Abstract: Psychological game theory can contribute to renew the analysis of unethical behavior by providing insights on the nature of the moral costs of dishonesty. We investigate the moral costs of embezzlement in situations where donors need intermediaries to transfer their donations to recipients and where donations can be embezzled before they reach the recipients. We design a novel three-player Embezzlement Mini-Game to study whether intermediaries in the laboratory suffer from guilt aversion and whether guilt aversion affects the decision to embezzle. We show that the proportion of guilt-averse intermediaries is the same irrespective of the direction of guilt and guilt aversion reduces embezzlement. Structural estimates indicate no difference in the effect of guilt aversion toward the donor and toward the recipient on intermediaries’ behavior. This is striking as embezzlement affects the earnings of the recipient but not those of the donor. It shows that guilt aversion matters even when decisions have no direct monetary consequences. 

Abstract: We investigate whether players' guilt aversion is modulated by their co-players vulnerability. In new variations of a three-player Trust game, we manipulate payoff-vulnerability and endowment-vulnerability. The former (standard) vulnerability arises when a player's material payoff depends on another player's action. The latter arises when a player's initial endowment is entrusted to another player. Treatments vary whether trustees can condition their decision on the belief of a co-player who is payoff-vulnerable and/or endowment-vulnerable, or not vulnerable at all, and the decision rights of the vulnerable player. We find that trustees' guilt aversion is insensitive to both the dimension of the co-player's vulnerability and the decision rights of the co-player. Guilt is activated even absent the vulnerability of their co-players. Rather, players' guilt is triggered by the willingness to respond to their co-player's beliefs on their strategy.

Abstract: Pro-social individuals face a trade-off between their monetary and moral motives. Hence, they may be tempted to exploit the uncertainty in their decision environment in order to reconcile this trade-off. In this paper, we investigate whether individuals with belief-dependent preferences avoid the monetary cost of behaving according to their moral standards by strategically acquiring information about others' expectations. We test the predictions of an information acquisition model in an online experiment. We use a modified trust-game in which we introduce uncertainty about the second movers' beliefs about first-movers' expectations. Our design enables to (i) identify participants with belief-based preferences and (ii) investigate their information acquisition strategy. Consistent with our predictions of subjective preferences, we find that most individuals classified as belief-dependent strategically select their source of information to avoid the cost of their conscience. 

Preliminary abstract: In this project, we investigate whether ingroup favoritism among children can be driven by guilt-aversion. A guilt-averse individual avoids disappointing others’ expectations. In a group context, if the decision-maker (DM) believes that ingroup members expect more pro-sociality from him than outgroup members, then the DM will discriminate in favor of ingroup members to fulfill their expectations (but not necessarily because he prefers them or because he believes it will lead to further benefit from him). We intend to provide further evidence on the role of second-order beliefs in ingroup favoritism. However, our main contribution is derived from our non-traditional participants pool which is composed of school children from age 7 to 11 years old. Previous research with children has often shown that ingroup favoritism increases with age (e.g., Fehr, 2008; Guroglu et al., 2014; Yu et al., 2016). If our account on the role of guilt aversion is relevant, findings should reveal that ingroup favoritism is linked to the development of understanding of second-order beliefs and of social perspective-taking more generally. To test this hypothesis, we measure– not only donation behaviors – but also beliefs and theory-of-mind skills.

Preliminary abstract: This project investigates whether individuals use information complexity as an excuse to avoid self-threatening information (i.e., information which can affect negatively how an individual perceive him-/herself) in the context of environmental consumption .

Preliminary abstract: This projects aims to study whether environmental behavior and environmental attitudes differ among age groups. To compare environmental behavior, we will observe the choices of younger adults (18 to 35) and older adults (aged 65 to 80) in the Work for Environmental Protection task (WEPT) and their environmental attitudes as measured by the New Environmental Paradigm scale. 

Abstract: Si les Français portent un grand intérêt aux questions économiques, ils déclarent également avoir de grandes difficultés à comprendre les informations économiques diffusées par les médias. Les résultats de notre enquête montrent que ces difficultés de compréhension nuisent non seulement au niveau d’intérêt, mais également à la confiance, accordés aux intervenants. Ils suggèrent également que cette défiance envers les médias et les intervenants est particulièrement forte chez les jeunes et les moins diplômés, lorsqu’ils sont confrontés à une information économique perçue comme incompréhensible. Les résultats de notre enquête soulignent enfin que les Français sont demandeurs de plus de pédagogie et prêts à faire des efforts pour comprendre les grands enjeux économiques actuels.

Abstract: L'Université de Lyon a décerné le prix de docteur honoris causa à Vernon Smith, lauréat du Prix Nobel de sciences économiques en 2002. L'occasion de dresser le portrait de celui qui a donné ses lettres de noblesse à la méthode expérimentale en économie.