Academic Articles

Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 

December 2021

State Accompli The Political Consolidation of the Islamic State Prior to the Caliphate.pdf

State Accompli: The Political Consolidation of the Islamic State Prior to the Caliphate

This study examines the successful consolidation of the Islamic State movement within the Sunni insurgency in Iraq from 2003 to 2014. We rely on insurgent media releases, captured documents, and a declassified U.S. military study of the Sunni insurgency in Anbar to evaluate the Islamic State movement’s complex relationship with its Sunni Arab rivals. We found the group moved through sequential stages of cooperative, competitive, and coercive consolidation to achieve hegemony in the insurgent field. Each phase of transition entailed organizational changes, including mergers, re-branding, and new structures. The movement’s well-developed ideology and state-building project distinguished it from peers whose political agendas were too diffuse to establish lasting coalitions. The tribal Awakening that worked with the Americans to temporarily defeat the Islamic State of Iraq also badly splintered its rivals and failed to prevent the revitalization of the Islamic State movement, setting the foundation for its short-lived caliphate project.

April 28, 2021   GW Program on Extremism:  The Department of Soldiers

Drawing on documents retrieved from northern Iraq as part of The ISIS Files project and other archival sources, this paper examines the Islamic State's Diwan al-Jund (Soldier's Department), exploring how the Islamic State managed its war department across its Iraqi and Syrian provinces. 

In 2020, the Islamic State changed tack on its branding efforts. After years of focusing its global media efforts on the activities of its enterprise in Syria and Iraq, 1 last year saw the group shift focus onto its pursuits in Sub-Saharan Africa more than anywhere else. 2 To be sure, it published more attack reports about the activities of its core in the Middle East (581 in Syria and 981 in Iraq, to be precise), but the lion’s share of its photo and video propaganda was devoted to the exploits of provincial franchises in the Lake Chad Basin and the Greater Sahara and, to a slightly lesser extent, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Mozambique. 3 Given that it also claimed on average five times as many confirmed kills and casualties per attack in West and Central Africa as were reported from either Syria or Iraq, it would appear that the caliphate’s expanded presence in Africa is not just window dressing.  

Accidental ethnographers: the Islamic State’s tribal engagement experiment 

By Craig Whiteside and Anas Elallame


Feb 2020

Abstract:  The disillusionment with U.S.-led counter insurgent efforts to gain a deeper understanding of social dynamics in countries with extensive tribal structures has led to a rejection of programs aimed to improve cultural competency. The Islamic State movement does not share this perception, and its strategists blamed its early failures during the U.S. occupation on a flawed understanding of tribal dynamics. This paper traces the political, ideological, and structural changes the leaders of the Islamic State movement made to adapt its approach toward the Sunni tribes of Iraq and later Syria, in order to develop a deeper base of popular support for its caliphate project. The group’s study of the tribes was done by a new tribal engagement office that put into motion an ethnographic study of tribal networks in key areas. There is evidence that the inspiration for this change came from its opponents. The Islamic State movement used these new insights to win a greater level of influence in rural areas, which in turn influenced its success in 2014. This research supports the idea that insurgency and counterinsurgency success often depend on which side is best at the incorporation of cultural and societal knowledge into policy and strategy. 

Abstract:  The terms in question and the concepts arising from them cause more harm than good, contributing to a dangerous distortion of the concepts of war, peace, and geopolitical competition, with a negative impact on U.S. and allied security strategy. 

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss1/4/ 

Black Ops: Islamic State and Innovation in Irregular Warfare


by Craig Whiteside, Ian Rice, Daniele Raineri

Black Ops: Islamic State and Innovation in Irregular Warfare


June 2019

Abstract:  This paper studies non-state militant group emulation and development of a special operation capability that stands in stark contrast to the normal repertoire of guerrilla and terror tactics. Building on evidence of one well-documented Islamic State attack in 2012 that fit many of the criteria of a special operation, we analyzed the mission using concepts from strategic studies to understand the decision-making behind it. We then expanded our search of Islamic State operational claims looking for other examples, in order to understand the scope and frequency of Islamic State special operations since 2006. We found solid evidence of at least three Islamic State special operations over a decade: Ramadi, Iraq (2007), Haditha, Iraq (2012), and Abu Ghraib/Taji, Iraq (2013). Using these insights, we present two key levers – leadership and propaganda - used by the Islamic State in the decision-making and centralized distribution of resources to invest in a special operations capability that produced outsized strategic effects. These findings contest the conventional wisdom of the future of insurgency as decentralized structures made up of loose, leaderless networks.

Nine Bullets for the Traitors, One for the Enemy: The Slogans and Strategy behind the Islamic State's Campaign to Defeat the Sunni Awakening (2006-2017) 


September 2018

Abstract:  The Islamic State is infamous for its sophisticated media campaigns, such as the one that inspired a large-scale migration of supporters to its so-called caliphate. Much less attention has been paid to its propaganda targeting local audiences, which tends to be more difficult to access and decipher. This case study examines a decade-long campaign to poison the use of the term “Sahwa” (Awakening), as part of a larger effort to discredit and delegitimize all future Sunni rivals of the Islamic State in the areas of its core caliphate and non-contiguous affiliates. Using primary sources, this paper traces the development of a strategy that skillfully integrated a long and patient campaign of subversion and terror operations with a consistent information campaign that reduced local support for Sahwa rivals and fueled the rise of the Islamic State’s caliphate. This information campaign displayed a skillful manipulation of emotional scripts – particularly that of the race traitor – to reshape identity construct among Sunni Iraqis, one that found strong appeal during a period of increased sectarian tensions after 2010. This paper builds on the work of International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague (ICCT) research scholars on the importance of in-group manipulation in extremist messaging as part of the larger Counter-Terrorism Strategic Communications Project.

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