Research

   Publications:

1.  Do Central Bankers’ Characteristics Matter for Africa? Ethnic Favoritism, Fractionalization, and Inflation with Constant Yayi. International Review of Financial Analysis. Volume 94, July 2024, 103256. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2024.103256

2. Selecting Finance Ministers: Key Characteristics Shaping Government Debt in Africa. International Review of Economics and Finance. Volume 93, Part A, June 2024, Pages 736-757. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.iref.2024.03.034

3. Strong, C. & Gapka, L. (2023). Crisis Babies: Inflation Experiences and the Probability of an Electoral Cycle. Finance Research Letters.  Volume 58, Part D. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2023.104657

4. Strong, C. (2023). Conditional Political Cycles in Africa: Myth or Reality? Accepted at Journal of African Economies. DOI: 10.1093/jae/ejad019 

5. Keen, B. & Strong, C. (2023). Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy in a Model with Government Corruption. Finance Research Letters. Volume 58, Part B. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2023.104435

6. Strong, C. (2023). The Effect of Fiscal Rules on Government Debt: Evidence from the CFA Zone. Empirical Economics. Volume 65, pages 2357–239. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00181-023-02430-w

7. Strong, C. & Yayi, C. (2023). Political Affiliation, Central Bankers’ Characteristics, and Government Debt: Evidence from Africa. International Review of Finance and Economics. Volume 85, pages 603-620.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.iref.2023.02.016

8. Strong, C. (2022). What Type of Central Banker Dampens the Political Business Cycle? The Case of Africa. 

   Forthcoming at the International Journal of Finance and Economics. http://doi.org/10.1002/ijfe.2769

9. Strong, C. (2023). Tying one’s hand: The effect of Fiscal Rules on the Political Business Cycle in Africa. Journal of African Economies. Volume 32, Issue 4, pages 438–467.

https://doi.org/10.1093/jae/ejac014 

10. Strong, C. & Yayi, C. (2021). Central Bank Independence, Fiscal Dominance and Government Debt: Lessons from Africa with Constant Yayi. 

   Journal of Macroeconomics. Volume 68, 103313.  https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmacro.2021.103313.

11. Strong, C. (2021). Political Influence, Central Bank Independence and Inflation in Africa: A Comparative Analysis.  

  European Journal of Political Economy. Volume 69, 102004. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2021.102004.

12. Strong, C. (2022). Do Commodity Price Shocks Affect the Probability of a Central Bank Governor’s Removal? 

  International Journal of Finance and Economics. Volume 27, Issue 2, p.1443-1460.  https://doi.org/10.1002/ijfe.2224

13. Strong, C. (2021). Did Mali Benefit from Joining the CFA Zone? An Analysis Using the Synthetic Control Method. 

  Review of Development Economics. Volume 25, Issue 2,  p.931-955.  https://doi.org/10.1111/rode.12733.

   Current Manuscripts Under Review and Research in Progress:

1. What Role do Finance Ministers Play in Political Business Cycles? Evidence based on a New Dataset. Revise and Resubmit.

2.  The Political Economy of African Currency Unions: Evidence from a Time-Inconsistent Model with Benjamin Keen. Under review.

3. Forging Monetary Hawks: Early-Life Inflation Experiences and Government Debt in Africa. Under review. 

4. Early-Life Currency Crises and Exchange Rate Pass-Through:  Understanding the Impact of Central Bankers’ Formative Years in Africa. With Lewis Gapka. Under review. 

5. The Political Economy of Central Bank Independence, Inflation and Economic Growth: Evidence from Africa. Working Paper.

6. Past Inflations, Current Decisions: How Central Bankers' Formative Years Influence Monetary Policy Preferences in Africa. With Benjamin Keen. Working Paper.