Abstract: Pro-social individuals face a trade-off between their monetary and moral motives. Hence, they may be tempted to exploit the uncertainty in their decision environment in order to reconcile this trade-off. In this paper, we investigate whether individuals with belief-dependent preferences avoid the monetary cost of behaving according to their moral standards by strategically acquiring information about others' expectations. We test the predictions of an information acquisition model in an online experiment. We use a modified trust-game in which we introduce uncertainty about the second movers' beliefs about first-movers' expectations. Our design enables to (i) identify participants with belief-based preferences and (ii) investigate their information acquisition strategy. Consistent with our predictions of subjective preferences, we find that most individuals classified as belief-dependent strategically select their source of information to avoid the cost of their conscience. 

Abstract: We investigate whether players' guilt aversion is modulated by their co-players vulnerability. In new variations of a three-player Trust game, we manipulate payoff-vulnerability and endowment-vulnerability. The former (standard) vulnerability arises when a player's material payoff depends on another player's action. The latter arises when a player's initial endowment is entrusted to another player. Treatments vary whether trustees can condition their decision on the belief of a co-player who is payoff-vulnerable and/or endowment-vulnerable, or not vulnerable at all, and the decision rights of the vulnerable player. We find that trustees' guilt aversion is insensitive to both the dimension of the co-player's vulnerability and the decision rights of the co-player. Guilt is activated even absent the vulnerability of their co-players. Rather, players' guilt is triggered by the willingness to respond to their co-player's beliefs on their strategy.

Abstract: Psychological game theory can contribute to renew the analysis of unethical behavior by providing insights on the nature of the moral costs of dishonesty. We investigate the moral costs of embezzlement in situations where donors need intermediaries to transfer their donations to recipients and where donations can be embezzled before they reach the recipients. We design a novel three-player Embezzlement Mini-Game to study whether intermediaries in the laboratory suffer from guilt aversion and whether guilt aversion affects the decision to embezzle. We show that the proportion of guilt-averse intermediaries is the same irrespective of the direction of guilt and guilt aversion reduces embezzlement. Structural estimates indicate no difference in the effect of guilt aversion toward the donor and toward the recipient on intermediaries’ behavior. This is striking as embezzlement affects the earnings of the recipient but not those of the donor. It shows that guilt aversion matters even when decisions have no direct monetary consequences. 

Abstract: Ingroup favoritism has been extensively documented in adults and its underlying mechanisms are debated. In children however, while the existence of the bias is documented, its driving forces remain largely unexplored. This study fills this gap by investigating ingroup favoritism in 7- to 11-year-old children, focusing on intrinsic preferences and guilt aversion. Employing a series of dictator games in which children allocated resources to ingroup or outgroup peers under varying conditions of recipient awareness, we assessed both their allocation behaviors and second-order beliefs about recipients' expectations. Our results reveal a clear ingroup favoritism in allocations. Both correlational and causal analyses suggest that – although intrinsic preferences play a role – ingroup favoritism is significantly influenced by children's beliefs about recipients' expectations and more so as children get older. 

Abstract: This study examines the pro-environmental attitudes and behaviors of individuals across different age groups. We compare young adults with older adults in an online experiment with German participants. We use an incentivized task - the Work for Environment Protection task (WEPT) - to measure environmental behavior. We find that compared to younger adults, older adults are more concerned and less skeptical about climate change. Older adults also exhibit significantly more pro-environmental behavior, reflected in higher participation in tasks associated with donations to an environmental organization. These results highlight the need to develop strategies to improve support for environmental policies specifically targeted to different age groups.

Preliminary abstract: This paper investigates whether individuals use information complexity as an excuse to remain ignorant to behave selfishly.  We study this question in a context where individuals face a trade-off between their monetary payoff and their pro-environmental preferences. We propose that individuals use information complexity as an excuse to make self-serving mistakes, which allow them to behave more selfishly without compromising their pro-environmental image. To test this idea, we conducted an online experiment in which we varied (i) the complexity of the information regarding the environmental impact of a donation and (ii) whether there is a trade-off between participants' selfish motives and pro-environmental preferences. In line with our hypothesis, we found that participants make more mistakes when information is complex, but even more so when there is a trade-off between their monetary payoff and their pro-environmental preferences. Our findings suggest that pro-environmental individuals do `play dumb' when doing so gives them an excuse to behave more selfishly without compromising their image.

Preliminary Abstract:   Charitable fundraising takes place in an increasingly competitive landscape, spurring interest in innovative fundraising mechanisms such as performance-based pledges (PBPs), where donors give a fixed amount each time a specific event occurs. Despite PBPs being pervasive, their effectiveness relative to traditional one-off donations has not been systematically tested. To address this gap, we conducted two pre-registered online experiments tied to real sporting events and complemented them with data from an independent campaign. We found that PBPs are a viable alternative to traditional one-off donations, as they do not reduce donors' participation and are preferred by a meaningful share of donors when offered alongside standard options. Further, our data highlight that PBPs potential is best exploited when targeted towards audiences engaged with sports betting or when implemented repeatedly to mitigate the risk inherent to these mechanisms. Taken together, these results suggest that PBPs can be a promising low-cost fundraising strategy for charities.

Abstract: Si les Français portent un grand intérêt aux questions économiques, ils déclarent également avoir de grandes difficultés à comprendre les informations économiques diffusées par les médias. Les résultats de notre enquête montrent que ces difficultés de compréhension nuisent non seulement au niveau d’intérêt, mais également à la confiance, accordés aux intervenants. Ils suggèrent également que cette défiance envers les médias et les intervenants est particulièrement forte chez les jeunes et les moins diplômés, lorsqu’ils sont confrontés à une information économique perçue comme incompréhensible. Les résultats de notre enquête soulignent enfin que les Français sont demandeurs de plus de pédagogie et prêts à faire des efforts pour comprendre les grands enjeux économiques actuels.

Abstract: L'Université de Lyon a décerné le prix de docteur honoris causa à Vernon Smith, lauréat du Prix Nobel de sciences économiques en 2002. L'occasion de dresser le portrait de celui qui a donné ses lettres de noblesse à la méthode expérimentale en économie.