Research

Research Interests

Microeconomic Theory; Game Theory; Experimental and Behavioral Economics; Networks; Contests; Public Goods

Publications

1. Brown, Christopher L. (2024). Team production in endogenous networks. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 217, 560-580.

2. Brown, Christopher L., and Kosovich, Stephen M. (2015). The Impact of Professor Reputation and Section Attributes on Student Course Selection. Research in Higher Education, 56 (5), 496-509. 

Working Papers

1. Local Inequality and Own Rank Preferences (with Tim Cason), Conditionally Accepted at Experimental Economics

   • Abstract: Support for redistributive policies may depend on individuals’ location in the income distribution, and relative performance evaluation is common in many organizations. We report a lab experiment to study subjects’ preferences over their ordinal rank in an earnings distribution. Following an assignment of unequal earnings, subjects can select a monetary transfer from exactly one individual to another, not including themselves. This can change their own position in the distribution, as well as influence overall inequality. The experiment varies whether the initial earnings assignment is random or is affected by preliminary competition. It also varies the reference group from a complete to a partial network. A majority of transfers reduce inequality by moving earnings from those with the highest rank to the lowest rank in the distribution. Rank-improving transfers are substantially more common for preliminary competition losers than winners. Transfers to individuals outside of the reference group are not uncommon, and they usually target as the source the individuals high in the income distribution. While generally weak overall, own rank preferences appear to be more common among men than women.

2. Local Public Goods in Dynamic Networks

   • Abstract: This study examines the relationship between choices, outcomes, and network dynamics in a repeated network public goods game where the network structure can endogenously evolve over time. The main theoretical results demonstrate that prolonged coordinated play to an efficient profile can be supported as part of a subgame perfect equilibrium on fixed regular networks, and in the dynamic network case, groups may be able to achieve higher welfare by establishing additional links to increase externality flows. The results of a laboratory experiment reveal a pattern of play largely consistent with cooperative play of efficient profiles, with many groups simultaneously forming complete networks. Overall, network dynamics suggest that groups use network revision opportunities to pursue higher potential welfare, but individuals also systematically respond to environmental factors and the recent history of play when making decisions about whether to change the status of their relationship with other group members.

3. Network-Dependent Externalities in Contests (with Luke Boosey)

   • Note: Previously circulated under the title "Network Contest Games"

   • Abstract: This paper considers a model of contests in which players have general preferences over the allocation of a valuable prize. We examine the impact of identity-dependent externalities, represented by a network of payoff spillovers, on competitive behavior in Tullock (1980) contests. The model defines a novel network contest game for which we establish existence and sufficient conditions for uniqueness of Nash equilibria, for any weighted (undirected) network with heterogeneous links. Our uniqueness result provides a novel adaptation and extension of well-known results for network games with linear best reply functions to the network contest game, which features non-linear best replies. We also provide specific characterizations and illustrations of equilibria for more tractable cases involving networks with homogenous links and networks with heterogeneous links, but homogenous node strengths. Variations in the network structure and the nature of the externalities have intuitive consequences for equilibrium investment. In general, the presence of positive externalities introduces free-riding incentives, whereas negative externalities intensify competition, especially among highly connected agents.

4. Contests with network-based externalities: Experimental evidence (with Luke Boosey)

   • Abstract: We report the findings of a laboratory experiment studying behavior in all-pay Tullock (1980) contests with network-based externalities. We test the predictions of a model in which the prize generates payoff externalities for losing contestants connected to the winner, by systematically varying the network structure and introducing either positive or negative externalities. The data provide robust support for the comparative static predictions of the model, although we also observe considerable over-investment relative to equilibrium predictions. Closer inspection of the observed patterns of over-investment suggests that behavior may be driven by heterogeneous joy of winning and social efficiency concerns.