How does Bishop Barron characterize the philosophical theory of Feuerbach? What does he emphasize and what does he leave out of his characterization?
Barron claims that Marx has influenced 21st-century society and that Marxism is shaping young people. How does he explain this? In other words, what does Barron think has led young people to find Marx appealing?
Barron claims that Marx is reductionist. What does he mean by this?
How does Barron characterize Marx’s fundamental critique of capitalism?
On what grounds does Barron disagree with Marx’s critique?
This claim needs to be clarified. In doing so, we will be in a position to critically evaluate Barron’s characterization. Let’s begin with a question: are the theories of society that Barron mentions descriptive or prescriptive?
A descriptive theory (or thesis) asserts that things are a certain way. It does not tell us how they should be, but rather how they (allegedly) are.
A prescriptive theory (or thesis), by contrast, asserts precisely what a descriptive theory does not; it tells us that things ought to be a certain way.
It is one thing to say, “Society is structured by antagonisms.” It is a very different thing to say, “Society ought to be structured by antagonisms.”
Barron says that Catholic Social Teaching (CST) is “premised” on a non-antagonistic social theory. I suspect that what he means is that it is a non-antagonistic prescriptive theory. As he alludes to, it seeks a “healing way forward.” Notice, though, that this implies there is healing that needs to be done; the way things are is broken, damaged, or unjust. CST presents a framework for action that is aimed at overcoming antagonisms. As such, it is — contrary to Barron’s claim — premised on a theory, (or, if one prefers, a recognition or assumption) that society is, in a descriptive sense, antagonistic.
In this limited sense, CST is not different from revolutionary Marxism (RM): both are prescriptive theories or programs for action that are premised on a descriptive theory of social antagonism. One of central claims advanced by Marx and Engels in the Communist Manifesto was that class conflict has shaped all of the significant developments in human history, and it continues to work unabated in present society. This, in itself, is a descriptive theory and is the Marxist parallel to the Christian notion that sin and brokenness have shaped human history.
The significant and relevant difference between RM and CST is not found at the level of the descriptive social theories upon which they are based. Rather, the key difference is that CST is a non-antagonistic theory of action whereas RM is an antagonistic theory of action. Where CST counsels non-revolutionary (that is, reformative) healing, RM counsels revolutionary action. Indeed, CST initially began to be articulated as a counter-revolutionary response to the political turmoil of the 19th Century. However, this does not entail that RM takes antagonism to be its telos, or end. In fact, Marxists argue that the point of a revolution should be to bring such antagonisms to an end, or at least establish the conditions for the possibility of a non-antagonistic society.
Barron is well aware of the Thomistic distinction between a proximate and an ultimate end. A proximate end is not an ultimate end, but rather something “closer,” a more immediate goal, the achievement of which is ordered to something more ultimate. RM advocates antagonism or class conflict here and now for the sake of ending class conflict in the future. Class conflict is precisely what it aims to destroy.
In light of all this, a more accurate way to articulate the differences between CST and RM would involve identifying three distinct topics and correlative theses.
1. What is the case?
On this there is agreement.
CST: Society and history are marred by injustice. The dignity of the human person is not respected and there is strife between people.
RM: Society and history are marred by injustice. The dignity of the human person is not respected and there is strife between people.
2. Why is this the case?
On this there is difference, but the positions are not logically contradictory or incompatible.
CST: Doctrine of original sin.
RM: Marx’s theory of dialectical materialism. This holds that human beings are essentially creative and productive in the sense that we must actively (re)produce our means of subsistence. Productive forces (i.e., the means of production plus embodied knowledge of their employment) tend to result in an increase in productive capacity. As productive capacities expand, the limitations of existing economic and social structures result in “contradictions,” or instabilities; they fail to harness and direct productive forces. When an economic structure constitutes a fetter to productive forces, it will be revolutionized and replaced with one that does not so fetter the productive forces in their present state of development.
3. What ought to be the case?
On this there is difference, but the positions are not logically contradictory or incompatible.
CST: There ought not be injustice and strife. The human person ought to be treated with dignity and people should exist in communion with God. The climax of history will not be achieved until all are in the God that is love and the love that is God is in all.
RM: There ought not be injustice and strife. The human person ought to be treated with dignity, meaning we should exist as free, equal, and united persons (“Liberté, égalité, fraternité”). This will not be possible until class conflict has been decisively brought to an end.
4. What ought to be done?
This is where there is significant disagreement and difference. Still, these positions are not logically contradictory, though they arguably are in practical tension.
CST: We should let the Holy Spirit work through us and with us in drawing all people into relations of mutual respect and love. Respect of the nature of the human person entails that we should strive to exist united in mutual respect and love. This requires that we seek to embody and model the action of the Holy Spirit, who overcomes strife, sin, and conflict through healing and by transforming persons.
RM: The working class should hasten the death of class conflict by seizing the means of production from the middle class and socializing capital. If this requires armed conflict (and it probably will, since the middle class won’t willingly bring about just and equal economic conditions), so be it.
Barron is correct that there is a difference between CST and RM. But there are also parallels and points of agreement. CST and RM are both social-political normative programs. They each, in their respective way, stand in opposition to the present order of things. They judge that the way of the world is not as it ought to be, and they seek to encourage people to respond to the injustices, conflicts, or antagonisms for the sake of achieving something better.
There is an ambiguity at play here. We need to be clear about the scope of the term “Marxist.” If we mean someone who genuinely adopts Marx’s theory of dialectical materialism, then this is simply a mischaracterization. Marx was clearly and vociferously opposed to idealism, or the notion that historically significant change is brought about as a result of people changing their ideas, values, or beliefs. He called socialists who held this view “utopian socialists.” However, if “Marxist” just means anyone who claims to be inspired by Marx, then sure: there are definitely nominal Marxists who are idealists.
Of course, consistency would require that we adopt the same approach with respect to “Catholic” and “Christian.” I am quite sure that Bishop Barron would not accept that the scope of these terms should be determined simply by people declaring that they are such people, or simply because they have been inspired by Catholic or Christian ideas.
I take it that by “wokeism,” Barron means the idealist social movement that takes the recognition of race, gender, and sexual orientation as having central political importance. Specifically, he seems to have in mind that part of this social movement that is officially concerned with performative politics and virtue signaling.
In the historical order of things, his claim is, in some sense true. What is called “leftist” politics in America was, for a time, influenced by Marxist thinking. For example, socialists in the 19th and 20th Centuries informed and advanced some of the social changes that took hold, such as limiting the work-day to 8 hours, outlawing child labor, the civil rights movement, and so forth. However, to a large degree, American “leftist” politics (1) developed in opposition to socialism, and (2) stands in direct opposition to dialectical materialism and revolutionary Marxism.
(1) FDR’s New Deal was, at the level of intention and outcome, a way to shut down socialist political efforts.
(2) Dialectical materialism is anti-idealist (it holds that economic factors and modes of production principally constrain and guide the development of ideology, not that that ideology is what determines social structures). Moreover, revolutionary Marxism (RM) is opposed to identity politics. In fact, identity politics was developed in opposition to the RM claim that class should be the ground of solidarity. It claimed that personal social identities, such as race and gender, were more important than class.
The historical connection between Marxism and contemporary identity politics is as relevant as the historical connection between fascism and contemporary right-wing religious politics. Which is to imply, there are connections that are historically interesting, but simply saying that one caused, inspired, or led to the other ignores the complex tensions, conflicts, and changes in the interim. Moreover, it elides the fact that contemporary positions, which are historically connected to earlier positions can, and often do, contradict earlier positions. By way of analogy, this is similar to how you would not exist if your grandparents hadn’t existed, and their choices and experiences constrained and shaped the life you have had, at least to some degree. But you are different than them, and you might even have completely different goals, values, and so forth than they had.
When comparing and evaluating moral and political perspectives, ideal should be compared to ideal, and practice (or history) should be compared with practice (history). This is often ignored in various ways. For example, critics of Christianity will sometimes contrast the historical expression of Christianity with the ideal expression of Buddhism or Hinduism. A proper comparison would be between the ideal expression of Christianity and the ideal expression of Buddhism or Hinduism. Or, alternatively, it would be between the historical expression of each. As another example, Christians often compare the ideal expression of their faith with the historical expression of the Islamic faith.
If we compared Marxists ideals with the ideals of an orthodox Catholic, there will surely be differences. If we compared the practices and histories of Christianity with those of Communism, the same will be true. But I think it is arguably probably more of a wash than Barron seems willing to consider.
Barron knows that putatively Catholic people and the Catholic Church have done awful things (consider the crusade against the Cathars), but that doesn’t seem to deter him from being committed to Catholic ideals. Most Marxists, similarly, know that a putative Marxist like Joseph Stalin did horrendous things, but that doesn’t invalidate what Marx said. (Indeed, Joseph Stalin is arguably responsible for the deaths of more socialists than any other person in history. His purges targeted Marxists and socialists.)
Similarly, just as Christian principles have led some people to act with beneficence and charity to others, so too have Marxist principles. And in many cases, it was both! Consider, for example, well known socialists like Martin Luther King, Jr., Helen Keller, Cornel West, et al.