"Model-Groups as Scientific Research Programmes", European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 10 (2020), 6, DOI: 10.1007/s13194-019-0271-7
Abstract: Lakatos's methodology of scientific research programmes centres around series of theories, with little regard to the role of models in theory construction. Modifying it to incorporate model-groups, clusters of developmental models that are intended to become new theories, provides a description of the model dynamics within the search for physics beyond the standard model. At the moment, there is no evidence for BSM physics, despite a concerted search effort especially focused around the standard model account of electroweak symmetry breaking (also known as the Higgs mechanism). Using the framework provided by Lakatosian research programmes, we can capture the way the periphery of a model-group changes as the available parameter space shrinks, while its central tenets remain untouched by unfavourable experimental findings. By way of motivation, I provide two case studies of model-groups that offer alternative mechanisms for electroweak symmetry breaking: supersymmetry and composite-Higgs models. Both of these model-groups are under pressure from the discovery of the Higgs boson, yet they have both been active research projects in the years after the Higgs discovery. However, a proper assessment of the progress of an ongoing research programme is impossible through a purely Lakatosian lens, so I propose replacing it with Laudan's problem-solving account, which provides ongoing assessment, while offering normative guidance concerning the pursuit-worthiness of research programmes. My incorporation of model-groups into Lakatosian research programmes captures the developments of two attempts to expand our physical description of the world, and Laudan's problem-solving rationality allows us to assess their pursuit-worthiness.
"From a Boson to the Standard Model Higgs: A Case Study in Confirmation and Model Dynamics" (w/ M. King, P. Mättig, & M. Stöltzner), Synthese, Forthcoming, DOI: 10.1007/s11229-019-02216-7
Abstract: Our paper studies the anatomy of the discovery of the Higgs boson at the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) and its influence on the broader model landscape of particle physics. We investigate the phases of this discovery, which led to a crucial reconfiguration of the model landscape of elementary particle physics and eventually to a confirmation of the Standard Model (SM). A keyword search of preprints covering the electroweak symmetry breaking (EWSB) sector of particle physics, along with an examination of physicists’ own understanding of the discovery as documented in semiannual conferences, has allowed us an empirical investigation of its model dynamics. From our analyses we draw two main philosophical lessons concerning the nature of scientific reasoning in a complex experimental and theoretical environment. For one, from a confirmation standpoint, some SM alternatives could be considered even more confirmed by the Higgs discovery than the SM. Nevertheless, the SM largely remains the commonly accepted account of EWSB. We present criteria for comparing degrees of confirmation and expose some limits of a purely logical approach to understanding the Higgs discovery as a victory for the SM. Second, we understand the persistence of SM alternatives in the face of disfavourable evidence by borrowing the Lakatosian concept of a research programme, where the core idea behind a group of models survives, while other aspects adapt to incoming data. In order to apply this framework to the model landscape of EWSB, we must introduce a new category of research programme, the model-group, and we test its viability using the example of composite Higgs models.
"Doubts for Dawid's Non-Empirical Theory Assessment", Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 63 (2018), 128-135, DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsb.2018.01.004
Abstract: Dawid's account of non-empirical theory assessment is meant to complement traditional theory assessments. I contend that his arguments don't provide support for this account. His three arguments, the no alternatives argument, the unexpected explanatory connections argument, and the meta-inductive argument from prior theories' success, are all problematic, particularly for an assessment of string theory. In particular, I argue that the meta-inductive argument is idle, because it's role in underwriting the future predictive success of a theory is subsumed by the normal accounting of its predecessor's predictions in theory growth and testing. Dawid's arguments are interdependent, so showing that one fails is sufficient to cast doubt on his entire account.
"String Theory, Lakatos, and Laudan"
Abstract: String theory's status as a popular theory without any empirical support has prompted a philosophical assessment by Johansson and Matsubara, who emphasise a Lakatosian analysis. They determine that string theory is a degenerating research programme, but refrain from offering normative guidance for deciding between string theory and its potential rivals. I argue that their assessment is premature, on Lakatosian grounds, and propose an adjustment to Lakatos's framework that sharpens their philosophical analysis and provides an account of scientific progress for theories that have theoretical virtues, but lack experimental testability. My proposed framework hybridizes Lakatosian research programmes with Laudan's pragmatic problem-solving account of progressiveness. This modified framework alleviates many of the criticisms levied against Lakatosian assessments. The merger presents the best of both worlds, providing research programmes with norms for pursuit and acceptance, while retaining their continuity and useful degree of specificity. This new hybrid framework is then used to take initial steps towards assessing string theory's pursuit-worthiness.
"Beyond Experiment: Defining Problems in High-Energy Physics"
In this paper, I analyze some of the conditions under which a scientific problem develops, changes, and may eventually be abandoned. I examine a pair of problems that are frequently cited in particle physics literature: the lack of new physics phenomena found at the LHC and the so-called 'naturalness' problem. Finding solutions to these problems has long been thought to be crucial for developing physics beyond the Standard Model. Although trying to solve them has led to a great deal of model-building activity, neither problem has yet been satisfactorily solved, leading to a change in perspective on how pressing they are, particularly with naturalness. This change in the urgency of naturalness as a problem has led to decreasing interest in models that offered solutions, but had few other virtues. In turn, the decreased weight in the naturalness problem will effect the pursuit-worthiness of BSM models, since they must continually show off their problem-solving prowess to remain viable.
“Abandoning Models: When Non-Empirical Theory Assessment Ends” 7th Biennial European Philosophy of Science Association Conference, Geneva, Switzerland, September 2019, (Presented as “Beyond Experiment: Defining Problems in High-Energy Physics”)
“Abandoning Models: When Non-Empirical Theory Assessment Ends” 16th International Congress on Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science and Technology, Prague, Czech Republic, August 2019, (Presented as “Abandoning Models: Defining Problems in High-Energy Physics”)
Invited Talk “String Theory, Lakatos, and Laudan” Workshop: Non-Empirical Theory Assessment: How Far Does It Reach and Where Could It Stumble?, Stockholm, Sweden, June 2019
“String Theory, Methodology, and Normativity” The American Philosophical Association’s Central Division Meeting, Denver, CO, February 2019
“Model-Groups as Scientific Research Programmes” in Symposium “Models in High Energy Physics: Shaping the Face of Theory and Experiment” The Third International Conference of the German Society for Philosophy of Science (GWP.2019), Cologne, Germany, February 2019
Poster “Model-Groups as Scientific Research Programmes” The Philosophy of Science Association’s Biennial Meeting, Seattle, WA, November 2018
“Model-Groups as Scientific Research Programmes” The 19th UK and European Conference on Foundations of Physics, Utrecht, Netherlands, July 2018
“Model-Groups as Lakatosian Research Programmes” Models & Simulations 8, University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC, March 2018
“Doubt for Dawid’s Non-Empirical Theory Assessment” The Philosophy of Science Association’s Biennial Meeting, Atlanta, GA, November 2016
“Doubt for Dawid’s Non-Empirical Theory Assessment” The American Philosophical Association’s Pacific Division Meeting, San Francisco, CA, March/April 2016
Non-Empirical Modeling and Theorizing: Scientific Progress in Particle Physics
Particle physics (and other fundamental physics research, including searches for a theory of quantum gravity) faces a problem when it comes to acquiring experimental evidence. Many theories and models make predictions that cannot be tested with current, or even prospective technology. Yet these fields continue to develop, with new models and theories regularly being introduced, scrutinized, changed, and discarded. My project aims at examining the way theories and models are constructed, adapted, and assessed in fields that lack the empirical evidence that usually grounds such tasks. I will focus on two prominent examples: string theory and attempts to explain electroweak symmetry breaking beyond the standard model explanation provided by the Brout-Englert-Higgs mechanism. After a brief introduction to the physical and philosophical issues relevant to my arguments, I move on to the core chapters. First, I begin the task of constructing a new framework for understanding the dynamics of scientific change in particle physics by introducing a new concept, the model-group, in order to expand the methodology of scientific research programmes introduced by Imre Lakatos. I use two case studies from particle physics to motivate the use of Lakatosian research programmes. In the following chapter, unsatisfied by Lakatos’s account of scientific assessment, I modify his framework further by integrating it with Larry Laudan’s problem-solving conception of rational scientific growth. In the final chapter, I criticize one recent and noteworthy attempt to understand confirmation in the absence of experimental evidence, namely Richard Dawid’s non-empirical theory assessment scheme. I then conclude, discussing some possible future advancements and applications for my new hybrid framework of scientific progress.
Successfully defended July 3, 2019