Christopher J W Candreva

christopher.candreva@uta.edu

Current Projects:

"Multi-Media Learning and Experimental Instructions"

Abstract: "This paper examines the influence of pre-experiment tasks on subject understanding. It used a 2x2 design varying the type of instructions and whether or not the pre-experiment quiz was incentivized. The Standard instructions were written closely replicate instructions used in prior economics experiments. The other was written using techniques from the Multi-Media Learning literature, which aims to find ways to maximize subject understanding from instruction. After the pre-experiment procedures, subjects participated in ten modified Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) selling markets with induced valuations. Neither Multi-Media Learning Instructions nor an Incentivized pre-experiment quiz were found to increase subject understanding of the BDM mechanism." R&R with JESA. Example instructions can be found here for Multi-Media Learning and here for Standard instructions.

"Risk and Repeated Games: Is Random Termination a Reasonable Proxy for Discounting?"

Abstract: "This paper looks to see if departures from risk neutrality cause subjects to behave differently in randomly terminated supergames compared to infinitely discounted supergames. I show that if subjects have a strictly monotonic utility function, and that utility function is applied to their entire income stream instead of their period by period earnings, then the critical discount factor, δ ∗ , needed to support cooperation in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma differs between discounted and randomly terminated supergames as subjects become more risk averse/seeking. I then take this theoretical result into the lab where I have subjects play randomly terminated supergames and supergames featuring discounted payoffs over an "infinite" time horizon using a unique experimental design. This design allows subjects to opt out of continuing to play the discounted supergames and instead receive a continuation payoff as compensation for every period of the supergame they choose not to play. The lab results show that there is no statistically significant difference between what actions subjects chose to play in randomly terminated supergames and those they chose to play in discounted supergames, even when their risk attitude is controlled for. Simple, two period patterns of stage game outcomes are more likely to emerge in discounted supergames than they are in randomly terminated supergames." Draft available at ssrn.

"Long Horizon Repeated Games: How Does Ending Rule Affect Decisions in High δ Games"

Abstract: "This paper looks to see if subjects approach long, indefinitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma games featuring discounted payoffs, with an option to opt out, differently from how they approach long, indefinitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma games that are randomly terminated. I show under relatively general assumptions that the critical δ ∗ -value, above which cooperation can be supported as a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium, differs between the two environments. A between-subject design with δ = 0.98 was used to determine if subject behavior did vary by treatment type. First period and all period cooperation rates were found to be higher in the random termination treatment compared to the discounted treatment. The evolution of cooperation across supergames also differed between the two treatments, where behavior in the discounted treatment did not follow the patterns typically observed in the literature. Lastly, the Strategy Frequency Estimation Method (SFEM) was used to determine whether or not subjects in different treatments used different repeated game strategies. I find that subjects in the discounted treatment were more likely to play strategies that defect initially (All D, STFT), but cooperative subjects in this treatment tended to play more forgiving strategies (TFT, STFT, TF2T). Conversely, subjects in the randomly terminated treatment tended to play more initially cooperative, yet less forgiving strategies (Grim, Grim2)."Draft available at ssrn.

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