are summarized as follows. First, business expectations are positively correlated to the number of transaction partners after several factors are controlled for. Firms with many transaction partners tend to expect high firm growth. Second, a firm’s forecast error about firm growth is positively correlated with the forecast errors of its transaction partners. Forecast errors transmit through transaction relationships. Third, firms with many transaction partners and/or stable transaction relationships tend to reduce forecast errors. We thus observe portfolio effects. Finally, when actual growth is smaller than forecasted growth, firms with large forecast errors are unable to increase the number of new transaction partners. On the other hand, when actual growth exceeds forecasted growth, firms with large forecast errors are likely to reorganize their transaction partners.

• Language: English

The 39th

• Date: Saturday, May 20, 2023

• Time: 16:00 ~ 17:30

• Workshop format: in-person

• Workshop venue: The 3rd floor lecture room of the Kitahama Campus of Osaka University of Economics on the 3rd floor of the Osaka Exchange  

• Access map: https://goo.gl/maps/4CUqBphcKX6xcppJA

• Presenter: Takanori Adachi (Kyoto University)

• Presentation title: Cournot Platform Competition with Mixed-Homing (coauthored with M.J. Tremblay with S. Sato) 

• Abstract: Competition in quantity dates back to Cournot (1838) for traditional markets and Katz and Shapiro (1985) for markets with direct network e ects. In this paper, we consider Cournot platform competition in two-sided markets with indirect network ef- fects while allowing for single-, multi-, and mixed-homing allocations. We nd that the markup and markdown terms that are typically found in monopoly two-sided pricing are distorted toward zero when platform competition intensifies. We also generalize the monopoly platform Lerner indices from Armstrong (2006) and Weyl (2010) to include competition and mixed-homing allocations. Lastly, we show that welfare decreases in the number of platforms for the most commonly considered homing allocations high- lighting how the welfare loss from breaking up a network across smaller platforms can outweigh the welfare benefits from lower aggregate prices in a setting where platforms are homogenous.

• Language: English

The 38th

• Date: Saturday, April 15, 2023

• Time: 16:00 ~ 17:30

• Workshop format: in-person

• Workshop venue:  Room AN221, 2nd floor of Building A, Osaka-Ibaraki Campus (OIC) of Ritsumeikan University

• Access map: https://en.ritsumei.ac.jp/file.jsp?id=246773&f=.pdf

• Campus map: https://en.ritsumei.ac.jp/file.jsp?id=415116&f=.pdf

• Floor Map:   https://www.ritsumei.ac.jp/file.jsp?id=229844&f=.pdf

• Presenter: Dongyu Guo (NUCB Business School) 

• Presentation title: Input price discrimination: The role of pass-through 

• Abstract: We investigate input price discrimination under secret contracting between a manufacturer and competing retailers, whose activities exhibit retail effort spillovers. The effects of discriminatory pricing hinge upon the pass-through rate of input price to retail quantity. Such pass-through, defined according to the contractual structure (linear or two-part tariffs), varies with retail effort spillovers and product differentiation. Under each contractual structure, discriminatory pricing is welfare superior if and only if it magnifies the pass-through rate of production cost to input or retail price. Our results deliver novel insights into the role of pass-through in the antitrust assessment of input price discrimination.

•  Language: English

第37回

• Date:  4 March, 2023

• Venue:  Room 1405,  14th floor, Kwansei Gakuin Umeda Campus at Applause Tower: https://global.kwansei.ac.jp/about/access/campus_access

• Time table (tentative):  

  • 13:30 - 13:40: Opening remark by Hiroshi Osano

  • 13:40 - 14:25 (45 min): Presentation by Kimiyuki Morita (Senshu Univ): Delegation and Decision Process in Organizations (joint with Hideshi Itoh)

  • 20 min break

  • 14:45 - 15:30 (45 min): Presentation by Kazumi Hori (Ritsumeikan Univ): Sequential Screening with Cooperative Investment 

  • 20 min break

  • 15:50 - 16:35 (45 min): Presentation by Eric Chou (National Tsing Hua University): A theory of property rights for firm boundaries. 

  • 20 min break

  • 16:55: Closing remark by Hideshi Itoh

• Language: English

第36回

• Date: Saturday, February 18, 2023

• Time: 4:00PM~5:30PM

• Workshop format: hybrid (in-person and online).  Registration is needed for in-person participants prior to the workshop.  

• Workshop venue (in-person): Room 505-506 of B Building (Ritsumeikan Ibaraki future plaza) in Osaka Ibaraki campus (OIC) of Ritsumeikan University

• Access map: https://en.ritsumei.ac.jp/file.jsp?id=246773&f=.pdf

• Campus map: https://en.ritsumei.ac.jp/file.jsp?id=415116&f=.pdf

• Presenter: Akitoshi Muramoto (Osaka University of Economics)

• Presentation title: Asymmetric Optimal Auction Design with Loss-Averse Bidders (with Takeharu Sogo)

• Abstract: We study optimal auctions with expectation-based loss-averse bidders. We first consider when bidders are ex-ante identical. Although symmetric designs are optimal for bidders with expected-utility preferences, if the degree of loss aversion is sufficiently large relative to the variation in valuations, expected revenues are higher in the optimal design with one buyer than in any symmetric mechanism with multiple bidders. Further, we provide a sufficient condition under which optimal mechanisms are necessarily asymmetric. When bidders are ex-ante heterogeneous, the optimal degree of favoritism must be modified from the level in Myerson (1981) to reduce the uncertainty in auction outcomes. Not only the degree of the required modification but also the direction of the modification may not be monotone in the degree of loss aversion.

• Language: English

第35回

• Date: Saturday, January 28, 2023

• Time: 4:00PM~5:30PM

• Workshop format: hybrid (in-person and online).  Registration is needed for in-person participants prior to the workshop.  

• Workshop venue (in-person): Room 505-506 of B Building (Ritsumeikan Ibaraki future plaza) in Osaka Ibaraki campus (OIC) of Ritsumeikan University

• Access map: https://en.ritsumei.ac.jp/file.jsp?id=246773&f=.pdf

• Campus map: https://en.ritsumei.ac.jp/file.jsp?id=415116&f=.pdf

• Presenter: Makoto Watanabe (KIER of Kyoto University) 

• Presentation title: Directed Search on a Platform: Meet Fewer to Match More? 

• Abstract: This paper explores the relationship between market transparency and efficiency in a directed search market intermediated by a profit-maximizing platform. We first provide necessary and sufficient conditions under which efficiency requires imperfect transparency such that each seller is not observed by all buyers. Full transparency is not optimal for either buyers or sellers. In particular, buyers prefer the minimum level of transparency. We then show that the platform can implement the efficient outcome. Our key insight is robust to the introduction of a second chance for unmatched buyers to search.

• Language: English

第34回

• Date: Saturday, November 19, 2022

• Time: 4:00PM~5:30PM

• Workshop format: hybrid (in-person and online).  Registration is needed for in-person participants prior to the workshop.  

• Workshop venue (in-person): Room 515-516 of B Building (Ritsumeikan Ibaraki future plaza) in Osaka Ibaraki campus (OIC) of Ritsumeikan University

• Access map: https://en.ritsumei.ac.jp/file.jsp?id=246773&f=.pdf

• Campus map: https://en.ritsumei.ac.jp/file.jsp?id=415116&f=.pdf

• Presenter: Makoto Hanazono (Nagoya University）

• Presentation title: Pay for Performance in Procurement (with Juan-Jose Ganuza, Fernando Gomez)

• Abstract: This paper sheds light on the limitations of ``pay-for-performance'' in bidding markets with ex post moral hazard. High-powered incentive schemes may lead to worse allocations. We present our analysis in a procurement setting in which potential contractors differ both in their costs and levels of wealth and  are protected by limited liability. We show first that competitive mechanisms adversely select undercapitalized firms. Second, more powerful incentive mechanisms induce less desirable allocations: the selected contractor is likely to be at the same time less solvent and less efficient. As a result, low-powered incentives in procurement may be optimal.  This is consistent with the fact, that despite the large social welfare losses arising from inadequate performance by contractors (delays, cost overruns, deficient quality of output) in procurement, powerful pay-for-performance mechanisms appear to be rare in reality.

• Language: English

第33回

• 開催時間: 2022/10/22（土）午後4時~午後5時30分（ハイブリッド開催）

• 報告者: Yichuan Lou 氏（東京大学）

• 報告タイトル:  Optimal delegation with information manipulation

• Abstract: A principal delegates a decision to an agent, who has the capacity to process the relevant information. The principal cannot process information herself, but can jointly control the actions and the information available to the agent. I provide sufficient conditions under which the optimal mechanism (i) attains a perfect alignment of incentives— subject to the constraints on discretion and information, the agent plays exactly as the principal would want him to; and (ii) belongs to a simple class of delegation and disclosure rules, called monotone partitional rules, which specify a finite set of allowable actions from which the agent chooses his preferred one, and moreover, partition the state space into finite intervals so that the agent only learns to which interval the true state belongs. I then turn to the uniform-quadratic case which permits an explicit characterization of optimal mechanisms and clear comparative statics. Finally, I discuss two applications: the regulation of a monopolist, and the self-control of a dynamically inconsistent individual.

• 報告言語: English

第32回

• 開始時刻: 2022/07/16（土）午後4時（ハイブリッド開催）

• 報告者: Juan-José Ganuza氏 (Universitat Pompeu Fabra, and Barcelona Graduate School of Economics)

• 報告タイトル: Biased Financial Advisers, Regulation, and Transparency (joint with Fernando Gomez and Jose Penalva)

• Abstract: We study the effects of transparency and investor sophistication over the incentives of a financial adviser to provide honest and suitable financial advice to partially informed consumers. The novel aspect of our analysis is the inclusion of courts as a costly mechanism to provide incentives to reduce incorrect advice, where the cost arises from judicial errors due to imperfect evidence. We show that the cost of using courts to provide appropriate incentives is decreasing in investor sophistication and transparency. However, the judicial system may not be able to implement the first best without appropriate regulation when advisers can choose their level of transparency. In such a case, advisers with strong incentives to provide incorrect advice may be tempted to reduce transparency if it increases the prevalence of judicial error. The analysis sheds lights on the structure of legal duties of investment services firms, such as those under the recent European MiFID II scheme.

• 報告言語: 英語

第31回

• 開始時刻: 2022/06/18   午後4時（オンライン開催）

• 報告者: 安藤 至大氏（日本大学）

• 報告タイトル: A conditional match rate anomaly and an order change pressure in residency matching programs (北原稔氏との共著)

• Abstract: In the medical residency matching markets in the U.S. and Japan, we observe that an applicant's probability of being matched to the first listed program is　disproportionately higher than that to the second listed conditional on that the applicant is rejected by the first, while the conditional probabilities are relatively stable after that. In addition, several experts have pointed out that participating programs sometimes exert pressure on applicants to influence the creation of their lists. In this paper, we first show that the latter can explain the former, considering a specialty of first listing.  Then, we use the data to find both substantial pressure and welfare loss, assuming a simple reduced-form acceptance and forcing process. In addition, we consider a probabilistic permutation of the submitted list to prevent pressure-induced list reordering and find in the data that the benefits of the intervention outweigh the associated efficiency losses.

• 報告言語：日本語

第30回

• 開始時刻 : 2022/05/21   午後4時（ハイブリッド開催）

• 対面会場: 立命館大学大阪いばらきキャンパス

• 報告者: 森 祐介 氏（立命館大学 ）

• 報告タイトル: Contractible Specific Investment, Loss Aversion, and Firm Boundaries 

• Abstract: This study provides a behavioral model of firm boundaries by extending the property right theory of the firm to the case of loss-averse trading parties who can undertake non-contractible general investments as well as contractible specific investments. The choice of governance structure determines the probability of each party’s becoming the first proposer in non-cooperative renegotiation, and then, affects their reference point regarding the renegotiation outcome. We show that integration induces the highest aggregate specific investment. We also show that, for joint ownership/non-integration to be optimal, the degree of loss aversion needs to be sufficiently low.

• 報告言語: 日本語

第29回

• 開始時刻 : 2022/04/16   午後4時

• 報告者: 森谷文利 氏（神戸市外国語大学 ）

• 報告タイトル:  An optimal Structure of Help (joint with Takuro Yamashita)

• Abstract: To deal with unforeseen negative shocks, organizations sometimes require their member to help each other. This research compares two types of help structure: (1) "circle" (all members help) and (2) "hierarchy" (one member mainly helps ), and consider what structure of help is optimal. Our conclusion is that (i) when help is verifiable and a cost to help the other member is convex, circle is optimal, (ii) in the case that help is not verifiable, hierarchy can be optimal even if the cost function is convex.

• Language: Japanese

第28回

• 開始時刻 : 2022/03/19   午後4時

• 報告者: 橋立洋祐 氏（早稲田大学）

• 報告タイトル: Social Preferences through Preference over Menus: Experimental Evidence (Joint work with Tetsuya Kawamura, Fabrice Le Lec, Yusuke Osaki, and Benoît Tarroux)

• Abstract: This paper aims to elicit social preferences through the choice between menus of social allocations. We consider a two-stage problem, a modified version of dictator games. In the first stage, the dictator (hereafter, DM) chooses between menus of allocations from which she will have to select one in the second stage. The first-stage choice is private, i.e., unobservable by the recipient, while the second-stage choice can be public, depending on the treatment. In treatment T1, the recipient observes the choice made by the DM and all the available allocations in the menu; in treatment T2, the only information given to the recipient is her payoff, but she has no information about the available allocations and the final payoff of the DM. We conduct online experiments in France and Japan. We find that selfish participants tend to remove the socially preferred allocation from their menu. We also find that generous subjects have various patterns. We observe a significant preference for removing the selfish allocation from their menu and being free to be selfish. We report some cases of the difference between treatments and between France and Japan. 

第27回 (関東学院大学経済経営研究所研究会との共催）

• 開始時刻 : 2022/02/19   午後9時

• 報告者: 天野友道氏（ハーバード大学）

• 報告タイトル: Gaming or Gambling?  An Empirical Investigation of the Role of Loot Boxes Addiction in Video Games 

• Abstract: In 2020, gamers worldwide spent more than $15 billion on loot boxes, a lottery of virtual items that can be purchased in video games. We examine why consumers purchase these loot boxes in often free-to-play games. We separate out two economic drivers of tastes for these in-game purchases: a functional value of receiving virtual items that complement game play, and a direct utility of opening loot boxes. The two drivers mirror the contrasting views between those in the gaming industry who argue that these purchases supplement game play, and regulators who argue that they can prompt gambling-like behavior, respectively. In a popular Japanese mobile game, our empirical context, we find evidence of the presence of two drivers as predicted by our model. We develop and estimate an empirical dynamic discrete choice model that separates out these drivers of demand, accounting for future game play benefits that loot boxes provide to players. We find that, in our context, loot box openings are driven primary because of their direct utility. We discuss how our model can be used to illustrate the consequences that marketing decisions and regulatory policies can have, not only on loot box openings, but on how players interact with the game overall.

第26回

• 開始時刻 : 2022年1月29日　午後9時（時間に注意！）

• 報告者: 方元駒 氏（大阪大学）

• 報告タイトル: Matching with Subjective and Objective Evaluations: Chinese College Admission Reconsidered（安田洋祐氏との共著）

• Abstract: Each year, millions of high school graduates in China take a standardized test and compete for college seats. Unlike other countries, college admissions in China have a distinct feature that the assignment is determined by three factors: test scores, students' preferences, and colleges' preferences. In practice, since there is a huge number of students in the market, colleges do not have time to review each student’s application material and consequently they may fail to figure out their preferences over the entire students. To alleviate this problem, the government has implemented a so-called “dummy quota policy”. The Chinese parallel (CP) mechanism, based on this policy, is a variant of the serial dictatorship (SD) mechanism but has various drawbacks. In this paper, we consider two scenarios depending on whether the dummy quota policy is maintained or abandoned. For each scenario, we propose a modified parallel mechanism to improve the allocation outcome of the CP mechanism.

第25回

• 開始時刻 : 2021/11/20（土）午後4時（時間に注意！）

• 報告者: 神田 豊氏（大阪大学）

• 報告タイトル: Performance report, task allocation, and wage contract （高原 豪氏との共著）

• Abstract: This paper analyzes the effect of performance report disclosure on the optimal incentivized wage. Our analysis assumes that disclosing the performance report forms a reputation among third parties regarding the agent's ability. Furthermore, we assume that the principal designs the wage scheme that designates the high-ability agents to an uncertain but advanced task and the low-ability to a certain but conventional task. We have compared the following two patterns of the disclosure; i) which task was performed, and the success or failure of the result if the advanced task was executed (detailed disclosure), ii) only if the advanced task was performed and succeeded (limited disclosure). Our analysis shows that the detailed disclosure leads to a higher expected wage, and the limited disclosure leads to a lower expected wage. This result is obtained as the detailed disclosure conveys the agent type more precisely than the limited disclosure. Therefore, the principal must pay an additional wage for the conventional task that the low-ability agent executes. Moreover, we have shown that the detailed disclosure reduces the agent's incentive for investment to be high-ability before the contract is offered.

第24回

• 開始時刻 : 2021/10/30（土）午後4時（時間に注意！）

• 報告者: 野津 隆臣氏 （京都大学）

• 報告タイトル: Repeated games with repayment constraints

• Abstract: In this paper, we consider a repeated Bertrand competition in which firms face constraints such that firms must repay their borrowing. There exists a deadline period for the repayment and if a firm fails to clear off the debt, then the firm goes into bankruptcy and exits from the market. Taking lenders' interests into account, we investigate whether or not there exists an equilibrium in which all firms repay their borrowing and collude afterwards. We first find that if firms are sufficiently patient relative to a deadline, collusion with all firms' full repayment cannot be sustained by an equilibrium with symmetric repayment behavior. On the other hand, collusion with all firms' full repayment can be sustained by an equilibrium with asymmetric repayment behavior if there exists a firm whose monopoly price is less than marginal costs of all the other firms. Next, we assume that there does not exist such an efficient firm and we construct a collusive equilibrium under a condition such that a deadline is sufficiently large relative to firms' patience. We also characterize the deadline period for the equilibrium.

第23回 CTW(Z) 夏の拡大版

• 日時：2021/09/11（土）午後8時～（時間に注意！） 

第1報告者：午後8時～8時45分，村本顕理（大阪経済大学）

• 論題: Signal Blurring in Relational Contracts （石原章史氏との共著)

• 要旨:This paper considers a relational contracting model where the principal ex-ante commits to a  disclosure policy that determines whether participants can or cannot observe the signal about the future outside options. Our main results are as follows. First, any equilibrium payoffs for the participants can be supported by a self-enforcing stationary contract regardless of whether the participants update the future outside options. Second, the optimal disclosure policy changes depending on the players' patience. Especially, the non-disclosure policy is weakly optimal for patient players, while the disclosure policy is for impatient players.  As an application, we also consider the case of multi-agents and show that the aggregation of the individual effort signals may be optimal, although the aggregated signal is less informative for the effort levels than the original individual signals.

第2報告者：午後9時～10時，山縣昂平 氏（ワシントン大学・セントルイス校）

• 論題："The Transition between Internal Promotion and External Recruitment: from the Perspective of Perverse incentive of Internal Candidates" （多鹿 智哉氏との共著）

• 要旨：Internal promotion is often used to incentivize employees to work for their manager’s project’s success. However, suppose an employee believes that she will likely replace a manager in the future. In that case, she loses the motivation to contribute to the current project because she can emphasize her future managing ability by causing its failure (i.e., she makes the project look difficult.) We develop an OLG model in which a firm chooses internal or external, and within the firm, two workers compete for the next manager position. First, this paper shows that the first best is sometimes not supported by incentive compatibility.  It generates the transition between first-best and second-best internal promotion rules when the internal promotion is only available. We show that as long as the project’s difficulty is sufficiently uncertain, frequent shifts of the applied promotion rules occur. This uncertainty prevents the rapid updating about the level of difficulty and causes future uncertain beliefs of the perceived level of difficulty. Second, this paper shows that the first best is less likely incentive compatible when a person from outside occupies the job. Once external recruitment is applied (ex. myopic firm), it continues in the wider range of uncertainty (i.e., first best becomes less likely). Once external recruitment is applied(ex. myopic firm), the first best rule is less likely to be applied, and then external recruitment persists in the broader range of uncertainty, which results in low success rates in the long run. It suggests that the farsighted firm would apply for internal promotion even when the first best is inapplicable. Indeed, we find a case when external recruitment is forbidden, the long-run success rate improves by a numerical simulation. 

第22回

• 開始時刻: 2021/08/28（土）午後4時（時間に注意！） 

• 報告者: 白田 康洋氏（小樽商科大学）

• 報告タイトル: The Formation of Global Free Trade Agreement (Joint work with Akira Okada, 報告論文へのリンク）

• Abstract: We investigate the formation of Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in a competing importers framework with n countries. We show that (i) FTA formation causes a negative externality to non-participants, (ii) a non-participant is willing to join an FTA, and (iii) new participation may decrease the welfare of incumbent participants. A unique subgame perfect equilibrium of a sequential FTA formation game does not achieve global free trade under an open-access rule where a new applicant needs consent of members for accession, currently employed by many open regionalism agreements including APEC. We further show that global FTA is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium under an open-access rule without consent. 

第21回

• 開始時刻: 2021/07/17（土）午後4時（時間に注意！） 

• 報告者: 西村健氏(駒澤大学)

• 報告タイトル: An Experimental Study of Crémer–McLean Mechanisms 

• Abstract: The full-surplus-extraction auctions designed by Crémer and McLean (1988) are often criticized as unrealistic mechanisms. We assess the performance of these auctions in a controlled experimental environment. The experiment has two treatments: second-price and first-price auctions (SPA, FPA) with lotteries (or side bets). We focus on subjects’ bidding behavior by forcing them to participate in the auctions. Our experimental results show that overbidding persists in the SPA treatment, while it diminishes through rounds in the FPA treatment.

第20回

• 開始時刻: 2021/06/19（土）午後4時（時間に注意！）

• 報告者: 笠松怜史氏(武蔵大学)

• 報告タイトル:  Dynamic Dilemma of Political Distrust (Joint work with Daiki Kishishita)

• Abstract : Some anecdotes indicate a dynamic interaction between political distrust and money politics. To understand this, we first construct a static electoral competition model where two candidates propose policy platforms, and an interest group determines campaign spending for each candidate. We show that political distrust mitigates money politics; that is, in the presence of high political distrust, candidates do not choose a policy favored by the interest group. Based on this mechanism, we identify what we call dynamic dilemma of political distrust: political distrust improves the future democratic performance, whereas it is a signal of the past low performance. We then extend the model to a dynamic one where candidates are short-lived. We show that this dynamic dilemma creates endogenous cycles of political distrust and money politics when the conflicts of interests between voters and the interest group is large. Political distrust is accumulated, consumed, and then restored, following cycles of money politics.

第19回

• 開始時刻: 2021/05/22（土）午後9時（時間に注意！）

• 報告者: 岸下大樹氏(東京理科大学)

• 報告タイトル: Strategic Opposition and Electoral Accountability (joint with Satoshi Kasamatsu)

• 概要: This paper aims to explore whether the minority party’s monitoring mitigates a political agency problem between the majority party and voters. For this purpose, we construct a two-period election model where voters face information asymmetry regarding each party’s type. After the majority party’s policymaking, the minority party sends a cheap-talk message about whether to oppose the policymaking. We show that the monitoring by the minority party is not useful even under the possibility that the party is the ethical type who sincerely tells the truth. When the majority party is more popular than the minority party, the minority party’s opposition does not change voters’ voting behaviors, and thus it does not improve electoral accountability at all. When the majority party is less popular than the minority party, the minority party’s monitoring partially improves electoral accountability, but its effect is limited. Overall, a possibility of the ethical type does not guarantee that opposition improves electoral accountability.

第18回

• 開始時刻：2021/04/17（土）午後4時（時間に注意！）

• 報告者: 十河丈晴氏（SKEMA Business School）

• 報告タイトル：Feedback for Talent Development (joint with Osamu Hayashida and Kimiyuki Morita)

第17回

・開始時刻：2021/03/20（土）午後4時（時間に注意！）

・報告者： 佐藤進  氏（一橋大学）

・報告タイトル：Usage Lock-In and Platform Competition under Multihoming

第16回

・開始時刻：2021/02/20（土）午後9時（時間に注意！）

・報告者： 多鹿智哉 氏（北星学園大学）

・報告タイトル：Restriction and Restoration of Freedom: An EconomicApproach toward Psychological Reactance (with Kohei Daido)

第15回

・開始時刻：2021/01/30（土）午後9時（時間に注意！）

・報告者： 玉田康成 氏（慶應義塾大学）

・報告タイトル：Managing innovation through mediation  

第14回

（注）これまでのCTWZと開催時間が異なります。 

・開始時刻：2020/11/21（土）午後4時（時間に注意！）

・報告者： 栗野盛光 氏（慶應義塾大学）

・報告タイトル：How to avoid black markets for appointments with online booking systems (joint with Rustamdjan Hakimov, C-Philipp Heller, and Dorothea Kübler )

第13回

・開始時刻：2020/10/31（土）午後９時

・報告者： 藤原直輝氏（ロチェスター大学）

・報告タイトル：Price and Quality in Scoring Auction（粟屋祐氏・Szabó Márton Bence氏との共著 ）

第12回

・開始時刻：2020/10/17（土）午後９時

・報告者： 善如 悠介氏（神戸大学）

・報告タイトル：Platform Encroachment and Own-Content Bias 

CTWZ夏期研究集会（終了）

・１日目開始時刻：2020/09/01（火）午後8時

・２日目開始時刻：2020/09/02（水）午後8時30分

・プログラム(2020/08/18一部修正)

第11回（終了）

・開始時刻：2020/08/22（土）午後９時

・報告者： 石原章史氏（東京大学）

・報告タイトル：Exclusive Content with Captive Consumers in Platforms

第10回（終了）

・開始時刻: 2020/08/08（土）午後９時

・報告者： 川口康平氏（香港科技大学）

・報告タイトル：Small Business under the COVID-19 Crisis: Expected Short- and Medium-Run Effects of Anti-Contagion and Economic Policies

　（児玉 直美氏・田中 万理氏との共著）

第9回（終了）

・開始時刻：2020/07/18（土）午後９時

・報告者：岩﨑康平 氏（ウィスコンシン大学マディソン校）

・報告タイトル：Cryptocurrency Bubbles and Costly Mining

第8回（終了）

・開始時刻：2020/07/11（土）午後９時

・報告者： 石黒真吾氏（大阪大学）

・報告タイトル：Relational Contracts and Savings

第7回（終了）

・開始時刻：2020/07/04（土）午後９時

・報告者： 野田俊也氏（ブリティッシュコロンビア大学経済学部 ）

・報告タイトル：An Economic Analysis of Difficulty Adjustment Algorithms in Proof-of-Work Blockchain Systems （奥村恭平氏・橋本欣典氏との共著）

第6回（終了）

・開始時刻：2020/06/20（土）午後９時

・報告者： 難波敏彦氏（関西大学）

・報告タイトル：The Cost of Gaming in Quota Contracts

第5回（終了）

・開始時刻：2020/06/13（土）午後９時

・報告者： 市橋 翔太氏（カナダ銀行）

・報告タイトル：Markets for Perception (Rohit Lamba氏との共著) 

第４回（終了）

・開始時刻：2020/05/23（土）午後９時

・報告者： 川中大士郎氏（大阪大学大学院 ）

・報告タイトル：Pre-lattice fixed point theorem and matching with weak preferences​ 

第３回（終了）

・開始時刻：2020/05/09（土）午後９時

・報告者： 白井 洸志 氏（関西学院大学）

・報告タイトル：Nonparametric analysis of games with monotone best responses

第２回（終了）

・開催時刻：2020/04/25（土）午後９時

・報告者：福田 慧 氏（ボッコーニ大学）

・報告タイトル：The existence of universal qualitative belief spaces

第１回（終了）

・開催時刻：2020/04/18（土）午後９時

・報告者: 粟屋祐氏（ロチェスター大学）

・報告タイトル: Incentives under equal-pay constraint and subjective peer evaluation

   （Jihwan Do氏との共著）