Conference Description

The traditional view of concepts is that they are kinds of mental representations. On this view, the claim that “Concepts are K” can be reinterpreted as “Concepts are mental representations of the kind X,” where the placeholder X can be substituted by any viable representation (Komatsu, 1992; Laurence and Margolis, 1999). The representations postulated include, but are not limited to, prototypes, bundles of exemplars, theory-like structures of some sort, perceptual ‘proxytypes’, and unstructured atomic symbols (Carey, 1985; Fodor, 1994; Lakoff, 1987; Nosofsky, 1988; Osherson & Smith, 1981; Prinz, 2002; Rehder, 2003). Until recently, the debate in the literature has focused on which of these representations is best able to satisfy what is required – both empirically and methodologically – of a general theory of concepts in cognitive science (Laurence &Margolis, 1999; Murphy, 2002; Smith, Osherson, Rips, & Keane, 1988).

It has now become clear, however, that whilst each of the representations listed above has explanatory advantages in a particular domain, the data is too multifarious to be accounted for by any of these representations taken alone. As a result, it has been argued that no theory of concepts based exclusively on any one of these representations is viable. But if cognitive scientists are compelled to postulate a variety of different kinds of representations, then this casts doubt over role of “concept” as a theoretical term, because it is not clear what additional explanatory work “concept” would be doing in cognitive science. Thus, if we are to take seriously the results of empirical science, it is not clear why we should appeal to “concepts” at all. This is the explanationist challenge to the purpose and value of postulating “concept” as a theoretical term in cognitive science, which also extends to general scepticism about the purpose and value of developing a theory of concepts.

As a result of the explanationist challenge, there has been a widespread rejection of the view that a single all-encompassing – or “monolithic” – theory of concepts could be developed that would be able to account for all of the explananda of cognitive science. However, it remains unclear what should be done with “concept” as a theoretical term in cognitive science. At this time, two broad approaches to “concept” as a theoretical term have emerged: concept eliminativism (CE; Machery, 2005, 2006, 2009) and concept pluralism (CP; Weiskopf, 2007, 2009, 2010). According to CE, the theoretical term concept “should be eliminated from the theoretical apparatus” of cognitive science because “it fails to pick out a natural kind” (Machery, 2009, 241). According to CP, however, because “Prototypes, causal models, etc. all serve to represent categories in thought, have the capacity to be combined into larger structures, and all play a role in categorization,” they can all be subsumed within a pattern of generality that can itself be viewed as a higher-level – or superordinate – natural kind worthy of scientific classification (Weiskopf, 2009, 163).

In this conference, we will consider the impact that philosophical explanationism – and the explanationist challenge, more specifically – has had on debates about the role “concept” as a theoretical term and about theories of concepts more generally. We will focus in particular on the impasse between CE and CP to consider – and critically evaluate – the space of possible responses to the explanationist challenge. In particular, we will attempt to provide answer to the following questions: what is philosophical explanationism?; what impact does and should philosophical explanation and the explanationist challenge have on the practice and results of philosophy and (the philosophy of) cognitive science?; what motivates explanationist approaches to concepts – e.g. CE and CP?; how do explanationist approaches to concepts stand in relation to traditional theories of concepts?; how do explnantionist approaches to concepts stand in relation to the traditional distinction between conceptual and non-conceptual representations?; given the explanationist challenge, what role could “concept” have as a theoretical term in cognitive science? (Hampton, 2010); what reasons – aside from philosophical explanationism – could philosophers have for wanting to maintain or undermine the role of “concept” as a theoretical term in cognitive science or to develop or eschew theories of concepts?; what justification – if any – is there for these kinds of reasons?; and many more.

The aim of this conference is to bring together researchers from a range of (sub-)disciplines to consider questions of this kind. On the one hand, then, the conference aims to examine and compare the impact that philosophical explanationism is having on debates within the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of science about “concepts.” But, on the other hand, the conference aims to critically engage with explanationist approaches to “concepts” by comparing and contrasting them with their more entrenched counterparts; e.g. the classical theory of concepts or the theory theory of concepts. In this way, the conference aims to consider how – if at all – the adoption of explanationist approaches/perspectives has – and should – impact on debates in (sub-)disciplines that rely heavily on concepts as theoretical and/or practical tools. It is hoped, therefore, that by focusing on these new, explanationist approaches to concepts, the form and nature of theory construction in relevant (sub-)disciplines can be identified and evaluated as a means to identify the potential stumbling blocks to both disciplinary and interdisciplinary progress.