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Post-Doctoral Researcher
I am a microeconomist specializing in decision theory and social choice theory, with a particular focus on incorporating insights from psychology and behavioral sciences into formal economic models. My research explores the implications of these insights for decision-making at both individual and collective levels, aiming to bridge gaps between theoretical models and real-world behavior. As a passionate educator, I am dedicated to cultivating critical thinking and intellectual curiosity through interactive, student-centered teaching methods.
I currently hold a position of postdoctoral researcher at the Department of Economics and Management at KIT. I am on the 2024/2025 academic Job Market.
Working Papers
Planning to Self-Control (Job Market Paper)
Ask about Reasons or Results? Epistemic Judgment Aggregation with Correlated Voters
Arrovian Aggregation of Choice Functions (with Clemens Puppe)
Publications
Consistent Rights on Property Spaces, Journal of Economic Theory 197 (2021): 105323.Â
Work in Progress
Embedded Leverage Premia
Abstract: Investors can obtain leverage on a financial asset on two ways: (i) They can buy the underlying and borrow against it as collateral. (ii) They can buy a call option on the underlying - a derivative security that is itself a levered version of the underlying. That is, investors build up leverage externally or buy securities that have leverage embedded. Buying stock (a call option on the firm's total assets) allows investors to obtain a leveraged position in the firm's total assets. Thus, investors who want to do so but are constrained in their ability to obtain external leverage will pay a premium for stocks that offer higher embedded leverage. As a consequence, two firms with identical assets but different capital structure trade at different prices.
Optimal Savings Behavior with a Fixed Cost of Self-Control (with Mert Ergin)
Abstract: We quantitatively study individual savings behavior in a simple infinite-horizon problem with a fixed cost of self-control. We assume that decision makers suffer from present bias unless exerting costly self-control to overcome it. For a range of parameters we obtain that optimal savings behavior produces a poverty trap. Decision makers with intial wealth above a critical threshold exert self-control to save sufficiently while less wealthy decision makers forego self-control and under-save.
Contact: claudio.kretz@gmail.com
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