Abstract: This paper studies how central governments can deter secessionist movements by changing the decision structure of independence votes. Secession clauses — which promise to allow secession whenever a region likes — deter secession by making the decision to remain day-to-day rather than once-and-for-all, as is the case under a single vote. Surprisingly, the optimal decision structure from the government’s perspective follows an alternating pattern: provide a once-and-for-all vote when the region’s desire to secede is high or low, provide a clause when the desire is intermediate, and costly waiting in between. Greater pro-independence conflict, government instability, and uncertainty about the future benefits of secession can all contribute to the introduction of a secession clause. The impact of secession clauses on stability of a union is ambiguous: allowing clauses (c.f. prohibiting them) increases the probability that secession eventually occurs, but can still improve the stability of the union in the sense of the union being longer-lived. The analysis highlights the surprising potential of secession clauses as deterrents.

Abstract: Rising polarisation heightens concerns about politicising regulatory agencies, prompting reassessment of the accountability–independence trade-off. We study whether perceived out-group oversight affects trust in regulation and market behaviour. Using US television transcripts, we show that media link agencies with presidents. We then conduct a field experiment (N=5,566) using a case where the EPA endorsed antibiotic spraying on citrus crops during both Trump’s and Biden’s presidencies. Holding science constant, out-group oversight reduces support for spraying by 26%, lowers trust in EPA’s evaluation, and increases donations to an opposing NGO by 15%. In an obfuscated follow-up, citrus demand is unchanged, but effects differ by consumption habits.